This chapter highlights two distinct perspectives – international and domestic – on the judicial application of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (the Convention). The international perspective is framed by reference to article 4 of the Convention and the maximalist approach taken by the Committee on the Rights of the Child. The domestic perspective is conceptualised by reference to the direct and indirect application of the Convention as permitted by the reception rules in monist, dualist, and hybrid legal systems. The chapter argues that the international and domestic perspectives on the judicial application of the Convention differ on account of the different institutional positions of the bodies that control them (the Committee vs the domestic courts). The maximalist international position promoted by the Committee is often unavailable to the domestic courts, although it may be a potential inspiration to them. Canvassing these distinct perspectives provides the context for a better understanding of the limitations in the domestic courts’ engagement with the Convention, detailed in the subsequent chapters.

Drawing from the case studies on the judicial application of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (the Convention) in France, Australia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom, this chapter argues that albeit fundamentally different in form, the direct and the indirect application of the Convention, respectively, produce similar effects. Both permit a meaningful engagement with the Convention and the development of child-sensitive reasoning. The chapter highlights that alongside the traditional methods of engagement with the Convention, courts have applied it in a sui generis manner. This demonstrates that the traditional reception rules are unable to capture the diversity of courts’ interaction with the Convention. The chapter discusses the factors that influence the courts’ application of the Convention and highlights the importance of the domestic structure of reception for the judicial application of the Convention. The chapter also concludes that article 3(1) of the Convention has been a favourite of the courts, who see it as a rich repository of legal principles and standards that allow them to justify a distinct legal treatment for children.

This chapter analyses the direct application of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (the Convention) by the Court of Cassation and the Council of State in France, a monist state that has not passed legislation to incorporate or transform the Convention domestically. The chapter highlights the historical contentiousness of the direct application of the Convention, the different approaches taken by the two supreme courts, and the positive impact of the direct application of the Convention once this became more widely accepted. The chapter argues that the direct application of Convention articles gives them a quasi-constitutional status, and permits their mainstreaming into decision-making. It also shows that the direct application of the Convention, and especially of its article 3(1), has added value to judicial reasoning in relation to children. The chapter demonstrates that, contrary to other views, the direct application of the Convention by courts depends to a large extent on factors independent of it rather than on its intrinsic features, such as the alleged weak remedial framework, the generality of its terms, or the formulation of its articles.

This chapter examines the ‘indirect application model’ in constitutional law whereby fundamental rights do not apply ‘directly’ to the relations between individuals but nevertheless influence the content of the private law legal rules that apply between non-state actors. The legal rules though articulate the obligations of non-state actors and, if fundamental rights affect those rules, they affect the obligations of non-state actors. I argue that the indirect application model has several drawbacks – including weakening rights and undermining their relational dimension - but ultimately collapses into a form of direct application model. I thus examine, through this lens, seminal cases in Germany and South Africa, seeking to understand what approach courts utilize to construct the substantive content of the obligations of non-state actors. The analysis highlights that courts draw on a number of factors together with an amorphous balancing process to determine those obligations – similar to the other models analysed in the book.

This chapter considers evaluation of student learning in a transformative classroom as assessing the degree of personal development: direct application, to near transfer, to transfer. Concurrent with these stages are three levels of emotional experience: memorable (emotional without insight), meaningful (emotion with insight), and transformative (emotion with insight, reflection, and change in behavior or attitude). These experiences can be positive or negative, with negative experiences being often found to be more formative. Examples are provided for teaching and testing on the basis of the intersection of these three levels of instruction and three levels of experience from an understanding of achievement, performance, and proficiency tests, along with the impact of testing on instruction – examples of both positive and negative impact of testing are given, and the case is made for aligning testing format and content with desired learning outcomes. Finally, a systematic flaw, of which testing is a part, in instructional system design that impairs formative assessment is pointed out, and suggestions are provided for integrating assessment into TLLT.