Two scholarly communities work on global trade and investment governance yet communicate little with each other. On the one hand, classic trade and investment scholarship focuses on states' foreign economic policies, trade and investment treaty programs, and participation in the World Trade Organisation. On the other hand, scholars of private and commercial law study how businesses draft and enforce the international contracts of a private law nature that ultimately constitute international trade and investment transactions. This research note seeks to raise awareness for this bifurcation of research on global trade and investment, develops a conceptual framework to better understand the role of private law in shaping trade and investment flows, and proposes a research agenda anchored in economics, political economy, and political science to advance our understanding of the role of private law in global trade and investment transactions and governance.

While the theory of economic policy offers a potential framework for thinking about the joint pursuit of economic objectives (EOs) and non-economic objectives (NEOs), over time the theory of economic policy was formalized in a way that considers NEOs as constraints that are given, rather than as goals that may themselves be endogenous alongside EOs. We examine the analytical treatment of NEOs as co-determined with EOs, revisiting some of the ground broken by Alan Winters in his analysis of NEOs. We review the place of NEOs in the theory of economic policy, discuss current practice in the representation of such objectives as exogenous constraints, and develop an argument for representation of NEOs as objectives in themselves.

This article reviews Adam Smith’s clearly articulated views about the desirability of free trade and his equally strong view on the necessity of sound institutions and ‘the tolerable administration of justice’ as key ingredients of successful economic management. It starts with Smith’s views on free trade and shows how pertinent they are to today’s high-level trade policy challenges. It then considers a more detailed day-to-day instrument of policy—the Trade Remedies Authority (TRA). Following Brexit, the TRA was created as an arms-length body for investigating cases for granting temporary import restrictions to specific products according to a reasonably well-defined objective process. The article demonstrates how, over the first 2 years of its life, the TRA has been reduced from a useful administrative instrument to a fig leaf for a political process for granting protection to petitioners. Unfortunately, this tendency to displace analytical approaches to policy by purely political ones can now be observed in many activities of UK governance.

The Office International des Épizooties (OIE) is a Paris-based, inter-governmental organisation with 164 member countries. Since its establishment in 1924, the OIE has made a major indirect contribution to animal welfare, at a global level, via the organisation's role in epizootic disease control. The OIE animal health code includes a chapter on minimum animal welfare standards for trade and a standard-setting role has also been played in respect of animal transportation. In 1994, the publication Animal Welfare and Veterinary Services was included in the OIE Scientific and Technical Review Series, and provides a valuable State Veterinary Service perspective on animal welfare capability and specific animal welfare issues. In drawing up its strategic plan for the period 2001 to 2005, animal welfare and food safety were identified as two areas for future OIE involvement and these were formally accepted as strategic initiatives at the 2001 OIE General Assembly meeting. An international expert group was established to provide specific recommendations on the nature and scope of the OIE's animal welfare role. The expert group's recommendations were reviewed and adopted, as Resolution XIV, at the May 2002 OIE General Assembly meeting. A permanent international working group was established and met for the first time in October 2002. This paper provides a background to animal welfare as an international trade policy issue and provides an update on progress to date in developing an OIE animal welfare mission statement, supporting guiding principles and policies, and an agreed modus operandi. Priority areas for OIE involvement are identified, and emphasis is placed on the importance of making use of all available expertise and resources, including those from academia, the research community, industry, animal welfare organisations and other relevant stakeholders.

In the context of the working-class backlash against free trade represented by Brexit, the recent surge of right-wing political parties in Europe and the 2016 US presidential election, it is timely to take stock of the threats to jobs and wages posed by recent negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The European Commission selectively relied on econometric analyses, predicting a positive impact of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Its proposed legal text on ‘Trade and sustainable development’ fell short of the European Parliament’s negotiating guidelines, which themselves failed to ensure protection of labour standards. The activities of corporate lobbies threatened the effective protection of workers’ rights. Major risks to workers’ rights are posed by discrepancies between US and European Union labour and social law and labour standards. The most recent legal text lacks compliance monitoring provisions and sanction mechanisms against member states failing to ratify core labour conventions. The investment court system does not resolve the problems of the discredited investor-state dispute settlement mechanism for which it is the proposed replacement. The year 2016 has provided a foretaste of the dislocation likely from trade and investment regulation that sees social and environmental standards and labour rights simply as barriers to corporate profits.

Three studies presented scenarios to lay people to investigate their willingness to restrict imports. Greater restriction was preferred when similar goods were made at home, when the owners of the foreign businesses made very good profits, and, less consistently, when the goods came from a low wage country. Particular reluctance to import from a low-wage country did not vary with whether a home firm was likely to lose business or the level of understanding of comparative advantage, but was related to the profits made by foreign business owners. The results show that lay people views are based on concern for people in other countries as well as in their own.

