Transnational policy networks (TPNs) participate in global governance by formulating ideas and policy options around and through formal and informal intergovernmental organizations. They illustrate the third type of informal governance introduced in Chapter 1, informal governance that exists in the spaces around these institutions. TPNs are constituted by individuals who share a common expertise, a common technical language, and broadly shared normative concerns, but not a common institutional setting nor agreement on specific policy goals. This chapter contrasts TPNs with other institutional forms in the literature – advocacy networks, epistemic communities, transgovernmental networks, public–private partnerships, multistakeholder initiatives, and transgovernmental initiatives – and argues for their integrative advantages and ability to address individual agency and power. A heuristic case illustrates how a TPN functioned to create the Office of the Ombudsperson at the UN – securing rights protection for individuals targeted for UN sanctions – despite the initial opposition of all five Permanent Members of the Security Council. The chapter concludes with reflections on the potential benefits of applying the concept to other emergent policy domains.

The UN Security Council is the central actor in matters of peace and security, but it is notoriously affected by the global political environment. Because of the veto power, it is currently unable to address crucial peace and security issues, such as the war in Ukraine. This introduction sets out the Security Council’s role in maintaining international peace. It offers an overview of how the Council’s institutional shortcomings have been addressed in the past. The chapter identifies four defining fields of tension in which the Security Council currently operates, which are explored throughout the remaining chapters of the book. These fields comprise the tensions between: (i) law and power; (ii) centralisation and institutional diversification; (iii) universalism and regionalism; and (iv) formalisation and informalisation. The chapter concludes with a short overview of the book’s main chapters.

The war launched in February 2022 by Russia against Ukraine has become a stress test for the role of the Security Council, and it confirms some findings of the three Trialogue authors. Congyan Cai, Larissa van den Herik, and Tiyanjana Maluwa have examined the manifestations of law and power in the Council, the substance and procedure of its workings, and the relationship between the Council as the centre and its periphery in the form of regional organisations. This concluding chapter revisits the three dichotomies in the light of the Russian invasion, asking: has power eclipsed law? Are empty ritualistic procedures unable to deliver substantive outcomes? And has the centre been disabled, so that peripheral actors dominate the scene? The chapter concludes that the Security Council remains important not only as a centre of power but also as a creature of law and as a law-producer. The Council’s action and inaction are highly dependent on legal procedures (as opposed to mere ‘politics’). Finally, the Council, also in its response to the Ukrainian war, is firmly embedded within a network of other international bodies and actors.

This chapter first demonstrates the significance of counterterrorism for China and international society and then reviews different narratives of China’s counterterrorism. It investigates China’s domestic and international counterterrorism lawmaking at the domestic and international levels. After the late 1990s, and especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the UN Security Council emerged at the forefront of international counterterrorism and adopted a lot of resolutions that imposed demanding obligations on UN members.The chapter examines how these UN counterterrorism resolutions are enforced in China. While many countries’ counterterrorism activities have been strongly criticized, China has encountered particularly strong criticism, and especially for its operations in Xinjiang. Finally, this chapter tries to recalibrate the relationship between counterterrorism and human rights protection, and to evaluate the implications of counterterrorism measures for human rights in China.

This chapter introduces micro-sociological lenses to the study of international meetings showing how a micro-sociological study can produce insights into the workings and dynamics of concrete, inter-bodily interaction in international meetings. The chapter analyzes micro-sociological dynamics of rapprochement, conflict, domination, and low-intensity interaction in international meetings and dives into specific cases of international meetings, including in the UNSC, the EU, and bilateral meetings. The chapter further discusses and exemplifies the micro-sociological significance of gender; that is, how macro-political structures of male domination are manifested in concrete situations as well as how female diplomats often have a larger room for maneuver. The meetings analyzed in the chapter raise critical questions about frontstage/backstage aspects of international encounters, micro-sociality versus performativity, as well as the interplay between in-meeting dynamics and structural conditions/effects of the meetings. The discussion of these questions in the chapter will illustrate the complex nature of micro-dynamics in international meetings.

