Economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights include a number of entitlements, such as the right to work and the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work; the right to form and join trade unions; the right to social security; the protection of the family, mothers and children; the right to an adequate standard of living, which includes adequate food, clothing and housing and continuous improvement of living conditions; the right to the highest attainable standard of mental health; the right to education; and the right to participate in cultural life and enjoy the benefits of scientific progress. All these are protected under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).

This chapter explores the emergence of a distinct right to artistic freedom in international human rights law. It starts with an exploration of the input of constitutional traditions, as well as State practice and arguments brought by delegates during the drafting process of article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with respect to freedom of creativity. It further provides an exhaustive examination of the legal instruments protecting freedom of enjoyment of the arts as an individual right, as well as its collective dimension. In particular, the chapter adopts a twofold approach to artistic freedom, viewed both as a component of freedom of expression (the ‘free speech’ approach) under article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and as a cultural right under article 15 of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Finally, the chapter thoroughly explores the scope and institutional protection of artistic freedom in the practice of international and regional human rights bodies (including but not limited to the European Court of Human RIgths), as well as the UN Specialized Agency for Science Education and Culture (UNESCO).

This chapter explores the positive obligations accompanying artistic freedom, and discusses the linkages between artistic freedom and ‘participation’ in cultural life under article 15 ICESCR. It focuses in particular on obilgations related to effective judicial remedies concerning censorship of performances (e.g. Pussy Riot’s Punk Prayer) and demolition of art installations (e.g. the ‘Bridges of Memory’ installation in the Mapocho River in Chile), as well as those related to artists’ cultural mobility (e.g. artists living in a situation of occupation). In this respect, the chapter makes a parallel between international obligations to protect artistic freedom as part of the right to participate in cultural life with forms of artistic performance that require the participation of the public (as in the case of Kaprow’s work, and the ‘Reinventions of Yard’). It further examines the impact of non-discrimination and equality in the artworlds – including for instance discriminatory laws on male guardianship that have an impact on womens’ ability to work as artists, display their work or participate in artistic events and performances. Finally, the author wonders whether de facto equality is ever possible in the artworlds, discussing the application of affirmative action and the so-called special measures in the artworlds.

The topic of this study might appear puzzling to creative artists and art worlds,1 namely painters, musicians, dancers, film-makers, playwriters, composers, all those who make artworks or work with artists, museum staff, art faculty, gallerists, collectors, art buyers and art lovers. What does international law have to do with art? And why is there a need to write a legal monograph on a topic that is self-evident? From the perspective of the aforementioned stakeholders, arts are and should remain free. Freedom is a vital condition for the realization of the creative process.

Many responses to the resurgence of “majority nationalism” assume that that there is nothing normatively significant to the claims of national majorities. They accordingly seek to blunt the force those claims – or simply redescribe them in ways that do not account for majority nationalists’ central commitments or concerns. The very arguments used to ground minority rights in Kymlicka’s works appear to equally justify at least some majority cultural rights. Where a group possesses majority status by reasonably benign means and yet faces threats to its culture through the operation of, for example, globalization, Kymlickean arguments for minority rights grounded in cultural vulnerability equally justify majority cultural rights. In “Nationhood, Multiculturalism, and the Ethics of Membership,” Kymlicka presents justice-based reasons to think that majority rights claims should nonetheless be neutralized. Yet his arguments assume that majority and minority rights claims will only be made within the boundaries of a nation-state and that rights recognition in those circumstances will be a “zero sum” game. This assumption too is unwarranted in a globalized world. The issue of majority rights claims is at least more complicated than what Kymlicka allows.

