The economic discipline plays a performative role in constructing the moral order of market society. Yet, little attention has been paid to what economists explicitly regard as moral or how they conceive of morality. This article reflects a recent attempt to put morals into economics, that is, to introduce morality as a research topic in behavioural and experimental economics. It maps three research programs that theorize the moral economy. The programs emphasize the moral foundations of market society, the moral limits of market expansion, and the moral consequences of market trading and, thus, appear irreconcilable with classifications of economists as market enthusiasts or moral agnostics. At the same time, however, the literature centres on an “economized” form of morality that is corrective to market inefficiencies, attributed to the responsibility of the individual, and expressed in rational terms. In doing so, this literature contributes to redefining moral problems in economic terms.

In this article, we show how interpretive battles about compliance can lead to regulatory differentiation and, in turn, market segmentation. To do so, we study the evolution of unsecured lending in the United States, between 1900 and 1945. In the early 20th century, a large segment of the workforce relied on their wages to access credit: this required the “legal coding” of labor income into capital, where lenders would offer advances in exchange for a lien over future revenues. Regulating these transactions raised conflicts between Progressive reformers, lenders and, after 1929, federal regulators, which spanned over five decades. The historical comparison of three states—Illinois, New York and Georgia—, shows that local discussions revolved around three outcomes—legal status, pricing method and collateralization—, the issue of which led to distinct regulatory paths and market configurations at the state level. Finally, the New Deal policies created an additional strand of federal coding, furthering market divides between unregulated payday lenders, non-bank credit companies, and commercial banks. On financial markets, discussions about compliance often revolve around calculative technologies, and we suggest this as a possible crossing point between STS analyses of capitalization devices and Pistor’s theory of capital modulation.

This article posits that institutionalized mythologies can create comparative production advantages. Myths shape collective identity, mobilize actors, and fundamentally reshape production dynamics. Myths are institutionalized in market rules, regulations and structures, leading to the reification of the myth. The myth functions as if it is true, not because it is true, but because it shapes the rules of production. Yet without the initial myth, specific production incentives—and even their institutional comparative advantages—would not exist. My theory integrates approaches from modernist historians (“imagined communities”) and economic sociologists (“imagined futures”) to explain how myths (“imagined histories”) shape contemporary market outcomes, using the example of the French wine market. This argument contributes to the historical institutionalist approach, which focuses on the historical power dynamics between competing groups and the present-day social and market consequence of their institutionalized solutions.

Despite the ubiquity of illegality in today’s financial markets and the questions this raises with regard to the social legitimacy of today’s financial industry, systematic scrutiny of the phenomenon of financial crime is lacking in the field of sociology. One field of research in which the illegal dimensions of capitalist dynamics have long taken center stage is the field of white-collar crime research. This article makes available to economic sociologists an overview of the most important conceptual insights generated in the white-collar crime literature. In doing so, its aim is to provide economic sociologists with some orientation for future research on financial crime. Building on the insights generated in wcc literature, the article concludes by suggesting a number of promising avenues for future sociological research on the phenomenon of illegality in financial markets.

“Weak ties”, a valuable aid in getting a job, are generally work ties. One reason for this feature is not that former colleagues increase one’s information but rather that they value the pursuit of past collaboration. We examine the consequence of the collaboration ties hypothesis in the financial industry labor market. In finance, the labor market values the assets that financial operatives take with them from one firm to another, such as knowledge, know-how and customers. Since assets are to a certain extent shared among co-workers, it is worth hiring business relations and former colleagues or moving in teams: this enables a better transfer of assets such as idiosyncratic work routines, distributed knowledge, or joint customers. To demonstrate our claims we rely on an online survey launched with eFinancialCareers.fr collected in September 2008 among French financial employees. This questionnaire shows that working at the core of financial markets favors the accumulation of key moveable assets on the one hand and of collaboration ties on the other. That is, collaboration ties and key moveable assets are strongly correlated. The moving of key assets, collaboration ties and notably the combination of those two dimensions all result in increased wages.

Cet article s'intéresse à la façon dont un sociologue, fondateur de ce que l'on appelle aujourd'hui la « New Economie Sociology », Harrison White, a repris presque à l'identique le modèle d'un économiste, Michael Spence, sur les relations employeurs / employés en situation d'asymétrie d'information et ce, afin de bâtir son propre modèle des marchés.

Il s'agit plus précisément de montrer que cet emprunt (méthodologique) cache en réalité des différences plus profondes entre les deux auteurs, et de déterminer dans quelle mesure il peut donner un éclairage nouveau concernant les rapports entre économie et sociologie.