Conspiracy theories are gaining increasing interest in academic and public debate. A broad research agenda focused on the socio-political and psychological determinants of conspiracy theory beliefs, on the effect of social media as a new channel of dissemination, on the role played by populist leaders in explaining those theories, and on the impact on social and political outputs. This introduction to the special issue proposes a summary of this growing literature and addresses an aspect that is still under-investigated: the life cycle of conspiracy theories. Previous empirical studies investigated the topic either in a cross-sectional fashion or by employing short-term panels – focusing on how conspiracy theories change over a small period (e.g., before and after an election). Using panel survey data, we take a medium-term approach. We base our investigation on a longitudinal study composed of two survey waves, administered in 2016 and late 2020. Respondents were asked to rate the plausibility of different ‘classic’ conspiracy theories. This allows comparing changes in beliefs in those conspiracy theories over this 4-year time frame. Results show that believes in these theories decrease over time. Furthermore, this decline can only be marginally explained by individual socio-demographic characteristics or political orientations. After thoroughly describing these differences over time, we speculate on why this decline occurs, mainly basing our argument on the role of the media landscape in shaping public opinion.

In the last decade, political protest events have been rising in Western democracies. At the same time, there has been a steady increase in the diffusion of conspiracy theories in political communication, a phenomenon that has captured the interest of scholars for its growing political relevance. However, while most research focuses on the reasons why citizens believe in conspiracies, studies looking at the political-behavioral implications of such beliefs, in particular their connection to political radicalism, have been more limited. In this paper, we investigate the association between people's belief in conspiracies and their propensity to endorse political violence or to legitimate radical political action. Building on pathway theories of radicalization, we argue that conspiracy theories provide narratives that might help people channel their feelings of resentment toward political targets, fueling radical attitudes. We provide some correlational evidence using survey data of US respondents collected on MTurk. We observe attitudes toward political violence using two multi-item batteries, one developed by us. Our results show that people who score higher on a scale of generic conspiracy belief are also more likely to endorse violent political actions.

In the increasing scholars' attention to factors associated with conspiracy beliefs, religiosity has been under-investigated, at least in empirical research. This study aims to address the issue by analysing to what extent and in which forms individual religiosity is associated with conspiracy beliefs. Religion and conspiracy theories could show both similarities and dissimilarities. First, as alternative religiosity and conspiracy theories tend to spread knowledge stigmatized by the authorities, we expect that alternative religious beliefs are positively associated with conspiracy beliefs. Second, as religion and conspiracy theories explain events with the agency of invisible forces and detect patterns in nature, also conventional religious beliefs are supposed to be positively associated with conspiracy beliefs. Third, church attendance is hypothesized to discourage conspiracy beliefs, as exposure to religious authorities could deter the adhesion to unofficial narratives. By employing data coming from the Italian joint edition of the European Values Study–World Values Survey 2018, the paper tests the hypotheses by analysing the association between the multiple dimensions of individual religiosity and belief in a conspiracy theory on pharmaceutical companies. Results show that, after controlling for confidence in political and religious institutions and attitudes towards science, only alternative religious beliefs, here measured by belief in the reincarnation, are positively associated with belief in the big pharma conspiracy theory. Empirical evidence suggests taking caution when looking at similarities between conventional religiosity and conspiracy beliefs.

While official science has given its answer to the question on the origin of the Coronavirus (animal to human transmission), alternative theories on human creation of the virus – purposely or inadvertently – have flourished. Those alternative theories can be easily located among the family of conspiracy theories, as they always assume some secretive activity of some groups acting on their self-interest and against the good of the many. The article assesses the prevalence of these beliefs during the COVID-19 pandemic in Italy, studies its development during the pandemic, and investigates its potential determinants. In particular, it analyses the relationship between beliefs in alternative theories on the origin of the virus and political orientation, by arguing that the association cannot be attributed to (politically) motivated reasoning, as the issue has not been highly politicized in the Italian context. Alternatively, the article suggests that the main factor driving beliefs in alternative accounts on the origins of the virus is institutional trust. Political orientation moderates its effects, depending on specific conditions (e.g. cue taking, position of the supported party either in government or opposition), and eventually reinforcing scepticism towards epistemic authorities for those with low trust in institutions. Data come from the ResPOnsE COVID-19 survey, carried out with daily samples from April to July 2020 (N > 15.000) to monitor the development of the Italian public opinion during the Coronavirus pandemic.