Chapter 6 provides an overview of the general aspects of the right of self-defence. It first examines the concept of an ‘armed attack’ as found in Article 51, with the aim of shedding some light on the difficult issues and questions raised by this prerequisite for the invocation of the right of self-defence. It then goes on to provide an examination of the twin customary principles of necessity and proportionality, including a specific look at the controversial concept of armed reprisals, before moving on to examining military action for the protection of nationals who are located abroad. The right of self-defence exists in both individual and collective forms, and the chapter takes a specific look at the right of collective self-defence. Finally, it examines the role of the UN Security Council in the invocation and implementation of the right of self-defence, an aspect of the right which is prominent throughout Article 51.

The past decade has seen outside states, coalitions or regional organisations lead military operations at the (real or alleged) ‘invitation’ of one of the parties embroiled in military strife – notably, in Mali, Syria, Yemen, and The Gambia. This chapter addresses key legal questions, starting with the validity of a government’s ‘consent’. Others include the legal nature and the effects of such consent, and how a government might lose its capacity to consent to military action in its own territory. The chapter includes analysis of the legal doctrines that might limit the lawfulness of the intervention despite such consent, including the invalidity of consent, the ‘negative equality’ doctrine or complete abstention, unlawful purposes, and other grounds of illegality, such as the inviting state’s complicity in international crimes. In the cases examined in the volume, the intervening states typically invoked multiple legal grounds, of which invitation is only one, and the UN Security Council has been intensely involved: the chapter appraises the legal significance of these novel features. It concludes with a summary of the trialogue method and an overview of the subsequent chapters.

Using a classical perspective tending to interpret existing positive international law, this chapter pursues a double objective. First, it fits in with the doctrinal trend embodied by the Institut de droit international (IDI) in emphasising that intervention by invitation is unlawful if it implies interference in an internal situation, contrary to the right of peoples to self-determination. Second, this research highlights the growing role of the UN Security Council in appraising and characterising the conditions surrounding the legal validity of intervention by invitation. The chapter focuses on military operations in Mali (2013), Iraq (2014), Syria (2015), Yemen (2015), and The Gambia (2017). It observes how, by adopting resolutions, the UN Security Council made pronouncements on which authority was entitled to give its consent, and on the legitimacy of the object and effects of the intervention. The chapter concludes that the Council no longer necessarily authorises any military intervention, but centralises and multilateralises the appraisal of the circumstances surrounding the formulation of the invitation.

This concluding chapter draws the central threads of the book together. It proceeds in five steps, providing conclusions, first, on the limitation of military intervention by invitation and, second, on the institutionalisation triggered by the increased importance of the UN Security Council in the operation of the law. It then takes up the question of whether Council practice may contribute to the development of the law, and it addresses the politicisation of the practice of consensual military intervention. Finally, it argues that while practice has been multilateralised as a result of the increased role the Security Council plays, we are in fact witness only to a ‘half-hearted multilateralisation’.

Aiming to move beyond the limited primary sources on which polarised debate is usually based, this chapter reviews new data on UN Security Council practice in response to consensual interventions. From 1990 to 2013, the Council passed resolutions on 76 per cent of all internal conflicts. This chapter evaluates that response in light of four leading theories: of the Court in Nicaragua, that governmental invitations are always valid; of the Institut de droit international (IDI), that pro-government interventions are ‘allowable’ until a conflict becomes a civil war; that intervention is allowable at the invitation of an elected ‘democratic’ government to secure or restore its power; and that it is allowable in response to an invitation to counter ‘terrorist’ threats. The data shows that the Council does not unequivocally support the Nicaragua or IDI views but has approved regularly the anti-terrorist, and occasionally the pro-democracy, views. Its active voice is more marked than its alignment with any one theory. Among other implications, the IDI view – a Cold War response to abuses of supposed invitations – may be less salient when a multilateral check on such abuses is available.

Given the weakness of today’s UN as an instrument for tackling global challenges, we need to rely on treaties and diplomacy for urgent safety measures at the international level: a new pact on restricting bioweapons and synthetic biology, with inspections for verification; a treaty on AI and cyberwarfare; and a treaty to restrain the arms race for weapons in the oceans and outer space. After creating an Office for Emerging Biotechnology in the US, we should promote the creation of similar offices in as many other nations as possible, building a network of global regulatory capabilities. Finally, we can undertake a series of moderate reforms to beef up the effectiveness of the UN: enlarging the Security Council; restricting the use of the veto; and adding new Peacebuilding roles to the General Assembly.

