Although most people in sub-Saharan Africa are very religious, state support for religion (such as through policies legislating religious values and supporting religious institutions) is very low in the region. Why is this? This paper explores this phenomenon using data from Pew Research Centre and Religion and State Project. While population religiosity is ordinarily correlated with state support for religion elsewhere in the world, sub-Saharan Africa is indeed anomalous. Yet contrary to popular explanations, this is not explained by limited state capacity, weak democracies, religious and ethnic pluralism, or majority religion. Using case studies of Rwanda and Mozambique, the paper considers whether challenges to the moral authority of religious actors as leaders of “the nation” may help explain why state support for religion is so low in sub-Saharan Africa. Taken together, these findings challenge assumptions that high religiosity in sub-Saharan Africa is a threat to secular governance.

Since the 1990s, gender quotas have been celebrated for improving women’s equality. Yet their cross-national and longitudinal impact on attitudes toward female politicians and the mechanism through which this process occurs are not well understood. Using multilevel modeling on 87 nations, we examine how different types of quotas, with varied features and levels of strength, shape beliefs about women in politics. We give particular attention to the mechanism of visibility created by quotas in impacting attitudes. Results suggest that unlike quotas with features facilitating low visibility (i.e., weak quotas), those producing high visibility (i.e., robust quotas) significantly impact public approval of women in politics. However, the direction of this effect varies by quota type. Social context also matters. Robust quota effects—both positive and negative—are especially pronounced in democracies but are insignificant in nondemocracies. Limited differences by gender (men versus women) emerge. Theoretical and policy implications are discussed.

In the increasing scholars' attention to factors associated with conspiracy beliefs, religiosity has been under-investigated, at least in empirical research. This study aims to address the issue by analysing to what extent and in which forms individual religiosity is associated with conspiracy beliefs. Religion and conspiracy theories could show both similarities and dissimilarities. First, as alternative religiosity and conspiracy theories tend to spread knowledge stigmatized by the authorities, we expect that alternative religious beliefs are positively associated with conspiracy beliefs. Second, as religion and conspiracy theories explain events with the agency of invisible forces and detect patterns in nature, also conventional religious beliefs are supposed to be positively associated with conspiracy beliefs. Third, church attendance is hypothesized to discourage conspiracy beliefs, as exposure to religious authorities could deter the adhesion to unofficial narratives. By employing data coming from the Italian joint edition of the European Values Study–World Values Survey 2018, the paper tests the hypotheses by analysing the association between the multiple dimensions of individual religiosity and belief in a conspiracy theory on pharmaceutical companies. Results show that, after controlling for confidence in political and religious institutions and attitudes towards science, only alternative religious beliefs, here measured by belief in the reincarnation, are positively associated with belief in the big pharma conspiracy theory. Empirical evidence suggests taking caution when looking at similarities between conventional religiosity and conspiracy beliefs.

While confidence in the business sector is crucial for well-functioning markets, there is surprisingly little empirical work on its sources. Available research recognizes generalized social trust and macroeconomic performance (especially unemployment and economic growth) as major forces explaining confidence in institutions and organizations in general. By assuming that confidence in companies hinges on rules, formal procedures, and practices that shape how organizations function, economic regulation is frequently advocated to foster confidence in companies, not least as it is supposed to reduce the scope for opportunistic behavior. Based on individual-level data from World Values Survey/European Values studies and economic regulation data from the Economic Freedom of the World project we investigate statistical associations of confidence in major companies with generalized social trust and macroeconomic performance as well as the intensity and quality of business regulation. From an economic policy perspective our findings suggest that confidence in the business sector can be facilitated by an implicit guarantee from governments of fair and impartial treatment.

This paper scrutinizes the impact of intolerance toward diverse ethnic, religious, and cultural groups on an individual’s willingness to actively engage in non-violent protest. Following new insights, we examine the individual as well as the ecological effect of social intolerance on protest behavior. Drawing from insights of social psychology and communication science, we expect that the prevalence of intolerance reinforces the positive effect of individual-level intolerance on protest participation. From a rational choice perspective, however, a negative moderating effect is expected, as the expression of opinions becomes redundant for intolerant individuals in an intolerant society. We base our multilevel analyses on data from the World Values Surveys covering 32 established democracies. Our results reveal that intolerance leads to more non-violent protest participation. This relationship, however, is strongly influenced by the prevalence of intolerance in a country.

Ongoing changes in social structures, orientation, and value systems confront us with the growing necessity to address and understand transforming patterns of tolerance as well as specific aspects, such as social tolerance. Based on hierarchical analyses of the latest World Values Survey (2005–08) and national statistics for 28 countries, we assess both individual and contextual aspects that influence an individual's perception of different social groupings. Using a social tolerance index that captures personal attitudes toward these groupings, we present an institutional theory of social tolerance. Our results show that specific institutional qualities, which reduce status anxiety, such as inclusiveness, universality, and fairness, prevail over traditional socio-economic, societal, cultural, and democratic explanations.