Innumeracy, that is, the inability to deal with numbers and provide correct estimates about political issues, is reported to be widespread among the public. Yet, despite the recognition that a conspiracy mindset is an increasingly common phenomenon in Western democracies, this has not been considered as a potential correlate of innumeracy. Using data from an online sample of respondents across 10 European countries, we show that those with a higher propensity to hold a conspiracy worldview tend to overestimate the actual share of the immigrant population living in their own country. This association holds true when accounting for country heterogeneity and other cognitive, affective and socio-demographic factors. Employing a comparative design and refined measurements, the article contributes to our understanding of how a conspiracy mentality may influence perceptions of relevant political facts, questioning basic processes of democratic accountability.

The formation of the ‘yellow-green’ government that took office in Italy after the general election held on 4 March 2018 looked puzzling to many commentators as the two coalition partners – the Five Star Movement and the League – appeared to be quite distant on the left–right continuum. In this article, we argue that despite being widely used in the literature, a unidimensional representation of parties' policy positions on the encompassing left–right scale is inadequate to explain the process of coalition governments' formation. We focus first on coalition outcomes in Italy in the period 2001–18. Our statistical analysis including, among other variables, parties' policy distance on the left–right dimension performs rather well until 2013 but fails to predict the coalition outcome in 2018. To solve the puzzle, we propose a two-dimensional spatial account of the Conte I government formation in which the first dimension coincides with the economic left–right and the second one is related to immigration, the European Union issues and social conservatism. We show that the coalition outcome ceases to be poorly understandable once parties' policy positions are measured along these two dimensions, rather than on the general left–right continuum.

Despite the development of empirical research on the relations between parties and interest groups, the topic is still understudied and presents several shortcomings. On the one hand, this relationship has been studied mostly from the political parties' point of view. On the other, there is a lack of consensus regarding the determinants of party–group connection. This study aims to advance our knowledge on the topic by examining the relationship between interest groups and political parties in Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). By relying on new data collected through an expert survey, we focus specifically on the strength of the linkage established between parties and interest groups, as well as their determinants. The results suggest that there is a great variation in party–group links, which is explained mostly by party characteristics, namely the type of parties, ideology, and their electoral strength.

In the last few years, a wave of Islamist-related terrorist attacks took place in Western Europe, mainly in France and Belgium but with relevant episodes also in the United Kingdom whereas so far Italy did not suffer any attack of this kind. Each of these countries hosts a large number of Muslim immigrants and communities, participated in military missions in the Middle East, and has been repeatedly threatened by ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) or other Islamist-related radical groups. What then explains the difference in the number and intensity of Islamist-related terrorist attacks in Western European countries? Using qualitative cross-case comparison case studies and relying on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the Association of Religion Data Archive (ARDA), I argue that countries directly discriminating toward Islamic communities are more likely to suffer these kinds of attacks because this discrimination causes grievances against the host state within the discriminated minority. This effect is higher in the presence of religious and cultural networks where these grievances can be brought at the center of the public debate and be connected together because of the presence of large audiences, resulting in the possible development of more radicalized positions of small portions of the discriminated community. This is particularly true for highly secular states like France, where the interpretation of secularism makes accommodation for religious minorities extremely challenging, also resulting in laws that regulate religious behavior of minorities, therefore increasing outrage and frustration of the minority group.

This article reviews three books that offer thought-provoking insights on a central political science question, namely the relationship between capitalism and democracy in the twenty-first century. First, ‘Democracy and Prosperity’ by Iversen and Soskice posits a symbiotic relationship between capitalism and democracy. Advanced capital thrives on nationally rooted institutions, hence it needs democratic politics. A majority of voters ask for pro-advanced-capital reforms, hence democratic politics needs advanced capital. Second, ‘Capitalism, Alone’ by Milanovic depicts a troubled coexistence between capitalism and democracy. The former's tendency to concentrate economic and political power in the hands of the few is the main reason why democratic politics is under pressure. Third, ‘The Age of Surveillance Capitalism’ by Zuboff suggests a negative relationship between digital capitalism and democracy. Surveillance capitalism increasingly acts as a control means of individuals' behaviour, which undermines democracy at its roots. The last section brings the three contributions together. It maintains that a mutually beneficial coexistence between capitalism and democracy currently faces both internal (from within) and external (from without) challenges. In line with Milanovic and Zuboff, it argues that the concentration of economic and political power in the hands of the few is the most apparent from-within challenge. Drawing on Milanovic, it contends that rise of China as a global power combining capitalism with non-democracy challenges the relationship between capitalism and democracy from without. Finally, it contends that the environmental question and the pandemic represent two windows of opportunity for democracy to recover lost ground and re-establish a more balanced relationship with capitalism.