The Productivity Commission is Australia’s foremost policy advisory body. Its original incarnation as the Industries Assistance Commission derives from the 1960s push to dismantle the protective tariff regime that underpinned the Australian manufacturing sector. With success in tariff reductions and complementary reductions in rural sector assistance, the Commission’s investigatory role was gradually expanded to cover the entire gamut of government policy. The Commission’s history has generally been treated favourably. This article places the history of the original Industries Assistance Commission in context and takes a critical stance on its and the Productivity Commission’s vision and achievements.

Long examined by the academic literature as a challenging technical-legal fiction with a strong geopolitical impact, border carbon adjustment is on its way to becoming a European reality. This Article provides an overview of the European legislative process with a comparison of the initial Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (‘CBAM’) project presented by the Commission in July 2021 with the positions formalised by the European Parliament and the Council in 2022. With a detour through the doctrine of international law and building upon the work of Professor Thomas Cottier on the concept of Common Concern of Humankind (‘CCH’) in international law, the Article examines the European CBAM, and more broadly, the recent multiplication of unilateral environmental initiatives with extraterritorial impacts, as a contextual transition from a logic of coexistence to a logic of cooperation in the field of environmental policies. It concludes on the necessity to design the European CBAM accordingly, by redistributing its direct revenues and developing open and inclusive cooperation frameworks, to accelerate this transition in the field of industrial decarbonisation.

This paper tests the hypothesis pertaining to the interdependencies between trade and environmental policies in the presence of industry/firm lobbies, which is captured through industry/firm size. For an unbalanced panel of manufacturing firms in India at the five-digit National Industrial Classification (NIC), 2008 for the period 2008–2019, I find that firm size has a positive and significant impact on trade policy. The same holds true for a subset of firms that are polluting in nature (based on the Central Pollution Control Board classification). It is found that larger firms have a greater influence on those trade policies that are set unilaterally by the government. Also, there is no empirical support in favour of trade and environment linkages in the Indian context. This could be due to the fact that these two policies come under the domain of independent ministries of the government. Moreover, environmental safety assumes less significance and tends to adversely affect the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector. Notwithstanding the fact that environmental regulations are in place, the enforcement and monitoring mechanisms are remarkably weak on account of weak environmental institutions.

Although globalization and the world trade regime have reduced the significance of distance between countries, within countries geography matters now more than ever. Inside countries’ borders, economic activities, such as production and employment, occur unevenly across space. As a result, international trade impacts parts of a country differently. Some areas benefit from rising trade, while others experience reductions in local wages and employment as a result of increased import competition. Because regions’ experience of globalization varies, public opinion about trade differs across geographic areas within countries. Voters living in regions advantaged by trade are more likely to support economic openness, while voters living in regions negatively impacted by trade are more skeptical of the benefits of globalization. The geographic disparities in public attitudes towards trade often align with salient political cleavages. As a result, debates over trade have become increasingly polarized in many countries, which may threaten states’ continued economic openness as well as their engagement with, and even support for, the world trade regime.

Foundational theories of trade politics emphasize a conflict between consumer welfare and protectionist lobbies. But these theories ignore other powerful lobbies that also shape trade policy. We propose a theory of trade distortion arising from conflict between consumer welfare and importer lobbies. We estimate the key parameter of the model—the government's weight on welfare—using original data from Venezuela, where Hugo Chávez used an exchange-rate subsidy to underwrite hundreds of billions of dollars of imports. Whereas estimates from traditional models would make Chávez look like a welfare maximizer, our results indicate that he implemented distortionary commercial policy to the benefit of special interests. Our analysis underscores the importance of tailoring workhorse models to account for differences in interest group configuration. The politics of trade policy is not reducible to the politics of protectionism.

This letter provides firm-level evidence that policy makers tailor trade policy to suit selected firms. It argues that firms with higher levels of specific assets find it more costly to reorganize production, and are hurt more by international competition. In response, policy makers grant more trade protection to firms with fixed assets. Since protectionism is costly, firms compete for it, which creates diffusion dynamics in which the protection granted to one firm affects the protection granted to others. This claim is tested utilizing the special role antidumping duties (ADDs) play in international trade, and combining petitions for ADDs with financial data on the firms filing them in a unique dataset. Using spatial autoregressive models, the authors find that firms with specific assets are granted more protection. However, diffusion dynamics differ within and between groups of firms producing the same good. This suggests that firms can partly shape their own level of trade protection.