The fighting stopped in 1975 with Hanois victory. But the battle for the hearts and minds of the American people continued and was propelled by politicians manipulating the mythical cause of POWs/MIAs. Postwar movies filled out the scenario of a war lost because of poor leadership in Washington combined with the baleful influence of the anti-war movement. Presidents wrestled with the legacy of Vietnam, including the controversy over the national Vietnam Memorial. Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter both attempted to move the nation beyond the grasp of the Vietnam Specter. Both failed. Ronald Reagan used it to help him win the presidency in 1980, after the debacle that followed the occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran, which only seemed to emphasize the nations lost claims to world leadership after Vietnam. George H. W. Bush claimed that it had been buried in the sands of Iraq after the rapid victory in Gulf War I. Bill Clinton succeeded in establishing diplomatic and economic relations with Vietnam. But it re-emerged with renewed force during the Second Gulf War and the never-ending war in Afghanistan. Even today it shapes much thinking about military interventionism.

Chapter 3 establishes the nexus between South African policies on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and their defiance thereof, and the continued parallel development of nuclear weapons. Drawing on recently declassified documents, I trace the national position of the South African government on NPT accession and the application of IAEA safeguards over the 1980s. Most importantly, the focus lies on domestic decision-making and how a small number of people in the South African government decided whether to sign the NPT. This also includes a careful analysis of Pretoria’s relations with the US government under President Ronald Reagan and related exchanges with the IAEA Secretariat under its Director-General Hans Blix, developing in parallel over the period from 1981 to 1988.

A brief history of the university, from Oxford and Cambridge to Harvard and Columbia, then from the University of Virginia to the University of California. The chapter focuses on the Morrill Act of 1862 (known also as the Land Grant Act) and on the influence of the German research university in the late nineteenth century. Considers the analysis of Laurence Veysey that the university was in some respects “incoherent” from the late nineteenth century on, given the competing constituencies made up of faculty, students, and alumni. Traces the twentieth-century history of the American university, especially the role of federal funding for research, the GI Bill after World War II, and then the Master Plan forged between Clark Kerr, President of the University of California, and Pat Brown, Governor of California, in 1960.

This chapter argues that the presidency of Lyndon Johnson remade Cold War conservatism in the mid to late 1960s. Rather than a movement defined by the political candidacy of Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater, the right cut its political teeth in opposition to President Johnson, growing savvier, more politically effective, and more ideological complex as it defined itself against the Great Society and the revitalized Cold War liberalism of the Johnson administration. In particular, Cold War conservatism took a populist turn, as the right navigated the majoritarian politics of the civil rights era and the popularity of more heterodox conservative figures like Alabama Governor George Wallace, who, while not a movement conservative, appealed to the same base that the right hoped to harness in national politics. After examining the emergence of Cold War conservatism and Senator Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign, the chapter then focuses on the ways conservative activists sought to counter, coopt, and contain Johnson’s presidency, ultimately developing the political coalition that would lead to the election of Ronald Reagan.

During the 1960s, the effects of the Cuban Revolution – especially in terms of support for guerrilla warfare against U.S. allies – became all too evident, and the United States pursued interventionism with new vigor. This renewed use of power included economic and diplomatic pressures, veiled threats, covert operations, and even invasion. U.S. officials framed the Cold War as a valiant struggle to protect freedom in the hemisphere, and the cases of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Guatemala epitomized the lengths to which the United States would go to fight what it considered to be security threats. In Latin America, many elites supported U.S. policy, but a growing undercurrent of discontent also emerged, which pushed for negotiated conclusions to war and protested against the treatment of so many citizens caught in the middle. They did not share the notion that leftist or even Marxist governments necessarily constituted a threat to national security and global order. This chapter ends with a discussion of the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989.

The great recognition that Griffith’s translation received outside the sinological community completely shifted the place of Sunzi in the West. The coincidence of Griffith’s credibility as a marine with experience of China, the success of the Chinese Communists under Mao Zedong in the Chinese Civil War, and the more general rise of China as a major, and revolutionary, power, all made the Sunzi important in the West as it had never been before. The Western interpretation of Sunzi started from Griffith and Liddell Hart’s perspective, and was then influenced by the marketing of the work, by its perceived value in military education, and its use as a window into Chinese strategic culture. Griffith and everyone who followed him claimed that as a classic work of Chinese strategy it offered both profound strategic wisdom and insight into Chinese behavior. As a strategic work, a number of military and political leaders in the West called for it to be included into the curricula of military academies and officer training. And, absent any real knowledge of Chinese military history and strategic culture, the Sunzi could be substituted for a fully informed expert.

