I provide a Stufenleiter of human intuition that systematizes Kant’s discussions. Starting with intuition überhaupt, as object-giving representation, I distinguish spontaneous from receptive intuition. I divide receptive intuition into sensible and non-sensible; and divide sensible intuition into inner and outer sense, under which our human varieties of temporal and spatial intuition fall as instances (not species). This chapter offers detailed accounts of givenness and of cognitive spontaneity (the other differentia are addressed in Chapter 8). I argue that givenness, the fundamental criterion of intuition überhaupt, involves securing both (i) the existence of the object and (ii) thought’s cognitive access to it. One might worry that these functions could come apart. I address this worry by developing a novel interpretation of spontaneity and its opposite, receptivity. As applied to representations, I argue, these notions are fundamentally epistemic and explanatory. This is why the functions cannot come apart and why a representation that performs one function spontaneously (or, as the case may be, receptively) must also perform the other spontaneously (or receptively).