One method of compensating for economic inequality between spouses at the time of divorce is to award a sum of money, paid monthly over a varying period of time or paid in a lump sum. The criteria for awarding an allowance are comparable in all of the European countries analyzed. The end result of the generality of those criteria is that the principle and amount of the allowance rest largely on the discretion of the judge.

Given the uncertainty that this discretion entails, there have not necessarily been any scales or guidelines developed at the initiative of the authorities with the objective of assisting judges and parties in doing this assessment. However, calculation methods have arisen whose sources and rationales cover a very wide range. The article proposes to produce a review of these various methods and to consider, in the case of France, the rationales they advance.

In 1975, as part of a complete reform of divorce law, France eliminated traditional spousal support awards in favour of payment of a “compensatory allowance.” French law thus went counter to the solutions adopted by most European legal systems, which held with maintaining a support obligation between former spouses as the expression of a duty to assist that continues beyond the divorce.

This analysis examines that innovation and the debate it generated among French parliamentarians and the legal community alike, identifying the justifications advanced by the actors in the French legal system for post-divorce financial compensation itself. We see that in spite of the innovation sought, there is no consensus on the question of the basis for financial compensation after divorce. In the most recent period, however, there has been more openness to remedying inequality associated with differences in the spouses’ investments in household activities.