We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Edited by
Selim Raihan, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh,François Bourguignon, École d'économie de Paris and École des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris,Umar Salam, Oxford Policy Management
This chapter provides an analysis of the structure of the banking sector in Bangladesh, different performance indicators of the banking sector, the trend in NPLs, and efficiency levels of private banks. It also explores the politics of the banking sector and avenues of governance failures in relation to private commercial banks in Bangladesh. This poor performance of the banking sector is related to the low quality of the sector’s lending operations. Through regulatory and policy capture, political patronage often leads to unproductive loans, or simply loans that bankers know will never be repaid. Also, cases of embezzlement through legal insider lending – that is to the bank’s owners or their family – have been reported. NPLs, and the frequent need for monetary injection in state-owned banks or bailouts of private banks, are the manifestation of these governance failures of the whole sector. This chapter emphasises key reforms needed in the governance of the sector which include autonomy of the central bank, modification of the Banking Companies Act and strict adherence to it, and political commitment to penalise loan defaulters.
Edited by
Selim Raihan, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh,François Bourguignon, École d'économie de Paris and École des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris,Umar Salam, Oxford Policy Management
This chapter provides an analysis of the structure of the banking sector in Bangladesh, different performance indicators of the banking sector, the trend in NPLs, and efficiency levels of private banks. It also explores the politics of the banking sector and avenues of governance failures in relation to private commercial banks in Bangladesh. This poor performance of the banking sector is related to the low quality of the sector’s lending operations. Through regulatory and policy capture, political patronage often leads to unproductive loans, or simply loans that bankers know will never be repaid. Also, cases of embezzlement through legal insider lending – that is to the bank’s owners or their family – have been reported. NPLs, and the frequent need for monetary injection in state-owned banks or bailouts of private banks, are the manifestation of these governance failures of the whole sector. This chapter emphasises key reforms needed in the governance of the sector which include autonomy of the central bank, modification of the Banking Companies Act and strict adherence to it, and political commitment to penalise loan defaulters.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.