The two decades from 1969 marked the tightening of Israel–US strategic ties. With the Cold War becoming more and more predominant in the America view of the Arab–Israeli conflict, American presidents, from Richard Nixon to Ronald Reagan, justified the tightening strategic relations between the two nations in the role Israel would ostensibly play in the defence of the Middle East against Soviet expansion. It did not really matter that Israel would not play that role; for Israel, the idealism that was prevalent in the relations between the two nations was not solid enough, and Israeli leaders gladly recited the Cold War rhetoric in their communication with American officials. Visually, the Arab–Israel conflict played a significant role in the conduct of the relations between the two countries, from the attempts to deal with the consequences of the 1967 June War to the 1982 Lebanon War. These, though, were only a minor irritation in what became deeper and closer ties, encompassing economic and industrial ties, the deepening of cultural connections and intensification of strategic cooperation, mainly in intelligence sharing and development of technologies.

History remembers Ronald Reagan as the ultimate hard-liner, whose campaign of maximum pressure across domains brought down the Soviet Union. But there was more to the fortieth president’s approach to the Soviet Union than that: As much as he went on the offensive, he also advocated for sustained engagement with Soviet leaders. US foreign policy in the 1980s, thus, was every bit as much carrot as it was stick; and it offers a host of lessons about dealing with a resurgent and intransigent Russia today. This chapter will examine the core tenets of Reagan’s grand strategy, and what they — and their successes and failures — can tell us about the way forward in US foreign policy today.

Fierce partisan conflict in the United States is not new. Throughout American history, there have been polarizing struggles over fundamental questions relating to the meaning of the Declaration, the Constitution, and the relationship between the two. These struggles over ideals have become all encompassing when joined to battles over what it means to be an American – conflicts that have become more regular and dangerous with the rise of the administrative state. The idea of a “State” cuts more deeply than suggested by Max Weber’s definition of “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” Beyond the powers of government, the State represents a centralizing ambition (at least for progressive reformers) to cultivate, or impose, a vision of citizenship. In Randolph Bourne’s words, the State is a “concept of power” that comes alive in defense of or in conflict with an ideal of how such foundational values of Americanism as “free and enlightened” are to be interpreted and enforced. The ideal is symbolized not by the Declaration and the Constitution but rather in rallying emblems such as the flag and Uncle Sam.

After 444 days in captivity, the Iranians finally release the hostages in Iran on the same day Ronald Reagan is inaugurated president – a final insult to the hated Jimmy Carter. Despite this initial positive step, the 1980s turn out to be a low-point in the relationship. Hoping to capitalize on the chaos of the revolution and regain oil-rich provinces ceded to the Shah a decade earlier, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein invades Iran and sparks an eight-year war of attrition at tremendous cost to both sides. Incensed at the lackluster response from the West over the invasion and the use of chemical weapons, Iran further isolated itself from the US and sought alternative means of promoting its interests, chief among them the spread of revolution through the region. Iranian support for Shia militant groups, especially Hezbollah in Lebanon, in turn outraged Reagan and his team, as Americans became key targets for kidnapping and terrorist attacks. Despite the mutual enmity, the two countries maintained some forms of communication, however ineffective. The greatest consequence of this, however, was the Iran-Contra Affair, which nearly brought down the Reagan White House.

This chapter analyzes the political debates in the United States about arms sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia in the late 1970s and early 1980s. When the United States “lost Iran” in 1979, the presidential administrations of Jimmy Carter and then Ronald Reagan identified regional instability as a threat to the security of the oil-rich Persian Gulf and “global economic health.” Both administrations turned to arms sales as a means to secure alliances in the face of American vulnerability. In this context, the burgeoning military sales relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia arrived through an Iranian workshop. Congressional debates about the sale of fighter jets and AWACS to both nations, as well as the corporate lobbying of the Bechtel Corporation, reveal important logical columns in this shift to a more aggressive foreign policy based on military relationships: the link between economic growth and US Cold War legitimacy, the importance of military sales to the US domestic economy, and the crucial place of weapons transfers in good relations with the ruling monarchies in Iran and then Saudi Arabia. When it came to the regional security of the Middle East and secure flows of its oil, this was the time when military force began to become the premier instrument of US diplomacy for a new global age.

