Ancient communications were slow and precarious, so overseas commanders enjoyed/suffered from partial absence of control by home authorities. Isolation should not be overdone. Literary sources mention official letters home only when remarkable for some reason. Requests to the senate for supplies from Rome were made routinely. Equally, some messages and orders arrived from Carthage. ‘Peripheral imperialism’, far-reaching decisions by men on the spot, are a feature of Roman operations in Iberia. Publius Scipio (father)’s decision to fight the war there is a good example. Other examples are reviewed. Hannibal’s treaty with Philip was co-signed by Carthaginian advisers. Appointment of good subordinates is an important indicator of the quality of a commander’s personal initiatives. Italian Locri is taken as a case study because Hannibal and Scipio both made decisions affecting it. Hannibal’s appointee Hamilcar was guilty of long-term arrogance but was perhaps not as bad as Scipio’s scandalous lieutenant Quintus Pleminius.

The physical world could drain and erode morale. The weather proved to be a central feature in the infantrymen’s experience of war. This chapter considers key themes that emerge from soldiers’ descriptions of winter: the cold, the rain, the mud, the snow, all of which were exacerbated by soldiers’ exhaustion. It discusses in turn the experience of winter 1914, winter 1916, and winter through spring 1917/18. These experiences fed negative perceptions of the military and encouraged men to view the war more pessimistically. They complained about trench conditions, clothing, and food. Furthermore, the anticipation of winter (as much as the experience of it) harmed motivation and morale. It undermined soldiers’ ability to visualise the future as they became frozen in time. Yet, soldiers’ negativity and pessimism after Passchendaele indicate that a deeper, more problematic, and increasingly pervasive gloom descended over the BEF in winter 1917/18. Yet, even then, men fell back on coping mechanisms. Their resilience shone through as they were able to project their discomfort onto the enemy and rationalise their winter experiences as a necessary (and temporary) trial. In fact, the experience of winter transformed soldiers’ perceptions of the campaigning season, which they viewed in a much more positive light. Spring and summer were preferable to the impotence of winter. Even if the warmer months promised more fighting, there was some agency to be found in battle. Furthermore, military action might end the war before the onset of the next winter.

This chapter examines the “nuts and bolts” of war, including the formidable problems of movement and supply, transportation and administration. Logistics represent a vital element of warfare, indispensable to the operations of armies ever since the emergence of organized warfare. Broadly defined, this concept involves moving, supplying, and maintaining military forces, as well as transportation of material, food and animals, communications, personnel replacement, quarters, depots, and rear administration. The Napoleonic Wars witnessed important developments in the logistics and one of its lasting effects was creation and successful dissemination of bureaucratic reforms that improved state’s ability to mobilize forces and extract resources

Describes the ACEP Geriatric ED Accreditation Program and how this guide can be used if preparing for it. Emphasizes that the scope of change may be small or large; pace may be gradual over years; or dramatic over a year. No wrong place to start; no wrong choices to make. Be bold.

In the summer of 1914 the armies that went to war in the East were formed according to similar rules and used similar tactics; all were based on conscription and all boasted vast numbers of men. It was believed that the biggest reservoir of human beings offered the best chance of victory. In this respect the statistics were unequivocal: no state could rival Russia. Moreover, even on a peace footing, the Russian army was three times the size of the German army and ten times that of the Austro-Hungarian army. One could attempt to redress this imbalance through training and equipment, and indeed that is what the Central Powers started to do on a large scale, once war had begun. In July 1914 all sides in the conflict – Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Serbia – had comparable ordnance which did not differ much from the arsenals tested recently on the battlefields of Thrace and Macedonia.

Caporetto had changed the very nature of Italy’s war from an offensive war into a struggle for survival. Italian armed forces, morale, supplies and finance needed to be bolstered, and Britain made the greatest effort – but not for free.

Warfare is not only about exerting military force but also about logistics. Men need arms to fight efficiently and, above all, they have to eat. Thus to a significant degree the struggle for survival and foodstuffs determined the Caste War during its first two decades. Although government forces often suffered as a result of insufficient supplies, they could at least rely on existing structures of production, distribution and transport, such as haciendas, trades and roads. The Caste War rebels, on the other hand, had to create their own economic system from scratch. While insurgents were mostly in a position to live “off the country,” commandeering or plundering the required resources in the areas under their control during the first year of the conflict, provisioning combatants and their families became more trying after their withdrawal to the eastern and southeastern parts of the peninsula. Firearms, powder, lead and other desired items had to be procured either by looting in the government-controlled area or purchasing them in Belize.

Warfare is not only about exerting military force but also about logistics. Men need arms to fight efficiently and, above all, they have to eat. Thus to a significant degree the struggle for survival and foodstuffs determined the Caste War during its first two decades. Although government forces often suffered as a result of insufficient supplies, they could at least rely on existing structures of production, distribution and transport, such as haciendas, trades and roads. The Caste War rebels, on the other hand, had to create their own economic system from scratch. While insurgents were mostly in a position to live “off the country,” commandeering or plundering the required resources in the areas under their control during the first year of the conflict, provisioning combatants and their families became more trying after their withdrawal to the eastern and southeastern parts of the peninsula. Firearms, powder, lead and other desired items had to be procured either by looting in the government-controlled area or purchasing them in Belize.