The word “dignity” is mentioned three times in the Indonesian Constitution, in Article 28 G(1), Article 28 H(3), and Article 34(2). While “dignity” in Article 28 G(1) is mentioned in the context of civil and political rights, both Article 28 H(3) and Article 34(2) mention “dignity” in the context of the rights of social security. In this chapter, the Indonesian Constitutional Court’s decisions on human dignity will be critically analyzed to illustrate how the Court interprets the concept of “dignity” differently in those articles. Arguably, the Indonesian Court takes the position that human dignity under individual rights should be limited but that human dignity under socioeconomic and cultural rights should be promoted.

This chapter sketches the development of international human rights law. The legal position of individuals was perceived by states as a domestic affair of the sovereign state, which could effectively treat its citizens as it pleased. It was not until after the Second World War that this fundamentally changed and international law began to grant individuals rights to protect them from the state. The chapter further presents the main categories or generations of human rights and discusses their key characteristics. Human rights are generally organized in three categories or generations: (a) civil and political rights; (b) economic, social, and cultural rights; and (c) collective rights. This chapter will subsequently turn to several matters concerning the scope of human rights norms, including their addressees, their territorial scope of application, and the circumstances under which human rights may be restricted by the state. Finally, this chapter will explain how human rights are monitored and enforced under international law.

This chapter sketches the development of international human rights law. The legal position of individuals was perceived by states as a domestic affair of the sovereign state, which could effectively treat its citizens as it pleased. It was not until after the Second World War that this fundamentally changed and international law began to grant individuals rights to protect them from the state. The chapter further presents the main categories or generations of human rights and discusses their key characteristics. Human rights are generally organized in three categories or generations: (a) civil and political rights; (b) economic, social, and cultural rights; and (c) collective rights. This chapter will subsequently turn to several matters concerning the scope of human rights norms, including their addressees, their territorial scope of application, and the circumstances under which human rights may be restricted by the state. Finally, this chapter will explain how human rights are monitored and enforced under international law.

This chapter discuss the emergence of a Kurdish student youth and its projection in a decolonization scheme, along with the development and diffusion of new means of communication enabling the different parts of Kurdistan to get more connected. Many developments of the further decade have their roots in the 1946–75 period. Before 1946, the Kurdish movement relied on tribal networks, and it was embedded in rural societies. The founding of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, although its resonance was limited, was a milestone. It was the first attempt to give the Kurds a territorial state and build unity among different parts of Kurdistan. In 1975, Kurdish demands in Iraq and Turkey were inspired by Marxism, even if tribal figures remain stark. The period between 1946 and 1975, therefore, is a transition period where new actors - urban dwellers, student youth - and new discourses - from the quest for a state to the quest for universal emancipation through cultural rights for the Kurds - emerged.

Chapter 7 analyzes the human right to the highest attainable standard of health, as the World Health Organization Constitution articulates it, as requiring both that scientific sharing for biomedical advances take place but also that the benefits of research must be distributed so as to ensure that humans have access to essential medicines. The right to science also seeks to ensure access to the benefits that arise from scientific research and its applications. These discussions are contextualized within the broader colonial histories of both global health and international law and recommends contextualizing both access to pathogens and the sharing of benefits within human rights obligations of states in a manner that is cohesive, and non-fragmented, with other international agreements, including the International Health Regulations and the Nagoya Protocol.

Complaints procedures offer a unique opportunity for individuals and groups to have claims of human rights violations considered and their rights vindicated in a judicial or quasi-judicial procedure. For non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and human rights lawyers, complaints procedures are an important avenue to pursue strategic objectives, in addition to supporting victims in individual cases. States, on the other hand, may find themselves having to defend allegations of specific or systemic violations. Ideally, complaints procedures act as a mirror that provides an opportunity for states to bring their practices into conformity with the respective treaty. In practice, however, states often view unfavourable decisions as unwarranted criticism, which may create difficulties at the implementation stage. The treaty bodies themselves are in theory neutral arbiters that apply the treaty provisions and rules of procedures. However, inevitably, their position as bodies created by states, and relying on states’ cooperation on the one hand and seeking the effective protection of human rights on the other, raises a host of challenges in actual practice.