For better or worse, non-fungible tokens (NFTs) are the most peculiar and least expected art market innovations of the early twenty-first century. This chapter provides a brief history of NFTs and the NFT market, beginning with the invention of blockchain technology, through the creation of the Bitcoin, Namecoin, and Ethereum blockchains, and the NFT phenomenon. It describes a selection of NFT projects and artists and provides a theoretical account of both the art market and the NFT market.

Fueled in part by the wealth created from digital currencies, major art dealers such as Christie’s and Sotheby’s have embraced the sale of non-fungible tokens (NFTs) attached to unique digital works of art. NFTs, how they are related to the blockchain, and the evolution of the market for digital art is the subject of this chapter. Despite recent decreases in value, it appears that digital art can be added to the growing list of uses for blockchain technology, which is now becoming a part of modern life. This chapter proceeds in five sections. First, the overview of the evolutionary progression of blockchain technology in the form of NFTs. Second, a description of the emergence of the market for digital art. Third, an explanation and historical account of digital art and related recent issues. Fourth, a coverage of the abrupt decline in the market price for many NFTs. And last, a conclusion, which focuses on how the dramatic extension of blockchain and other digital technology to the world of art represents a new and exciting platform for creative expression. This chapter offers a valuable addition to the literature by providing a readable introduction and overview of what is now known about the likely impact of blockchain technology and NFTs to art. Additionally, this important development should have a significant impact on the future of innovation and property law.

Cryptocurrencies are reshaping money and payment systems in unprecedented ways. Catalysts include the launch of Bitcoin in 2009, the evolution of decentralised and centralised technologies, the announcement of Libra in 2019, the ongoing live trials of China’s Digital Yuan, and the COVID-19 pandemic and the related move to presenceless payments.This chapter considers the policy issues and choices associated with cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, and central bank digital currencies (‘CBDCs’) and emphasises that there is no single model for CBDC design. The catalysts reshaping monetary and payment systems challenge regulators. While Bitcoin and its thousands of progenies could be ignored safely by regulators, Facebook’s proposal for Libra, a global stablecoin (‘GSC’), brought an immediate and potent response from regulators globally. This proposal by the private sector to move into the traditional preserve of sovereigns– the creation of currency– was always likely both to trigger such a regulatory response and the development of CBDCs by central banks. China has moved first with its e-CNY– an initiative that may, in time, provoke a chain of CBDC issuance around the globe.

This chapter examines further examples of property rights, including money and wildlife.

Chapter 5. Bitcoin emerged in 2009 from a community of libertarian cryptographers who sought an alternative payment system free from fiat inflation and from government payment surveillance and censorship. Today it provides an alternative payment rail that circumvents central banks. Bitcoin serves as a medium of exchange in some transactions, but not yet as a commonly accepted medium of exchange. The Bitcoin source code keeps the number of Bitcoin in circulation growing, at an ever-slowing rate, along a programmed quantity path. Basic monetary theory shows that this supply mechanism has pros and cons: It avoids money supply shocks, but it rules out any supply response to variations in demand, making the purchasing power of Bitcoin more volatile than that of gold or (relatively well-managed) fiat, which limits the attractiveness of holding Bitcoin as a medium of exchange. The costs of the Bitcoin industry are borne by its users, not by third parties, to the same extent as those of any energy-using private industry. The non-zero chance of its serving as a future global money means that Bitcoin has a fundamental value. It does not inherently rest on an unsustainable chain-letter or “bigger fool” process.

The spectacular, if erratic, growth in the price of Bitcoin since its first implementation in 2009 has attracted substantial public interest. Unlike the stocks promoted by venture capitalists, it is not simply another instance of a well-established asset class, but rather a completely new asset class. Unlike those stocks, it is not promoted by well-connected finance industry insiders, but has been established by outsiders whose agenda was in part to escape the influence of established institutions. And yet, as this chapter will argue, there are some striking similarities in how its value has been constructed. Above all, the process has depended upon the development of a series of narratives about the value of Bitcoin, which have sought to connect it to lay theories of value or valuation conventions, and those narratives have been marketed to specific groups of potential buyers leading to the construction of an asset circle. This chapter traces some of the narratives that have been told about Bitcoin and how they have contributed to (or, in some cases, undermined) the growth of an asset circle for Bitcoin and thus to its spectacular growth in price.

