We study an OLG model with child policies and a PAYG pension with endogenous retirement and fertility. The result of the planned economy is compared to the decentralized competitive equilibrium deriving optimal policies. We show that in the presence of a PAYG pension system, the optimal policy mix includes an education subsidy and a subsidy for the supply of labor in old age. Fertility should be taxed or incentivized depending on whether there is full or partial retirement, and on the parameters. We focus on the parameter reflecting the deterioration of human capital and show that a child tax may be required.

This paper studies retirement and child support policies in a small, open, overlapping-generations economy with PAYG social security and endogenous retirement and fertility decisions. It demonstrates that neither fertility nor retirement choices necessarily coincide with socially optimal allocation, because agents do not take into account the externalities of fertility and the elderly labor supply in the economy as a whole. It shows that governments can realize the first-best allocation by introducing a child allowance scheme and a subsidy to incentivize the labor supply of older workers. As an alternative to subsidizing the elderly labor supply, we show that the first-best allocation can also be achieved by controlling the retirement age. Finally, the model is simulated in order to study whether the policies devoted to realizing the social optimum in a market economy could be a Pareto improvement.

A central policy issue in the battle against HIV in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is whether and when high-prevalence countries might become autonomous in designing and implementing their own intervention policies against the disease. The aim of this research is twofold. First, it develops a framework for explaining economic development in a general equilibrium growth model with endogenous fertility and endogenous mortality forced by the threat of a persistent, deadly infectious disease, such as HIV/AIDS in SSA. Second, it aims to shed light on the interplay between foreign aid and endogenous domestic public policies in SSA countries severely afflicted by HIV. Consequently, it investigates the demographic and macroeconomic implications of an intervention against HIV/AIDS whose total amount is the sum of an exogenous component representing foreign aid and an endogenous public expenditure. On the assumption that these policies allow the same degree of HIV control, we show the emergence of quite different responses in terms of key demo-economic variables. These effects mainly pass through the fertility response to the evolving epidemic conditions.

The aim of this research is to build on a theory for explaining economic development in a (neoclassical) growth model with endogenous fertility. The economy is inhabited by overlapping generations of rational and identical individuals and identical competitive firms producing with a constant-returns-to-scale technology and no externalities. From a theoretical perspective, the distinguishing feature of this work is that endogenous fertility per se explains the existence of low- and high-development regimes. It provides different reasons (history driven or expectations driven) why some countries enter development trajectories with high GDP and low fertility and others experience underperformances with low GDP and high fertility. The model is also capable to reproduce fertility fluctuations and explain the baby busts and baby booms observed in the last century in some developed countries.

In this paper, we analyze the effects of demographic change on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system, financed with a defined contribution scheme. In particular, we examine the relationship between retirement, fertility, and pensions in a three-period overlapping generations model. We focus on both the case of mandatory retirement and the case where the retirement age is freely chosen. In the case of mandatory retirement, increasing longevity has an unambiguously negative impact on fertility and pension payouts and a positive effect on the level of physical capital in the steady state. On the other hand, when agents choose the time of retirement, an increase in life expectancy positively affects physical capital only when the tax rate is sufficiently low and can have a positive impact on pension benefits, because agents may find it optimal to retire later and to decrease fertility less. Finally, the effects of the social security tax on capital per worker are negative with mandatory retirement; however, they could be positive in the optimal retirement case.

We set up an overlapping-generations model with endogenous fertility to study pensions policies in an ageing economy. We show that an increasing life expectancy may not be detrimental for the economy or the pension system itself. On the other hand, conventional policy measures, such as increasing the retirement age or changing the social security contribution rate could have undesired general equilibrium effects. In particular, both policies decrease capital per worker and might have negative effects on the fertility rate, thus exacerbating population ageing.

Since the seminal work of Becker, the dynamics of endogenous fertility has been based on the trade-off faced by parents between the quantity and the quality of their children. However, in developing countries, where child labor is an indispensable source of household income, parents actually incur a negative cost by having an extra child, so that the trade-off disappears. The purpose of this paper is to restore the Beckerian quantity–quality trade-off when intergenerational transfers are upstream, in order to keep fertility endogenous. We do that by adding a negative “sibship size effect” on human capital formation to the standard Becker model. With a simple specification, we obtain multiplicity of steady states or, more fundamentally, the possibility of a jump from a state with high fertility and low income to a state with low fertility and high income, triggered by a continuous increase in the productivity of human capital formation.

We study the general equilibrium properties of two growth models with overlapping generations, habit formation, and endogenous fertility. In the neoclassical model, habits modify the economy's growth rate and generate transitional dynamics in fertility; stationary income per capita is associated with either increasing or decreasing population and output, depending on the strength of habits. In the AK specification, growing population and increasing consumption per capita require that the habit coefficient lie within definite boundaries; outside the critical interval, positive growth is associated with either declining consumption due to overcrowding, or extinction paths with declining population. In both frameworks, habits reduce fertility: the trade-off between second-period consumption and spending for bequests prompts agents to decrease fertility in order to make parental altruism less costly. This mechanism suggests that status-dependent preferences may explain part of the decline in fertility rates observed in most developed economies.