Running off the £2 trillion of UK corporate sector defined benefit liabilities in an efficient and effective fashion is the biggest challenge facing the UK pensions industry. As more and more defined benefit pension schemes start maturing, the trustees running those schemes need to consider what their target end-state will be and the associated journey plan. However, too few trustee boards have well-articulated and robust plans. Determining the target end-state requires a grasp of various disciplines and an ability to work collaboratively with different professional advisers. This paper sets out issues trustees, employers and their advisers can consider when addressing whether their target end state should be low- dependency, buyout or transfer to a superfund. Member outcomes analysis is introduced as a central tool through which to differentiate alternative target end-states. A five-step methodology is set out for deriving an optimal target end-state for a scheme. Also considered are the specific factors impacting stressed schemes, which highlights the importance to trustee boards when considering their Plan B should their employer or scheme ever become stressed. The paper ends with specific recommendations for the actuarial profession and The Pensions Regulator to take forward.

This paper sets out the working party’s view that for a defined benefit pension scheme’s commutation rate the appropriate starting point should be to set it in line with the scheme’s cash equivalent transfer value basis. We recognise that there may be several reasons why an actuary in their advice may deviate from that starting point and we explore these in detail, giving our views on when deviation is and is not justified, noting that many common reasons used such as selection risk are often used without (in our view) adequate justification. We also cover frequency of review – our view is that commutation rates should be reviewed at least every 3 years and actuaries should consider performing a high-level review of commutation rates annually. We suggest that actuaries should consider proposing market-related commutation rates especially in periods of volatile market conditions. In terms of timing, there are good arguments to review commutation terms either following or during a valuation. Finally, we set out some considerations on how actuaries should present their advice, such as clearly setting out all the information required to take key decisions, following up with any actuarial certification in writing (if necessary) and illustrating the impact on members for changing commutation rates.

We study the time-consistent investment and contribution policies in a defined benefit stochastic pension fund where the manager discounts the instantaneous utility over a finite planning horizon and the final function at constant but different instantaneous rates of time preference. This difference, which can be motivated for some uncertainties affecting payoffs at the end of the planning horizon, will induce a variable bias between the relative valuation of the final function and the previous payoffs and will lead the manager to show time-inconsistent preferences. Both the benefits and the contribution rate are proportional to the total wage of the workers that we suppose is stochastic. The aim is to maximize a CRRA utility function of the net benefit relative to salary in a bounded horizon and to maximize a CRRA final utility of the fund level relative to the salary. The problem is solved by means of dynamic programming techniques, and main results are illustrated numerically.

The last 12 years have seen the evolution of a new funding regime under the supervision of the Pensions Regulator. Over this period, there has been significant turbulence in financial markets, including record low interest rates. This paper takes a critical look at the development of funding approaches and methodologies over this period. It analyses the Pensions Regulator guidance and how scheme specific actuarial methods have emerged since the move away from the Minimum Funding Requirement in 2001 and the introduction of the Scheme Specific Funding Requirements in 2005. It asks whether these new methodologies have been successful from the perspective of members, trustees, employers and shareholders. At a time when actuarial valuation methodologies have faced considerable criticism, this paper aims to propose a pension funding methodology which is fit for purpose and also reflects the latest guidance from the Pensions Regulator on integrated risk management.

This paper summarizes recent developments in Dutch occupational pensions of both the defined contribution and defined benefit (DB) types. A reform of DB schemes is discussed that introduces financial assets as individual entitlements. At the same time, the reformed schemes derive (dis)saving, financial risk management and insurance decisions from the explicit objective of adequate and stable lifelong retirement income. The proposed system also involves an insurance contract pooling longevity risks and possibly collective buffers that share systematic risks with future pension savers. The paper identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the Dutch contract design and draws lessons for other countries.

Over the last 20 years, the extent of defined benefit provision has declined substantially in the United Kingdom. Whilst most of the focus has been on deficits relating to past benefit accrual, the increasing cost of future benefit accrual is also important. There are two reasons for this. First, the change in the cost of defined benefit accrual represents the difference in the earnings for employees with membership of a defined benefit scheme and those with membership of a defined contribution scheme. Second, the current cost of defined benefit accrual gives an indication of the cost of an adequate pension. As such, it can be compared with levels of contribution to defined contribution schemes to determine whether these are adequate. I therefore look at how the cost of pensions has changed relative to the cost of non-pensions earnings. I also look at the main components of the change in pensions cost – those relating to benefits payable, discount rates and longevity – to analyse their relative importance. I find that the cost of employing a member of defined benefit pension scheme has consistently outpaced the cost of employing someone in a defined contribution arrangement. I also find that the current cost of accrual is significantly higher than the average level of payments to defined contribution schemes.