Cryptocurrency markets are unregulated, and increasingly popular, places for ordinary investors to conduct transactions, not unlike the early Wild West of the First Era discussed in Chapter One. This Chapter explores the historical origins of cryptography and its application in the digital sphere. It begins with the Cypherpunk movement against traditional institutions and their demands for transactional privacy, which led the elusive Satoshi Nakamoto to introduce a viable alternative to traditional market transaction platforms in the form of Bitcoin, a cryptocorrency powered by blockchain technology. Blockchain transaction sequences, while anonymous or, more accurately, “pseudonymous,” are self-regulated system that allow users to transact without trusting each other and without having a trusted third-party intermediary. This novel technology ultimately led to the incredible success of Bitcoin currency, which dominates the cryptocurrency market today. Undeniably, Blockchain technologies are reshaping the financial landscape, but their implications extend far beyond the financial sector alone.

Blockchain technology, originally the basis of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency, has received great attention from both academics and practitioners in the last decade. The consequent rise of interest in blockchain applications by different industries as well as public sector organizations has been complemented by questions and research on the impact of blockchain on organizations’ business models. Blockchain is also considered a source of innovation opportunities and challenges for entrepreneurs. Therefore, this chapter explores its potential for digital entrepreneurs, by first introducing the main elements making up the technology and then discussing eight companies that apply blockchain in different sectors, thus providing insights for new ventures. The chapter aims to give an essential understanding of blockchain’s advantages for digital entrepreneurs as well as insights that could inspire potential future applications of this technology for value creation and innovation in different sectors.

Now that we have learned about the common economic definitions of futures and other derivatives, it’s time to see how the relevant US laws and regulations define these financial instruments. The legal and regulatory definitions of derivatives and other financial instruments are often different from the common economic definitions of those selfsame instruments. Why is that? Contrary to what one might think, it is not because Congress wants to make life difficult for law students, or to confuse people. Instead, the differences between how various financial instruments are conceptualized in everyday life and how they are described in statutes and regulations are largely (although not solely) the result of Congress trying to make sure that people cannot easily evade applicable laws and regulations by simply creating look-alike financial instruments that would escape the regulatory framework that Congress had intended for such instruments. In many cases, the legal and regulatory definitions of financial instruments are more expansive and ambiguous than the definitions in common usage.

Chapter 12 is the conclusion of the book. The chapter starts by arguing that the bubble triangle can explain why the cryptocurrency bubble occurred in 2017. It then asks whether the bubble triangle is a good predictive tool. The answer to that question is yes, but bubbles are still difficult to predict because the sparks are difficult to discern. The bubble triangle is also able to predict which bubbles will be destructive (politically sparked bubbles with high bank lending) and which will be useful (technology sparked bubbles with low leverage). The chapter then moves on to look at what governments could do to prevent bubbles. However, since political bubbles are often created because they are in the government’s interest, governments cannot be relied upon to take these measures. The question then arises as to whether the news media can alert investors to the presence of bubbles. The answer to this question very much depends on whether they have the incentive to do so, and this incentive appears to be diminishing over time. The chapter concludes by arguing that investors need to build broad mental models, which include history, if they are to have any chance of predicting bubbles.

In this chapter, the author discusses blockchain's energy problem. Beginning with an account of Boden, Sweden's emergence as the "Node Pole," the chapter explores how much energy the blockchain is consuming, why it is consuming as much as it is, and what can be done about it.

In this chapter, the author dicusses alternative approaches that governments have available to deal with new technologies. Beginning with an account of Malta's efforts to attract blockchain business to the country, the chapter then goes on to explore three regulatory paradigms for technology: (1) the "do nothing" approach; (2) the permissive approach; and (3) the restrictive approach. The chapter explores the pros and cons of each.