In this contribution, we exploit machine learning techniques to evaluate whether and how close firms are to become successful exporters. First, we train various algorithms using financial information on both exporters and non-exporters in France in 2010–2018. Thus, we show that it is possible to predict the distance non-exporters are from export status. In particular, we find that a Bayesian Additive Regression Tree with Missingness In Attributes (BART-MIA) performs better than other techniques with an accuracy of up to 0.90. Predictions are robust to changes in definitions of exporters and in the presence of discontinuous exporting activity. Eventually, we discuss how our exporting scores can be helpful for trade promotion, trade credit, and assessing aggregate trade potential. For example, back-of-the-envelope estimates show that a representative firm with just below-average exporting scores needs up to 44% more cash resources and up to 2.5 times more capital to get to foreign markets.

Theoretical equivalence exists among various auction mechanisms, specifically the Second-Price-Auction (SPA), a competitive environment, and the BDM mechanism, a non-competitive environment. Yet, empirical studies suggest that behavior in these mechanisms may diverge. Our experimental study examines the WTP and the WTA of individuals by analyzing buying and selling bidding patterns both for a physical product (mugs) and for two types of lotteries (regular lotteries and extreme lotteries) in these two auctions mechanism: SPA and BDM. We found that the WTP in the SPA is higher than the WTP in the BDM for mugs and for regular lotteries, while the mechanisms do not differ significantly for extreme lotteries. In addition, the WTA in the SPA is lower than in the BDM for regular lotteries only. These results indicate that the WTP and WTA, as well as the WTA-WTP gap, tend to differ in the SPA and in the BDM as a result of the interaction between the competitiveness effect and other psychological effects on bidding patterns for riskless and risky assets. In addition, the current study suggests that the competitiveness effect depends not only on the type of mechanism (SPA), but also on the type of item (physical assets or lotteries) and the type of lottery. In addition, the influence of the competitiveness effect may vary between buying and selling positions.

In this paper, we document a violation of normative and descriptive models of decision making under risk. In contrast to uncertainty effects found by Gneezy, List and Wu (2006), some subjects in our experiments valued lotteries more than the best possible outcome. We show that the overbidding effect is more strongly related to individuals’ competitiveness traits than comprehension of the lottery’s payoff mechanism.

This paper investigates the benefits of incorporating diversification effects into the pricing process of insurance policies from two different business lines. The paper shows that, for the same risk reduction, insurers pricing policies jointly can have a competitive advantage over those pricing them separately. However, the choice of competitiveness constrains the underwriting flexibility of joint pricers. The paper goes a step further by modelling explicitly the relationship between premiums and the number of customers in each line. Using the total collected premiums as a criterion to compare the competing strategies, the paper provides conditions for the optimal pricing decision based on policyholders’ sensitivity to price discounts. The results are illustrated for a portfolio of annuities and assurances. Further, using non-life data from the Brazilian insurance market, an empirical exploration shows that most pairs satisfy the condition for being priced jointly, even when pairwise correlations are high.

India's ambition of playing a prominent role in regional and global affairs has been particularly visible since the assumption of office by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in May 2014. The ambition has resulted in India's external engagement, abandoning the posturing of non-alignment for a more proactive multi-alignment strategy. Its efforts to engage with major powers such as the US and China, as well as other global middle powers such as Japan, the UK, and Australia, have been positioned on rapid economic progress, enabled by one of the fastest rates of growth among major economies. Attempts to expand global strategic influence, a natural outcome of robust economic expansion, should have seen India pursuing an aggressive outward-oriented external trade policy for increasing its share in global trade. India, though, has shown a marked resistance to open trade, including being reluctant to engage in regional and bilateral trade negotiations. This paper examines the dichotomy between India's desire to play a prominent global role and its aversion to open trade policies. Attributing the inward-looking approach to lack of competitiveness of Indian industry, absence of domestic pro-trade constituencies, and discomfort in negotiating new-generation trade issues, the paper argues India's quest for greater global strategic influence might be adversely affected by its restrictive trade policies.

The EU´s falling share in global manufacturing has fuelled concerns about an overall loss of EU competitiveness, in particular vis-à-vis China. We analyse the empirical evidence underlying these concerns by applying a newly developed decomposition technique to global input-output data spanning the years 2000 to 2014. Our results confirm the diminishing role of the EU in manufacturing value chains, but also show that this is mostly, by nearly 75 per cent, a consequence of the geographical and sectoral reallocation of global demand, reflecting the lower economic growth in the EU relative to the rest of the world. Still, the other almost 25 per cent of the EU’s loss of global share is explained by its lower participation in manufacturing value chains, which confirms a downturn in EU competitiveness. By extending the analysis to individual manufacturing activities we show that this general trend is more pronounced for low-tech (e.g. textiles) than high-tech sectors, with pharmaceuticals emerging as the most resilient EU industry. Policy concerns appear to be most warranted for electronics, a key sector for which the EU´s global share fell even more than for overall manufacturing, without evidence that EU value added from upstream service inputs could significantly mitigate this trend.