To improve the design of the pay-out phase of DC plans, this paper proposes a new approach to structure pension products: the Personal Pension with Risk sharing (PPR). By unbundling and valuing the investment, (dis)saving, insurance and risk-sharing functions of pensions, PPRs allow risk management and (dis)saving to be customized to the specific features of heterogeneous individuals. Unlike variable annuities, PPRs allow investment risks to be combined with longevity insurance without giving rise to high year-on-year volatility in consumption streams or opaque and rigid valuation and smoothing rules. The synthesis of a PPR structure provides new opportunities for product innovation and for the comparison of retirement products.

Radical changes have been implemented to pension schemes across the UK public sector from April 2015. This paper simulates how these changes will affect the lifetime pension and how the negotiated pension changes compare across six public sector schemes by level of education. Specifically, we simulate the occupation specific Defined Benefit (DB) pension wealth accumulated for a representative employee over the lifecycle by factoring in the recent changes to pension conditions. We find that less educated workers with low or moderate earnings in the NHS, Local Government and Civil Service schemes are the winners having secured an increase in the value of their pension of between 10–20 per cent. Graduate workers with faster wage growth in the Civil Service, Teachers and Local Government schemes lose between 3 per cent and 5 per cent. This is in sharp contrast with the Police and Fire services who have lost around 40 per cent irrespective of their education.

We analyze optimal consumption and pension insurance during the life time of a consumer using the life cycle model, when the consumer has recursive utility. The relationship between substitution of consumption and risk aversion is highlighted, and clarified by the introduction of this type of preferences. We illustrate how recursive utility can be used to explain the empirical consumption puzzle for aggregates. This indicates a plausible choice for the parameters of the utility function, relevant for the consumer in the life cycle model. Optimal life insurance is considered, as well as the portfolio choice problem related to optimal exposures in risky securities. A major finding is that it is optimal for the typical insurance buyer to smooth adverse shocks to the financial market, unlike what is implied by the conventional model. This has implications for what type of contracts the life and pension insurance industry should offer.

State and local pension plans are increasingly moving from the traditional defined benefit (DB) model to non-DB models that generally allow for participant-directed investment. This shift has important implications for the management of the more than US$3 trillion in assets held to finance public employee retirement benefits. To investigate these implications, we introduce new data from a nationwide survey of public DB and non-DB plans and a unique data set on thousands of individual investors in the state of Florida's defined contribution (DC) plan. Using these sources, we explore how participant involvement in the public sector affects the distribution of asset class allocations, management fees, investment outcomes, and portfolio rebalancing at both the individual and aggregate levels. We found that there is little difference between the DB and non-DB plans in terms of asset mix, returns, and fees, except that DB plan have greater access and allocations to alternative investments. We also found that while the average individual DC plan participant allocated their asset similarly to the DB plan, black females and older white males, on average, invested on opposite tails of the risk spectrum.

The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's (PBGC) Pension Insurance Modeling System (PIMS) is used to evaluate the financial security and resilience of the national program backstopping private defined benefit plans. The Pension Research Council of the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania recently convened a Technical Review Panel of experts to review key inputs, outputs, and model assumptions. Our review was intended to provide a formal evaluation of the technical adequacy of the model by outside experts. The papers herein summarize views of each expert on this project. Key findings are as follows:

• • The PIMS models are an important and valuable tool in modeling the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's liability risk. To the best of our knowledge, there is no other model that can do a comparable job.

• • Nevertheless, some improvements could be integrated in the Agency's approach to modeling. Those deserving highest priority attention, in the experts’ view, include incorporating systematic mortality risk (i.e., treat mortality and longevity as stochastic variables); including new asset classes increasingly found in defined benefit plan portfolios (e.g., commercial real estate, private equity funds, infrastructure, hedge funds, and others); developing a more complex model for the term structure of interest rates; and incorporating an option value approach to pricing the insurance provided.

