Equivalence is an essential discipline for liberalising trade between States whose sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures are based on divergent regulatory approaches. During the Uruguay Round negotiations, “equivalence” under the SPS Agreement was regarded by negotiators as being “of great importance”, and it was even considered to establish a right for exporting States. In practice, the discipline has remained ineffective, with only thirty-six equivalence recognition decisions made since 1995. This article argues that the underperformance of equivalence as an obligation is structural in nature: in effect, the SPS Agreement establishes a conditional right of importing Members to refuse equivalence requests. As such, exporting Members only gain equivalence protection where they either demonstrate that their measures (1) meet the importing Member’s appropriate level of protection or (2) achieve the same level of protection as parties to recognition agreements. Finally, the need for fostering regulatory trust between domestic SPS regulatory agencies is underscored as a prerequisite for achieving broader equivalence recognition.

The Korea–Radionuclides case addresses Korean SPS measures imposed on Japanese fishery products after the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant meltdown in 2011. Japan challenged these measures as more restrictive than necessary under the SPS Agreement. The panel agreed with Japan, but this ruling was largely reversed by the Appellate Body. Korea's victory at the Appellate Body was based on procedure. The panel accepted Korea's appropriate level of protection (ALOP), which included both quantitative and qualitative elements. However, the Appellate Body found that the panel only addressed the quantitative aspect of Korea's ALOP and reversed on that basis. The Appellate Body's ruling did not affirmatively find that Korea's SPS measures were legal under WTO rules. Instead, the Appellate Body found that panel had not sufficiently addressed Korea's arguments and, thereby, the panel could not determine that the SPS measures were more restrictive than necessary. The case highlights the need for the Appellate Body to be able to conduct its own factual analysis, a power it could be given if the dispute settlement system is reformed. Without independent fact-finding power, the Appellate Body cannot correct panels’ mistakes, and respondents can prevail based on panel error.

The recent WTO dispute case, Korea–Import Bans, and Testing and Certification Requirements for Radionuclides, illustrates complex legal issues and significant political implications associated with the regulatory autonomy of a sovereign country under the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). There has been constant tension between the sovereign right of a WTO member state to determine its own appropriate level of protection (ALOP) and the regulatory constraints imposed under the SPS Agreement to prevent abuse and disguised trade protection. The case emerged from this tension and raises questions on the extent of the regulatory autonomy in the application of an SPS measure. This article addresses these questions and examines the criteria for the qualitative standards for the ALOP, the question that the Appellate Body decision did not fully resolve. The criteria for the qualitative ALOP standards affect the regulatory autonomy significantly under the current SPS rules as they determine the manner and the extent to which a Member may meet the sensitive public interests in the application of an SPS measure. The article proposes a rational basis test to restrain abuse of SPS measures while preserving the regulatory autonomy protected under the SPS Agreement.

Following the proliferation of private standards in the global supply chain trade, it has become clear that these can have adverse effects on international commerce and world welfare in the same way that government-imposed mandatory regulations do. However, the scope of the obligation of WTO Members in relation to the regulation of private standards remains vague and open to divergent interpretations under WTO law. This article starts from the premise that the debate should move beyond the search for a reasonable interpretation of relevant WTO disciplines and instead begin to consider normative questions concerning the legitimacy and accountability of transnational private regulation in global governance and the potential role of the WTO in regulating such private authority. The article explores what justifies the role of the WTO, a multilateral intergovernmental organization, in regulating transnational private standards and how a regulatory mechanism might be designed and implemented in practice.

Agricultural and wildlife trade is subject to sudden, disruptive import restrictions arising from concerns over sanitary and phytosanitary safety and the conservation of natural resources. These restrictions can create significant international price differences that encourage the smuggling of goods across borders. This article presents an equilibrium model of smuggling where the supply and demand for smuggled goods depend on interregional price disparities in the presence of a trade ban. In this model, smuggling is more prevalent when demand and supply among trade partners is more inelastic or when there are fewer total trade partners at the time a trade ban is enacted. Applications are presented for regionalization, destruction of goods in government eradication programs, price support, stockpiling, and the development of substitutes. Regionalization may increase smuggling under certain production and consumption patterns.

In this article, I suggest that one of the central characteristics of New Legal Realism is the productive tension between empiricist and pragmatist theories of knowledge which lies at its core. On one side, new realist work in its empiricist posture seeks to use empirical knowledge of the world as the basis on which to design, interpret, apply, and criticize the law. On the other, in its pragmatist moments, it explicitly draws attention to the social and political contingency of any claims to empirical knowledge of the world, including its own. As a consequence, it is distinctive of much scholarship in the New Legal Realist vein that it continually enacts creative syntheses of different philosophies of truth in an attempt to be, in Shaffer's words, ‘positivist . . . interpretivist, and legal realist all at once’. The first part of this article draws on existing historical accounts of legal realism briefly to trace the problematic and ambiguous place of scientism in the legal realist tradition. Then, in the second and more important part of the article, I argue that the ambivalence of the legal realists’ vision has left us, in certain contexts, with a complicated form of mixed legal-scientific governance which has proved remarkably and surprisingly resilient in the face of late twentieth century critiques of scientific objectivity. This may be one of the most enduring legacies of the ‘old’ legal realists for those today who work in the New Legal Realist vein.

The idea of randomness is mostly excluded from international legal argumentation. If we need law at all, we are told, it is precisely to avoid arbitrary fortuity. Nonetheless, the exclusion of randomness renders international law structurally incapable of dealing with general risk issues, be they external or manufactured. The core of the problem is the notion of causation. International law seems to be infused by a model of causation that excludes any consideration of randomness. The law of state responsibility and certain elements of international trade law bear witness to this point. Randomness, however, is Janus-faced, and risk is its correlate aspect. By excluding randomness, risk is also left out. Therefore the model of causation embedded in international legal language makes that very language incapable of framing the ideas that a risk society needs to express. It is not surprising, then, that risk societies turn to other languages to express their needs, as is evidenced by the WTO SPS disputes. In this context, international law seems to become a broker of expertise, which refers to the relevant epistemic community that is needed to ‘get the job done’, and abandons any aspiration to holding an independent normative pull in itself.

This article understands risk dialectically as a decision-making resource stressing probability but as also giving rise to further uncertainties. It shows that the panel report in EC – Biotech reflects an understanding of risk as decision-making that is deterministic and leaves little room for the application of precautionary approaches and non-scientific factors. It submits that such an approach is unsuitable for novel technologies with limited background knowledge and reduces the accountability of risk regulators. A different approach is put forth, which allows members greater scope for precautionary action while preventing trade protectionism. The article concludes that law can enhance its authority and epistemic validity through scientific evidence but only if it recognizes science's epistemic and its own limitations. Law has to approach science as contested knowledge and risk regulation as political decision-making, leading – inevitably – to more indeterminate solutions to legal conflicts.