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causal trait model

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Chapter 11 - Virtue and the fitting culturing of the human critter
- By David Henderson, Terence Horgan
Edited by Abrol Fairweather, San Francisco State University, Owen Flanagan, Duke University, North Carolina
Book:

Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue

Published online:

05 April 2014

Print publication:

27 March 2014, pp 197-222
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Summary

This chapter provides a detailed assessment in philosophy of the Big Five approach, specifically on the question of whether it provides empirical support for the widespread possession of the moral and epistemic virtues. It briefly reviews some of the recent discussions in philosophy concerning the empirical adequacy of the virtues. The chapter also provides an overview of the Big Five approach in personality psychology. It focuses on three important reasons for why the Big Five taxonomy, however well supported it might be, does not offer any empirical support for the widespread possession of the traditional moral and epistemic virtues. Three important concerns are: Big Five traits are only summary labels; problems for the leading causal trait model of the Big Five; and Big Five and responsibility. The labeling approach can apply to the facets which use virtue concepts.