The concept of electoral competition plays a central role in many subfields of political science, but no consensus exists on how to measure it. One key challenge is how to conceptualize and measure electoral competitiveness at the district level across alternative electoral systems. Recent efforts to meet this challenge have introduced general measures of competitiveness which rest on explicit calculations about how votes translate into seats, but also implicit assumptions about how effort maps into votes (and how costly effort is). We investigate how assumptions about the effort-to-votes mapping affect the units in which competitiveness is best measured, arguing in favor of vote-share-denominated measures and against vote-share-per-seat measures. Whether elections under multimember proportional representation systems are judged more or less competitive than single-member plurality or runoff elections depends directly on the units in which competitiveness is assessed (and hence on assumptions about how effort maps into votes).

Governments support clean technologies to advance both environmental goals and national competitiveness. By adopting environmental policies early on, governments are argued to create durable competitive advantages for domestic companies that develop clean technologies for export to late adopters. This paper argues that policy competition between lead and follower markets conditions the ability of governments to create durable competitive advantages in low-carbon technologies. Depending on the complexity of the technology, we observe two patterns of green industrial policy competition. In low-complexity technologies, such as solar photovoltaics, follower markets are likely to adopt policies that support manufacturing capacity to rapidly achieve price advantages from economies of scale, with global supply chains intensifying this competition (“scaling up”). In high-complexity technologies, such as electric vehicles, follower markets are likely to adopt policies that support research and development to develop differentiated high-tech products for export (“innovating up”). We also suggest that new forms of interdependence in policy competition can affect the political sustainability of lead market policies. Competition in scaling-up is more likely to undermine political coalitions in favor of government support for low-carbon technologies, while innovating-up dynamics embed political coalitions that support lead market policies for low-carbon technologies.

The aim of this article is twofold: first, it seeks to address the question of why the competitive knowledge economy orientation that emerged in certain economically advanced states as a response to the crisis of Fordism came to be embraced by the Indian and the Brazilian states from the late 1980s onwards. Second, it aims to elucidate the manner in which the goal of becoming competitive knowledge economies has been articulated and implemented locally, especially from the mid-1990s onwards, by key fragments of the Indian and the Brazilian states. Drawing on insights from the competition state, regulation school, knowledge economy literature and that on India and Brazil, attention is paid to the context- and conjuncture-specific domestic and international factors that have contributed not only to the adoption of the competitive knowledge economy orientation, but also to the necessarily distinctive ways in which it found expression in practice in India and Brazil.

Animal welfare has become an important issue in poultry production. Concern about poultry welfare has mainly been expressed in industrialised countries. Since trade of poultry products is highly internationalised, welfare aspects have to be considered by all countries involved. This paper reviews the changes in the attitude to animal welfare in Western societies and the related development of regulations and standards, the impact of high welfare standards on production costs and on international trade of poultry products and finally, the influence of different stakeholders on poultry production and marketing. From the 1960s onwards, animal welfare activities have been focused on farm animals kept under ‘industrial’ conditions, such as caged laying hens. Consequently, the management conditions for laying hens in Europe have been regulated in detail by national laws and EU-Directives. Meanwhile, conventional cages have been banned in the EU and welfare activities are now directed towards other issues, such as beak-trimming and killing day-old chicks of layer lines. All measures which are considered to improve the welfare of animals increase cost of production. Hence, differences in national welfare regulations are expected to relocate poultry production to countries with low welfare standards. There is a tendency that important retailers and food chains use welfare as a marketing argument and establish high price premium labels. Standards which are established and controlled by stakeholders of the poultry market are independent of national welfare legislation. This will lead to harmonisation of welfare standards on an international level. Most welfare labels have been developed by retailers in cooperation with welfare-oriented NGOs. There is a new trend in Germany where retailers and farmers organisations develop welfare schemes and poultry producers are paid an extra allowance for welfare-friendly production. This system ensures that poultry farmers are reimbursed for the welfare-related costs.

This article analyzes the competitive strategies of Odense Steel Shipyard between 1918 and 2012 and challenges existing scholarship on competition in global industries. Until the 1980s, the yard adopted typical strategies in shipbuilding, starting with cost leadership and subsequently adopting global segmentation and differentiation strategies. From the mid-1980s, however, it successfully followed a unique national responsiveness strategy, which scholars including Dong Sung Cho and Michael E. Porter had ruled out in shipbuilding. The article shows how shipyard owners shaped strategies and influenced competitiveness.