This chapter gets to the heart of why the disciplinary imagination of international law is only able to see deterritorialisation without reterritorialisation, by excavating the content of the orthodox concept(s) of territory and scrutinising the spatial assumptions. For it is how territory is understood that forces the production of aterritorial functionalist account of law. The chapter reviews the standard definition(s) of territory before deconstructing the characteristics and qualities of the concept of territory. These include: that territory is only states’; that territory is imagined in a two-dimensional, flat, jigsaw-like form; that the physical referents are analytically prioritised over the social; that territory tends to be imagined as homogeneous, uniform, and contiguous ; that territory is bound by a particular technology and representation of borders; and that territories are relatively static. The final sections delve into the signification of territory and outline five different uses for territory in the discourse, before exploring how territory has mediated legal theoretical understandings of sovereignty.

This chapter argues that the systemic integration of customary international law in the interpretation of investment treaties should equip vulnerable polities with principled arguments for why a high degree of deference is warranted in their adoption of regulatory measures to address the health, economic and social dimensions of chronic crises. The chapter reviews the recent demand for governments to protect their right to regulate by imposing a moratorium on investment treaty claims. This critical discourse has overlooked the deeper roots of the State’s presumptive right to regulate without compensation, an expression of its territorial sovereignty under customary international law. Evident across landmark decisions such as the Oscar Chinn Case, the Iron Rhine Arbitration and Philip Morris v. Uruguay, the regulatory dimension of territorial sovereignty both preceded and endured the mid-century debate over the standard of compensation for nationalisation and the subsequent rise of investment arbitration. In contemporary practice, the customary rule that there is no State responsibility for reasonable regulation may be integrated through arbitral practice to ensure each claimant bears the burden to prove that regulatory measures were unreasonable, discriminatory, or adopted in bad faith.

This chapter considers the ICJ and territorial disputes, an area where the Court has had significant scope to consider the applicable law in multiple cases. The authors identify three areas in which the Court has made a significant contribution to the law on territorial disputes: first, the reconceptualisation of the rules of international law governing the acquisition of territorial sovereignty; second, the clarification of the territorial implications of the fundamental principles of international law; and finally, the elaboration of a clear and coherent method for the legal settlement of territorial disputes, the core of which rests on respect for the principle of legality.

This chapter deals with the German position on States and their organs. It is divided into five parts; territorial sovereignty, political independence, Statehood and recognition, organs of the State and their status and State succession. The first part deals with the legal consequences of Germany’s non-recognition of the Russian annexation of Crimea while distinguishing the same from sanctions policies, Germany’s position on the international legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is a disputed territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Germany’s views on the presence of Thailand’s king in and his conduct of State affairs from Germany and Germany’s position on Israel’s annexation plans in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The second part addresses Germany’s response to the new Hong Kong national security law, and Germany’s position on Taiwan. The third part, statehood and recognition, encompasses Germany’s opinion on Palestine not being a State party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Germany’s non-recognition of the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’, and Germany’s support of Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Assembly as an observer.

What are the physical limits of state sovereignty? This chapter reviews international law concerning the territorial sovereignty of states, including on the land, the oceans, and the air and space above.  Specific legal instruments that govern these areas are examined in some depth, including the Chicago Air Convention of 1944 and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).  Six methods of obtaining sovereign territory are discussed along with vivid examples of each.  The struggle to allow fair use by states and companies over the resources in and below the high seas and outer space is highlighted.  The new space race may prevent the original space treaties’ vision of a new frontier that is devoid of commercialization and militarization.

This chapter examines the relationship between peace treaties and territorial change. Distinguishing peace treaties from other related agreements, it analyses the critical role that peace treaties play in the acquisition of territorial sovereignty following the use of force, both under contemporary and classical international law. In this regard, it maintains that, besides cases of debellatio, conquest alone was never a valid title to territorial sovereignty. Based on the difference of the applicable legal regimes, it distinguishes peace treaties concluded between independent states from those concluded as part of the process of accession of a people to independence, as well as from those concluded with successful secessionist entities. In addition, particular attention is paid to the great variety of territorial clauses contained in peace treaties.

This chapter analyses the main circumstances in which a cyber operation may constitute an internationally wrongful act. The first observation made, which is developed in the first section, is that there is no general prohibition of cyber operations in international law. Cyber operations between States are not per se prohibited by international law and generally constitute unfriendly or hostile acts. Despite the absence of a general prohibition on cyber operations, the carrying out of a cyber operation may lead to a violation of specific norms of international law. This chapter focuses on the primary norms of international law that can be breached by state-sponsored cyber operations, namely State sovereignty, non-intervention and human rights.