This chapter analyzes a symbolic politics of 1980shuman rights discourses by focusing on the place Poland and Chile had in global debates on human rights. In particular, it shows how these two countries featured in three different debates: First, the chapter reconstructs debates at the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1982 to show how the Reagan administration tried to turn the situation in Poland, where martial law had been imposed in 1981, into a symbolic counterweight to Chile, a country that had come to encapsulate the human rights discourse of actors and movements critical of US policies in Latin America. Second, this chapter shows how Polish and Chilean activists themselves struck an alliance to increase the international salience of their causes and thus mobilize international support. Third, this chapter shows how these debates on human rights in Poland and Chile intersected with US debates about neoliberal economic policies.

This chapter focuses on the strong support Poland’s Solidarity movement received from the USA’s largest trade union, the AFL-CIO. At least partly, this chapter shows, the AFL-CIO’s strong advocacy for Solidarity has to be seen within US political debates triggered by the election of Ronald Reagan. In Reagan’s rhetoric, Communist totalitarianism came to denote only the most extreme form of the general threat of the modern state to silently encroach on the lives of individuals. Even as he revived the ideological Cold War, Reagan went on to reshape the social imagery underpinning it – a change that entailed curbing the power of organized labor. Against this background, Solidarity fascinated the AFL-CIO not primarily as an anti-Communist movement, but as a trade union. As Reagan reduced the influence of trade unions, the AFL-CIO invoked Solidarity to argue that it was not human rights as such that expressed the difference between East and West, but a particular human right – freedom of association. In the United States, the chapter demonstrates, Solidarity became a contested icon in a political and intellectual struggle initiated not by different foreign policy aims – in this field, the AFL-CIO agreed with Reagan – but by a reconfiguration of the normative and conceptual world of US politics.

Chapter 8 examines the Cold War during 1984, a presidential election year. It featured a dramatic shift in US foreign policy, as the need to avert a major crisis conjoined with domestic imperatives. The pragmatists grasped the symbiosis. If his ambition of reducing nuclear arms was to be realized, Reagan would need to win a second term. His immediate political interests would be served by forging a more flexible, constructive approach with Moscow. Reagan would now emphasize the peaceful side of “peace through strength” – a candidate who could be peacemaker and statesman. The chapter provides in-depth analysis of Reagan’s move toward the center. A string of new US initiatives were undertaken without any Soviet movement: Reagan’s conciliatory address on US–Soviet relations; the pursuit of new agreements with Moscow (diplomatic and military); the reversal of Carter’s 1980 sanctions; and a White House invitation to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Although these events did not yield a major diplomatic breakthrough, 1984 witnessed a thaw in US–Soviet relations, in which the sense of fear, paranoia, and distrust were eased. Orwellian scenarios did not come to pass.

The epilogue provides an overview of the end of the Cold War. It discusses the Reagan–Gorbachev relationship, their efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons at a remarkable summit in Reykjavik (1986), and the INF Treaty of 1987. The chapter analyzes the reasons for the end of the Cold War and the change in Soviet policy. I argue that although SDI was an important part in Soviet thinking, the key changes effected from 1989 were primarily the result of factors originating in the USSR and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. These were factors largely (but not entirely) independent of the policies pursued by US administrations. They include Gorbachev’s own evolving predilections (reinforced by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster); Soviet high politics; long-term structural problems besetting the Soviet economy; the role of non-state actors; and the courageous efforts of citizens and peace groups across Eastern Europe. The epilogue concludes by highlighting the foreign policy turns of Carter and Reagan, and their significance for the Cold War. I argue that only by examining the full landscape – international and domestic – can we truly understand how US foreign policy is crafted.

