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One aspect of the currently prevailing view on corruption is the emphasis on quantifications of corruption, which have been used to research its causes and effects, and to gauge progress of anti-corruption reforms around the world. This chapter is dedicated to these measures. Corruption country scores are an example of so-called Global Performance Indicators and assume that by taking the right initiatives, countries can improve their ranking in a given Global Performance Indicator. However, the available measures of corruption are not well suited to assess changes of corruption over time. A more general conclusion also emerges from this chapter. In studying social phenomena using quantitative techniques of analysis, it is considered to be important to draw a sharp line between the definition of a concept, which should come first, and attempts at measuring it, which should be conditional on the chosen definition. However, when measures of social phenomena are successful, they take on a life of their own and contribute to an ossification of the concept they refer to. Consideration of the extent to which the prevailing concept of corruption and its most popular measures have shaped each other also provides a good angle to discuss corruption more generally.
Pervasive corruption at all levels of society was a common feature for the majority of countries from the start of transition and persists to the present day in many. It is not unique to transition; it is widespread in many developing and some developed countries, and was commonplace in the communist period. However, the same divergence seen in the degree of reform and socioeconomic performance applies to corruption. Most in Central Europe and the Baltics experienced significant reductions in socialist corruption soon after reforms began in 1990, and this improvement continues, with a few like Estonia and Slovenia nearly equalling the best of advanced countries. It is not a mere coincidence that the least corrupt were the most reformed and had the highest degree of democracy. Southeast Europe lagged behind, but even there considerable improvements have taken place, probably under pressure of EU requirements for membership accession. The worst levels persist in the former USSR with the heroic exception of Georgia since its Rose Revolution. It seems that formal political “programs” to combat corruption, even with foreign involvement, are far less effective than a committed effort to complete economic democratic and Rule-of-Law reforms.
Do Global Performance Indicators (GPIs) influence the application of material power? While existing research has shown that GPIs can provoke reform through social mechanisms, material power is an important tool for influencing states resistant to social pressure. We investigate whether GPIs shape third-party policymakers’ decisions to employ material power in the fight against corruption, an important component of the good governance agenda. We theorize that GPIs influence policymakers by acting as focal points that provide information and establish standards of behavior. We test this argument for a highly visible GPI: Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. We find that while this GPI garners significant media attention, it does not influence policymakers’ decisions to punish corruption offenders by withdrawing or altering foreign aid. Our results raise important scope conditions on the power of GPIs and suggest that their ability to alter state behavior through third-party material mechanisms may be limited.
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