How does politics affect private international lending? This article highlights the relationship between international banks, their home governments, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and international regulators during the years that preceded the debt crisis of 1982. Based on new archival evidence from different case studies, we find that the decisions of commercial banks to lend were largely based on the home governments’ preferences, competition, and the assumption that home governments and international organizations would provide lender of last resort functions to support borrowing governments. While previous works suggest the 1982 debt crisis was unexpected, we show that banks primarily reacted to the deteriorating macroeconomic situation in many emerging economies once the support of their home governments and the IMF became uncertain.

We investigate how key monetary policy instruments and financial regulation affect the banking firm. We take the user-cost approach to the construction of prices for financial services and use quarterly data on the U.S. commercial banking sector, over the period from 1992 to 2016, obtained from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. We use the symmetric generalized Barnett variable profit function to derive demands for and supplies of monetary and nonmonetary goods and provide evidence consistent with neoclassical microeconomic theory. We find that the compensated price elasticities of banking technology are small in magnitude. Yet a hypothetical policy experiment shows that even small changes in the holding costs of financial goods can result in significant changes in user costs and the quantities demanded and supplied.

A tobit econometric procedure was used to examine the effect of selected demand and supply factors on nonreal estate agricultural lending by commercial banks in Texas. Results show that banks have reduced their agricultural loan portfolios in response to increased use of interest sensitive deposits after deregulation. Moreover, almost half of this decrease came from banks that stopped making agricultural loans. Also, results show that banks affiliated with multi-bank holding companies lend less money to agriculture relative to their assets than do independent banks.

This article discusses the dividend strategy adopted by Norwegian commercial banks before 1914. Based on a unique data set covering all banks in the period 1882– 1913 as well as six other institutions for the pre-1882 period, I identify the existence of a strong bias towards the payment of high and stable dividends to shareholders. The origins of such bias lie in the specific institutional set-up of commercial banking, the expectations of shareholders and the absence of developed securities markets. Combined with a strong preference for high gearing, this feature contributed to increase the fragility of the Norwegian banking system.

This paper explores the relationship between the nature of Spanish savings banks and the extent of their market success during the twentieth century. It deals with the key factors which have made such a good performance possible, including their ability to promote private saving, to cooperate with government economic policy, to adapt to changing circumstances, to operate in particular geographical areas, and to cooperate with one another. Finally, the paper deals in depth with this last factor. The competitive cooperation model is used to explain the outstanding role of the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks in making the strategic alliance between the Spanish savings banks possible.