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2 results

  • Chapter 10 - Immunity to error through misidentification: what it is and where it comes from

  • Edited by Simon Prosser, University of St Andrews, Scotland, François Recanati
  • Book:
    Immunity to Error through Misidentification
    Published online:
    05 May 2012
    Print publication:
    05 April 2012, pp 180-201

  • Summary

    It is often claimed that there is a range of self-ascriptions that are immune to error through misidentification (IEM) relative to the first-person pronoun. The more abstract perspective allows us to see IEM as an instance of a much more general phenomenon having to do with the interaction between representational media. There is some dispute about which self-ascriptions are properly classed as IEM. Some claim that only mental self-ascriptions are IEM, others claim that some non-mental self-ascriptions are IEM. Among mental self-ascriptions, we can distinguish self-ascriptions of experiences and self-attribution of intentional states. IEM is a formal product of the translation between media with different representational scope, together with the representationally unmediated character of reflexive identification. It has nothing in particular to do with mental representation and carries no implication of a special ontology for the self.

  • Chapter 11 - I and I: immunity to error through misidentification of the subject

  • Edited by Simon Prosser, University of St Andrews, Scotland, François Recanati
  • Book:
    Immunity to Error through Misidentification
    Published online:
    05 May 2012
    Print publication:
    05 April 2012, pp 202-223

  • Summary

    This chapter first reviews Wittgenstein's distinction between use of 'I' "as subject" and use of 'I' "as object" in the Blue book. Then, it explains what Immanuel Kant meant by "consciousness of oneself as subject". The chapter argues that Kant's notion offers resources for understanding a heretofore unexplored aspect of the use of 'I' as subject. The chapter offers empirical-psychological support for the distinctions, and for the dependence relation suggested between the different kinds of self-consciousness grounding the uses of 'I' as subject. It draws on a clinical example borrowed from Oliver Sacks in his book The Man who Mistook his Wife for a Hat to illustrate the relation between the two quite different uses of 'I' as subject and the two corresponding kinds of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) relative to the first-person pronoun analyzed in the first two parts of the chapter.