Chapter 6 covers the first three months of 1983, which featured several important developments. By the mid-point of his first term, Reagan was facing a political crisis: an economic recession, a nationwide nuclear freeze movement, sagging approval ratings, heavy defeats in the midterm elections, and waning support for his military program. To counter the freeze movement and revive domestic support, Reagan would unveil a dramatic proposal for a space-based missile defense system, to protect the United States from nuclear attack. The Strategic Defense Initiative (or, to its critics, “Star Wars”) emerged as a major development in the story of the end of the Cold War. I explain the origins of SDI, arguing that the proposal stemmed from a domestic political crisis as much as strategic one. The chapter analyzes the Soviet response to SDI and the ramifications for the Cold War, as well as discussing Reagan’s famous “Evil Empire” speech of March 1983.

Chapter 4 covers the first year of Reagan’s presidency. Living up to conservative expectations, his administration embarked upon the most hardline, anti-communist agenda in at least two decades. To compel the Soviets to negotiate on arms control, Reagan would oversee the largest peacetime military buildup in American history. But there was little evidence of any strategy to complement the buildup. The Reagan administration engaged in anti-Soviet rhetoric, rejected the idea of a summit with Brezhnev, and refused to offer any serious arms control proposals. The confrontational approach raised US–Soviet tensions during 1981. This chapter also discusses Reagan’s support for the Contras in Nicaragua, which prompted resistance from Democrats in Congress, culminating in the Boland Amendment of late 1982. Finally, the chapter analyzes the crisis in Poland, which saw the imposition of martial law amid the movement led by Solidarity (a non-communist trade union). I discuss the complex factors behind Reagan’s response: his ideological beliefs, European–Soviet trade relations, the influence of the AFL-CIO, and conservative criticism.

Chapter 5 covers the second year of the Reagan administration, and the growing public concern over nuclear war. It discusses the rise of a major grassroots movement, which called for a freeze in the production, deployment, and testing of nuclear weapons by the US and the Soviet Union. The nuclear freeze campaign soon morphed into the largest peacetime peace movement in American history. The force of the movement would make foreign policy the political liability of the Reagan administration. Public demands for a “freeze” on nuclear weapons began to elicit support from within the Democratic Party. The freeze campaign, and a broader “peace movement,” became the Democrats’ most potent political weapon against Reagan’s conservative revolution. The chapter analyzes the administration’s struggle to combat the movement, and persuade the public of the benefits of its own strategy for reducing nuclear weapons. Among other aspects, it discusses Reagan unveiling of a START initiative. By late 1982, Reagan’s policies had raised tensions with Moscow, upset NATO allies, weakened support for his arms buildup, and generated antinuclear movements across America and Western Europe.

Chapter 9 covers 1985, beginning with the election of Mikhail Gorbachev as Soviet leader. It discusses the Soviet “new thinking,” Gorbachev’s desire to implement reform, and his decision to remove Gromyko as foreign minister. For the newly re-elected US president, Gorbachev’s arrival was perfectly timed. Riding a wave of popularity and political strength, Reagan stood by the policy of engagement and moderation. He rejected the advice of hard-liners who persisted in opposing realistic negotiation. Despite his early misgivings, Reagan realized that Gorbachev was a “somewhat different breed” of Soviet leader. The Geneva summit of November 1985 – the first meeting of a US and Soviet leader in six and a half years – marked the end of the Second Cold War. Although no agreement on arms control emerged, the meeting set a new tone for US–Soviet relations. It provided a base for trust between two men with different backgrounds and philosophies. Reagan and Gorbachev viewed the summit as a personal breakthrough. There were many issues to resolve, and Gorbachev’s policies would evolve gradually. But the events of 1985 did much to allay the tension and mutual suspicion between the two nations.

Chapter 3 covers the period from November 1979 through to the end of Carter’s presidency. On December 24, 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought détente to a final, shuddering halt. Together with the US response (the force of which would surprise Moscow), it marked the beginning of a “second” Cold War. It was a conflict that grew more tense, dangerous, and unpredictable over the next four years. Afghanistan followed on the heels of one of the most humiliating episodes in modern US history. The Iran hostage crisis became headline news and struck an emotional chord with the American public. As election season began, Iran and Afghanistan played into the hands of Carter’s critics, who accused him of “weakness.” The world’s number one power, so they argued, could neither stem the tide of Soviet expansion nor bring home the captive Americans. The setbacks allowed political opponents such as Ronald Reagan to declare that the pursuit of SALT had been misguided all along. With criticism mounting, Carter would stake his credibility on a vigorous, alarmist response to the Soviet invasion. It was, he claimed, “the most serious threat to world peace since the Second World War.”