This chapter describes a “second wave” of modifications to the UN system that would further strengthen its capabilities during the latter half of the twenty-first century. It focuses on two major challenges that the UN will be facing during the coming decades: the international regulation of biotechnology, and the global effort to remove excess carbon dioxide from the Earth’s atmosphere. New, CRISPR-based technologies for editing genomes have allowed scientists to make path-breaking innovations, bringing the concept of “designer babies” far closer to realization than ever before. At the same time, the climate crisis has prompted some scientists to propose radical new forms of “solar radiation management” such as artificial clouds or even a space shield to prevent runaway global warming. Effective regulation of such extreme new technologies will require new international instruments over the coming decades, such as a democratically elected World Parliament, a more representative Security Council, and a standing UN army equipped to respond swiftly to emerging crises.

Chapter 6 presents the second of the three case studies: Protecting the Individual Human Being from Mass Atrocities. The case study offers a critical discussion of the literature and the development of R2P. The chapter then analyses the discourse on Libya and Syria concerning actions to protect civilians and the potential use of force to do so. The analysis focuses mainly on UN Security Council deliberations. Finally, the chapter demonstrates how the individual human being appears in the discourse on protection as innocent civilians or guilty perpetrators or terrorists. As will be demonstrated, this matters for enabling a politics of protection. By analysing the debate on the intervention in Libya in 2011 and dealing with the conflict in Syria, mainly focusing on the years 2011 to 2015, respectively, I demonstrate how these politics of protection play out

The role of the UN Security Council in the protection of civilians has evolved significantly over the last twenty-five years. This chapter describes how civilian protection has become not only a mandate for UN peacekeeping but also the grounds for Council authorisation of military action. The chapter also describes the difference (and overlap) between the protection of civilians and the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). It also touches on the controversial issue of unilateral humanitarian intervention as a means to protect civilians.

International commercial courts have much to learn from international criminal tribunals (ICTs), as these were the first (along with investment tribunals) to combine domestic and international law, in a manner that today exemplifies the interplay of transnational law. Although ICTs dispensed criminal justice, their hybrid commercial counterparts of the twenty-first century do not depart from the ICT model of justice. There are striking similarities in that both wish to attract users and ultimately become financially independent; they both strive to convince their financiers that they are worth the effort and expense. Ultimately, and although this may not be apparent from the outset (and may not perhaps even be an indirect goal), both ICTs and hybrid commercial tribunals will have to show that they are truly legitimate and that they feed into the local legal system in a meaningful way. If they do not, they will have failed to meet the concerns and aspirations of all users of the pertinent legal system.

The law of transnational counter-terrorism comes in various forms, encompassing hard-law instruments like Security Council resolutions, regulatory instruments like good practices or guidance, and managerial instruments like the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Law is a critical instrument in the post-9/11 approach to developing, reorienting, and globalising a particular orientation towards counter-terrorism. This chapter outlines the dynamics of transnational counter-terrorism law, considering the Security Council’s ascendant position as a lawmaker in this field, the ways in which the regulatory activities of informal institutions are ‘hardened’ through Security Council engagement (thus identifying them as pseudo law-making entities), and how the approach adopted in the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy reinforces these practices. The chapter shows how, through the variety of its forms and addressees, the law of transnational counter-terrorism transports the logics of transnational counter-terrorism into everyday practices of administration, criminal justice, surveillance, all the while marginalising rights.

Transnational counter-terrorism is a crowded field dominated by closed institutions. They include formal international organisations, informal international or multilateral institutions, hybrid entities, private actors, and regional organisations. National authorities and states are also part of this transnational milieu, implicated as members of international organisations and institutions, as founders and funders, as co-ordinators, and as implementers. This chapter argues that consideration of institutions is critical to achieving insight into the dynamics of transnational counter-terrorism, and in particular to understanding the flows of power, norms, and activity across different scales of transnational counter-terrorism, as well as from counter-terrorism to other fields of activity. It then considers the institutions of transnational counter-terrorism: the UN Security Council and its subordinate entities, the General Assembly, the members of the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, and informal institutions, organisations, hybrids, private actors, and others that have been drawn into the transnational counter-terrorism order.