This chapter addresses the motivations and mechanisms behind the following shifts. The structures and functions of Chinese passives underwent three typologically significant changes: (a) the passive morphemes in Old Chinese could not introduce any agent phrase in preverbal position, but those in Contemporary Chinese must introduce an agent noun to make the passive structure well formed; (b) the agent phrase could be introduced only in postverbal position in Old Chinese but is exclusively constrained to preverbal position in Contemporary Chinese; and (c) the passive morphemes are extremely diverse in Contemporary Chinese, including four markers in Mandarin Chinese and at least sixty-nine markers in the other dialects that have grammaticalized from different lexical sources but have quite uniform structures and functions, where the presence of an agent is generally obligatory.

Chapter 4 of Discourse Syntax (Variation in the Middle) introduces students to syntactic patterns that lead to sentences with non-canonical subjects or variation in the way the verb’s arguments are realized, including the object position. After discussing principles of canonical argument realization, including facts from language acquisition and insights from psycholinguistics, the chapter discusses the passive construction, including in preposition stranding contexts, and the verb-particle construction (also known as “phrasal verbs”), in the context of establishing topics, arranging given and new information, and shifting complex material to the end of the sentence (Principle of End-Weight). Woven into these explanations are data from current research in the text-linguistic and variationist approach and attestations from freely available corpora.

Chapter 1 surveys the rise of the pre-Occultation Imamic agents, and their role in ensuring the stability of the Imamate. While previous scholarship has tended to conflate the various roles of the followers of the Imams as a bloc of men (rijāl), it is argued that we must distinguish between different roles, in particular between scholars and agents, although these roles sometimes overlapped. Unlike pure scholars, the prestige and authority of the agents rested upon the fiscal institutions of the Imamate: the systems for collecting the canonical alms taxes, the zakāt and the khums, which were instrumental in ritually and materially connecting the community with their Imams. It is argued that, though the precise origins of an institutionalized Imamate are unclear, by the time of the tenth Imam, legal conventions and institutional protocols for defining the Imamate and its operations had emerged, setting the scene for Occultation-era contestations.

The principle of joint responsibility is only halfway to solving the question of the international responsibility of the EU. That the EU and its Member States are independently responsible for their joint obligations does not necessarily mean that a breach will result in their joint and several responsibility. Chapter 4 accordingly addresses the exclusive responsibility of the EU and its Member States. This chapter explores the hypothesis suggested by the European Commission that authorities of the EU act as de facto organs of the Union when they implement EU law. For this purpose, this study delves into the travaux préparatoires of the ILC rules of responsibility to search for the concept of an organ and agent. It is suggested that while the ILC adopts a broad reading of these terms, international dispute-settlement practice does not support the European Commission’s claim that conduct of Member States’ organs is attributed to the EU when they carry out EU policies.

This chapter explores the final step in the evaluation process: the judgement itself. When the evaluation process is triggered through a noticeable breach of expectations, interactants draw on the various facets of their evaluation warrant (as explained in Chapters 7 and 8) and make a judgement. Chapter 9 focuses on this verdict stage of the process and explores the various elements associated with this. It points out that emotions are often intimately linked with the whole process of evaluation and argues that judgement of behaviour and judgement of the agent need to be distinguished. Often the two are imperceptibly merged, with ‘rude behaviour’ turning into a judgement of ‘rude individual’. Drawing on a theory of blame, the chapter unpacks the various elements that influence people’s judgement of the agent. It also acknowledges that the judgement process is affected by the dynamics of behavioural interaction, including issues such as mindfulness. Finally, the chapter argues that reflecting on the whole evaluation process, including the different perspectives that people may have on what happened and different reasons for it, can be extremely valuable for enhancing intercultural awareness and promoting positive intercultural relations.

In this chapter, we describe the two components of the database of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. The first is the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). The SAM database reports the value of all transactions in an economy during a period of time. The data are organized in a logical framework that provides a visual display of the transactions as a circular flow of national income and spending. The SAM’s microeconomic data describe transactions made by each agent in a region’s economy. When aggregated, the SAM’s micro data describe the region’s macro economy. The SAM’s micro data can be used to calculate descriptive statistics on an economy’s structure. We describe three extensions to a SAM: non-diagonal make matrices, domestic trade margins, and multi-region input-output tables. A CGE model database also includes elasticity parameters that describe the responsiveness of producers and consumers to changes in income and relative prices. The role of these parameters in driving model results can be evaluated in a sensitivity analysis.

In Chapter 1, we saw that ‘negotiation is a process by which two parties with differences’ come together to resolve them. Up until now, we have kept the idea of ‘two parties’ quite simple, and for the most part considered what happens between two negotiators, one on each side. However, we have also seen that negotiations are ‘messy’. The core process of negotiation outlined in Chapter 4 is made more complex when the negotiators are acting on behalf of others. Few negotiate solely on their own account – two business development teams negotiating over a potential joint venture represent their respective companies, as does an IT manager negotiating to acquire a new system for their company. A union official negotiating a new enterprise agreement represents the membership. Members of a delegation to the local council seeking a change in the parking regulations represent their neighbours up and down their street. When the CEO of Air Berlin negotiated over lunch, then shook hands with the CEO of Airbus on a US$7 billion deal to supply aircraft, each executive had complete authority but was at the same time representing their company and all their employees (Newhouse 2000, p. 40). Similarly, with regard to ‘Brexit’, British Prime Ministers David Cameron and later Theresa May had a series of meetings with each of the European leaders over Britain’s departure from the European Union. The countries’ leaders on either side of the table would be using their personal authority to make progress but at the same time be fully conscious of the need to represent their nation’s political viewpoint. In these situations, negotiators can find themselves acting as a bridge, spanning the two sides and forming a channel of communication and accommodation. When the negotiators are not able to broker a deal this may be due more to the pressure on them than to their poor negotiating.

I argue that none of the current explanations of why shareholders should be given voting powers are persuasive. I then explain the exercise of informal power through the exertion of influence.

I argue that none of the current explanations of why shareholders should be given voting powers are persuasive. I then explain the exercise of informal power through the exertion of influence.

I argue that (i) the general meeting is a co-agent of the company and (ii) the company's interests should refer to the long-term value and viability of the company from a normative, legal and empirical perspective.

I argue that none of the current explanations of why shareholders should be given voting powers are persuasive. I then explain the exercise of informal power through the exertion of influence.