• • The Agency could also do more to communicate the range of uncertainty and potential for problems associated with the PBGC's financial status. This could include additional information including the conditional value-at-risk, and perhaps an ‘intermediate,’ ‘optimistic’, and ‘pessimistic’ set of projected outcomes, as well as the expected ‘date of exhaustion’ for assets backing pension benefits insured by the PBGC.

The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insures private sector defined benefit (DB) pension plans, when an employer becomes insolvent and is unable to pay the pension liabilities. In principle, the insurance premiums collected by PBGC should be sufficient to cover potential losses; this would ensure that PBGC could pay the insured benefits of terminated pension plan without additional external funding (e.g., from taxpayers). Therefore, the risk exposure of the PBGC from insuring DB pension plans arises from the probability of the employer insolvencies; and the terminating plans’ funding status (the excess of the value of the insured plan liabilities over the plan assets). Here we explore only the second component, namely the impact of plan underfunding for the operation of the PBGC. When a DB plan is fully funded, the PBGC's risk exposure for an ongoing plan is low even if the plan sponsor becomes insolvent. Thus the questions most pertinent to the PBGC are: what key risk factors can produce underfunding in a DB plan, and how can these risk factors be quantified? We discuss the key risk factors that produce DB pension underfunding, namely, investment risk and liability risk. These are interrelated and must be considered simultaneously in order to quantify the risk exposure of a DB pension plan. We propose that an integrated risk management model (an Integrated Asset/Liability Model) can help better understand DB pension plan funding risk. We also examine the Pension Insurance Modeling System developed by the PBGC in terms of its own use of some of the building blocks of an integrated risk management model.

We report analysis of voluntary switching from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) plans in an environment best characterised as benign. Using a large Australian fund database we identify socio-demographic correlates and the macroeconomic circumstances associated with DB to DC switching. The age of participants is an important correlate of switching behaviour, suggesting a degree of risk tolerance previously not recognised in the literature. It is also noted, however, that this type of switching behaviour may involve secondary behaviour such that uncertainties of DC investment performance are managed by reference to an asset allocation formula that maps to the previous DB investment strategy.

This paper explores the application of ERM-style techniques to pension funds. It uses the term ‘entity-wide risk management’ rather than ‘enterprise risk management’, even though both have the same acronym (‘ERM’), because many pension funds do not view themselves as business ‘enterprises’ as such. Some of the techniques that business enterprises have for managing risk (e.g. raising new capital from shareholders or branching into new business areas if existing ones have unattractive risk-reward characteristics) may not be open to many pension funds. The paper argues that the holistic approach to risk management (and governance) that is a hallmark of ERM is as appropriate to pension funds as it is to any other type of entity. This is the case whether the fund is defined benefit or defined contribution in nature, or a hybrid. It is also the case whether the ‘entity’ is deemed to be the fund itself, the sponsor or the two combined. Indeed, there are aspects of pension arrangements, such as the relationship between the fund and its sponsor, that lend added impetus to the use of ERM-style techniques in practical pension fund management.

This paper takes an overview of the potential roles and responsibilities of pension scheme actuaries in the United Kingdom in relation to defined contribution (DC) schemes.

First it summarises briefly the background to UK retirement provision and in particular the move to DC arrangements. The paper then compares and contrasts the pension scheme actuary's current role in both defined benefit (DB) and DC schemes. This is then developed to consider what further statutory roles there may be for actuaries in DC schemes.

The paper challenges the profession to champion the public interest by seeking clarity and simplification, and finally considers the impact on actuarial employment.

Traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plans remain the overwhelming norm for teachers, policemen and other employees of state and local governments. The incentives for workers with DB pension plans to stay in their jobs shift dramatically over the course of their careers. Moreover, limited transferability of pension wealth across states and between public and private jobs impedes mobility in the labor market. Yet, little is known about the labor market effects of pensions on state and local government workers. The literature on private-employer pensions has made contributions on some of these fronts in recent years that can shed light on policy concerns raised by the possibility that pension plans will be modified in coming years. Moreover, some of the limitations constraining research on pensions may be overcome by focusing on government workers, with recent work on public school teachers pointing the way. Very recent studies are finding strong retirement responses to age- and tenure-related incentives built into state pension plans.