This chapter investigates monastic experience, which has been a deliberate pursuit of religious life for most of Christian history and also appears in other religious traditions. It argues that monasticism is especially characterized by structures of stability that are achieved through communally shared rules and vows of stability. The tasks of prayer and labor – often accomplished in silence – mark monastic life and often interpenetrate each other, as prayer becomes labor and work is infused with prayer. The monastic self is shaped through obedience to the rule, shared communal practices, and mutual love. It is a profoundly communal religious way of life to the point that the individual is entirely absorbed into the monastic community. In this regard, it carries human plural experience – usually pursued in a more temporally limited fashion – to its height.

This chapter introduces a conception of rule that takes resistance rather than obedience as the constitutive element of rule. Based on an eclectic reading of different theories of rule, we argue that there is no rule without resistance. Even though rule might aim at suppressing resistance or might take such a subtle shape that it hardly encounters resistance, conceptually, rule is bound to resistance. Without a minimum of opposition, a recourse to rule would not be necessary. Even legitimate rule, which Weber calls authority, is legitimate only to a certain degree. As a consequence, not only obedience and the will to comply, but also dissent and the will to resist are part of rule. This chapter therefore sheds light on the relational dimension of rule, by analyzing the dynamic relationship between (forms of) rule and (forms of) resistance at the global level. To this end, we distinguish between two forms of resistance – opposition and dissidence – in order to show how resistance and rule implicate and influence each other. To demonstrate this relationship, we discuss four illustrative case studies on state and non-state forms of resistance and how they indicate and influence different forms of rule.

This chapter adds a regional perspective to the study of rule in the international system by exploring the region as a site of rule, formalized in the growing authority of regional organizations to define governance principles for their member states. Concretely, the chapter analyzes the connection between international authority and authority in/of states, thus offering a relational reading of authority which focuses on the constitutive connections between different sites of authority. With a case study on the African Union’s (AU) anti-coup policy, the chapter analyzes how the authority to define what counts as legitimate authority in states both reproduces the state as a locus of legitimate authority and denies it that very authority. Unlike most of the existing literature, which studies the authority of international organizations by focusing on the sources of IO authority, the chapter offers a reading of IO authority through the practices of enacting authority and the effects this has in specific locations.

In this chapter, authority and rule are considered as analytical concepts to capture different forms of domination based on recognition. Both concepts involve the social paradox of voluntary subordination, particularly evident concerning global governance and International Organizations (IOs). The chapter discusses three theoretical solutions to the social paradox, thus three conceptualizations of authority. While contracted authority and inscribed authority represent the dominant conceptions in IR, they suffer from several shortcomings. Building on a critique of these variants, the chapter introduces reflexive authority as a third response, which understands authority in global governance as deriving from epistemic foundations that include the permanent monitoring of authorities. Reflexive authority relations involve enlightened and critical subordinates recognizing authority because they acknowledge their limitations. Instead of commands, authority holders send requests to constituencies, who monitor the authorities closely. This recognition of authority as worth observing leads to deference. Primary forms of contestations include non-compliance, delegitimation, and dissidence, which aim at different targets.

International Relations scholars are increasingly studying different forms of sub- and superordination in the international system through analytical lenses such as hierarchy, hegemony, or authority. Drawing on these debates, this introduction sets out to establish the concept of rule as the defining feature of order in the international realm. More specifically, we argue that the manifold conceptual approaches to sub- and superordination in the international should be understood as rich conceptualizations of one concept: rule. We define rule broadly as constellations of formally or informally institutionalized sub- and superordination with the aim of affecting the distribution of basic goods and influence and of stabilizing expectations, regardless of whether these constellations are primarily of sociocultural, economic, or military nature. With this, we aim at advancing a research agenda that defines rule as a systematic approach to studying international politics. By promoting the concept of rule, we aim to show that rule can serve both as an integrating and a diagnostic tool for the study of the international “beyond anarchy.”

Over thirty years ago, Frank Klink and I wrote a paper on anarchy, authority, and rule—the first of its kind and a touchstone for subsequent theorizing about states and their relations. We sought to rebut prevailing claims about anarchy as the absence of authority and replace these concepts with a scheme centered on conditions of rule in every society. We identified three forms of rule: hegemony (inspired by Gramsci), hierarchy (drawing on Weber), and heteronomy (inspired by Kant, drawing on liberal theory). We argued that the relations of states exhibit elements of all three forms of rule to the abiding advantage of some few states. There is today a great deal of interest in rule in international relations but less interest in our three-part conceptual scheme. Looking back, I believe it holds up in its own terms but works even better when situated in an overarching framework linking three types of speech acts, derivative types of rules, and correlative forms of rule. I erected this framework in World of Our Making (1989) and reprise it here. I conclude by showing how modernity has reinvigorated status to support sovereign equality, thereby conjoining hegemony and hierarchy in a durably heteronomous world.

Vision science combines ideas from physics, biology, and psychology. The language and ideas of mathematics help scientists communicate and provide an initial framing for understanding the visual system. Mathematics combined with computational modeling adds important realism to the formulations. Together, mathematics and computational tools provide a realistic estimate of the initial signals the brain analyzes to render visual judgments (e.g., motion, depth, and color). This chapter first traces calculations from the representation of the light signal, to how that signal is transformed by the lens to the retinal image, and then how the image is converted into cone photoreceptor excitations. The central steps in the initial encoding rely heavily on linear systems theory and the mathematics of signal-dependent noise. We then describe computational methods that add more realism to the description of how light is encoded by cone excitations. Finally, we describe the mathematical formulation of the ideal observer using all the encoded information to perform a visual discrimination task, and Bayesian methods that combine prior information and sensory data to estimate the light input. These tools help us reason about the information present in the neural representation, what information is lost, and types of neural circuits for extracting information.

What is the best way to begin studying international law? This chapter jump-starts your study of international law, providing you with helpful resources on how to read cases and treaties, how to brief cases for later use, and how to read and use other documents you will encounter in this book. The end of the chapter provides a snapshot of the major theoretical approaches to international law and international relations that can shape your thinking about its usefulness, limits, and power to shape the behavior of states.

There is a critique that investment arbitration undermines or hampers the development of national legal institutions. By providing a forum for foreign investors separate and distinct from local courts, critics argue, ISDS removes any incentive for foreign investors to promote the development of local legal institutions. This chapter sets out an account of how investment arbitration might affect development of local legal institutions, in particular international commercial arbitration and, perhaps, domestic arbitration. The authors find that while both the number of investment agreements and investment arbitration proceedings to which a state is a party is negatively related to the rule of law in the state, the presence of an indicator for support for international commercial arbitration – adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration – essentially offsets that negative relationship.

This chapter addresses the puzzling question of why, in his Timaeus, Plato combines two very different topics: a cosmogony and account of the universe, on the one hand, and a story about the moral actions of ancient Athens, Atlantis, and Egypt, on the other. Sattler argues that the key to understanding the relation between these two parts is recognition that, in Plato’s view, they confront us with a structurally similar problem: how we are to account for the intelligibility of processes in the phenomenal world. Sattler shows that Plato no longer chooses to solve this problem by tying intelligibility to complete uniformity, as he did in the Republic, but by tying intelligibility to a rule – to norms and laws for actions in the human cultural realm, and to ratios and descriptive rules for the motions of the heavenly bodies in the natural realm. While Plato also accounts for the concerns specific to ethics and physics, the attempt to understand processes raises similar problems for him in both realms. Recurring natural catastrophes, such as floods and fires, appear as one kind of natural regularity in this Platonic account.

In this chapter the influence of Hellenistic philosophy on Roman law is continued in terms of method: from Hellenistic epistemology the Roman jurists, like the grammarians, took over the notion of rule: they started to use it initially as a mnemotechnical device in order to get to grips with their growing legal output.

A few monasteries cannot easily be categorized because so little is known about them from fleeting references in documents. This brief chapter considers the limited evidence for these monasteries and evaluates what can be said about their likely affiliation and their place in the framework of Crusader States society.

Wow, that’s a massive call, right? You are going to read an awful lot of stuff in the next few years. How can we possibly suggest this is going to be the most important of all? For the moment, you will just have to trust such a bold claim. But what the authors of this text can tell you is that, together, we have marked many thousands of university assignments. We have seen the good, the bad and the very, very ugly. And from that experience we can guarantee that students who understand the material contained in this chapter invariably do better than students who do not.

Chapter 2 conceptualizes constitutional properties in both domestic and international settings. Drawing on domestic experiences, it defines constitutions, whether written or unwritten, as a special category of institutions that provide fundamental rules (of recognition and change) as well as rules that regulate a community of members, their relations, and their rights and duties (rules of conduct). It then identifies corresponding constitutional properties in the international setting, acknowledging the limits of this analogy. While still embryonic, international rules with constitutional relevance are especially apparent in those binding treaties of public international law that are universal in intended participation, global in scope, and of substantive importance. These rules are underpinned by the principle of sovereignty, which provides for their stability and superiority. International constitutional rules define states as the prime members, organize inter–state relations in an anarchical environment by concentrating authority in circumscribed domains, and lay out rights and duties that enable collective action and set standards of appropriate behavior.

Moving from the grand and abstract theme of international constitutionalization to the more tangible and observable process of international rule making, Chapter 5 analyzes states’ motives for cooperating over international rules that form the unintended basis of international constitutionalization. It lays out the logic of democratic power, according to which states that are both democratic and powerful (democratic powers) combine the willingness and ability to promote international rules. Because democracies are rule–based, they understand the value of operating through rules and doing so is consistent with their domestic operations. Insofar as they are also powerful, democracies are able to advance their rule–based approach at the international level to shape rules according to their interests and values, which makes it easier for them to commit to and follow those rules. Democratic powers are thus decisive for international rule–based cooperation. States that lack either one or both of these prerequisites are less supportive of institutionalized cooperation and thus constitutionalization in world politics.

Constitutionalization encompasses a variety of ways in which constitutional rules emerge and change. Chapter 3 addresses the emergence and development of constitutional rules in the national context. It begins with a conceptual discussion of constitutionalization, defined as any process that brings about and changes constitutional rules. Spanning a spectrum between two ideal–type revolutionary and evolutionary pathways, constitutional processes vary with regard to frequency, intensity, output, and means of change, as well as the underlying political intentionality and contestation. The variability of constitutionalization is demonstrated empirically through a systematic analysis of national constitution–making in the United States, Sweden, and Britain in terms of the five constitutional elements identified in Chapter 2, emphasizing their similarities and differences. While this analysis will not be entirely novel to the comparative constitutional law and politics readership, it is an important building block for conceptualizing constitutionalization in the international setting.

A functioning rule of law system helps facilitate democracy from above by constraining government from discriminating against or otherwise limiting the ability of citizens and groups to participate in politics. This chapter provides evidence to support our argument that one of the mechanisms through which power sharing encourages the emergence of minimalist democracy is by helping establish the rule of law in states emerging from civil war. Specifically, we consider how power sharing allows for de facto judicial independence. We argue that the rudimentary separation of powers that takes place under power sharing produces a political environment under which judicial independence is likely to flourish. We also show that power sharing has a positive impact on a more expansive understanding of the rule of law, with power-sharing arrangements influencing governments to behave proactively by granting and protecting rights and freedoms evenly across social groups and ensuring that the actions of one individual or group do not threaten the rights and freedoms of other social groups.