The relationship between scholarship and adjudication has attracted considerable attention in recent years, especially in those areas where significant academic expertise has been developed and academic scrutiny of decisions is common. Yet the role of scholars and scholarship in the context of the adjudicatory practices of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has remained palpably under-investigated. This article begins to fill this gap in the literature by carrying out the first large-scale empirical study of the use of scholarship by the ECtHR. The authors rely on a purpose-built dataset comprising all the citations made by the Grand Chamber of the Court in judgments and separate opinions appended to it. The study finds that the Court's majority uses scholarship for the purposes of reviewing facts and interpreting international and domestic law but does so rarely. The majority of the ECtHR does not use scholarship to interpret the European Convention on Human Rights or for persuasive purposes, unlike the individual Judges in their separate opinions. Indeed, individual Judges refer to scholarship more often, for more varied and arguably different purposes. This use, however, is inconsistent in terms of both frequency and the types of sources referred to.

The article offers a brief account of the continental European (viz., German) and the US American approach to legal education and scholarship. It then explores in which respect legal academics active in these cultures are vulnerable to the lure of commodification, that is, incentives to produce legal expertise for clients. After concluding that these incentives may well be stronger in countries where legal academics consider themselves badly paid and where scholarly traditions are weak, the article explores how commodification can adversely affect the culture of ‘legal science’ as a whole and even work to the detriment of clients.

The emergence and consolidation of European Community law (later European Union law) was rendered possible by key legal and political actors drawing a map of supranational law with the key concepts of direct effect, primacy and uniformity. The underlying assumption was that the actual territory of the law, the law on the ground, would come to fit into the drawn map. However, the last two decades have seen trust on the transformative power of the map drawn through such concepts decline, not least due to related developments. First, what looked like residual points of resistance have become polarized sources of contention over the scope and meaning of EU law; (2) sheer indifference towards EU law has emerged as a relevant attitude, partially replacing acceptance or opposition. Both developments have not led not only to a crisis of European law, but also to an existential crisis of the very actors (the “cartographers”) in charge of drawing the map of European law.

It is widely acknowledged that the contextual study of European Community law, later European Union law, has contributed to a richer understanding of EC/EU law. This review proposes a contextual reconstruction and analysis of EC/EU law in context, or what is the same, it considers the institutions, milieus and debates which fostered the analysis and assessment of EC and EU law as ‘an intricate web of politics, economics and law’, at the same time that facilitated the development of critical self-consciousness about the underlying assumptions that scholars (including contextual scholars) bring to their study of law. This is done by engaging with the work of Francis Snyder, and in particular, with his groundbreaking collection “New Directions in European Community law”.

The law of tort (or extra or non-contractual liability) has been criticised for being imprecise and lacking coherence. Legal systems have sought to systemise its rules in a number of ways. While civil law systems generally place tort law in a civil code, common law systems have favoured case-law development supported by limited statutory intervention consolidating existing legal rules. In both systems, case law plays a significant role in maintaining the flexibility and adaptability of the law. This article will examine, comparatively, different means of systemising the law of tort, contrasting civil law codification (taking the example of recent French proposals to update the tort provisions of the Code civil) with common law statutory consolidation and case-law intervention (using examples taken from English and Australian law). In examining the degree to which these formal means of systemisation are capable of improving the accessibility, intelligibility, clarity and predictability of the law of tort, it will also address the role played by informal sources, be they ambitious restatements of law or other means. It will be argued that given the nature of tort law, at best, any form of systemisation (be it formal or informal) can only seek to minimise any lack of precision and coherence. However, as this comparative study shows, further steps are needed, both in updating outdated codal provisions and rethinking the type of legal scholarship that might best assist the courts.

Legal scholarship in Australia is under-researched. Without detailed empirical investigation, it is difficult to understand the characteristics of the scholarship in terms of topics and method/approach. Legal scholarship, like all scholarship, claims to make a contribution to knowledge. To understand and evaluate the scholarship, this article adopts an empirical method. Using a case study approach and citation counts, the article provides an analysis of all the articles published by a leading law review over ten years: 2008–2018. The article identifies the types and methods of legal scholarship in the journal and examines a sample of its most highly cited articles. The study then evaluates the impact of this scholarship with recommendations for the future.

The newly established judicial-transparency platforms, like China Judgements Online, have provided access to a new resource—judicial big data—making it possible to conduct empirical, big-data-based legal research. However, as is often the case with new products, these platforms—China Judgements Online, in particular—pose a few problems for big-data-based legal research: insufficient academic depth; immature technical methods; and lack of innovation due to flawed data, strict technical thresholds, and lack of theoretical ambition and ability. In the future, big-data-based legal research should make use of current data resources, continue to promote statistical science and computer science in research, and apply small-data research methods, and in the meanwhile pay attention to the combination of data and theory.

This article portrays the use of consensus claims, as well as their substantiation, in the debate on cyber-attacks and Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Focusing on (re)interpretations of the prohibition on the use of force in the light of cyber-attacks, the article first shows how scholars appeal to the ‘majority opinion’ of scholars or the ‘generally accepted’ interpretation of the norm. It points out the different uses of these ‘consensus claims’, as I refer to them, and what scholars invoke exactly when referring to this elusive majority. Elaborating on this ‘elusive’ nature of consensus, I argue that the appeal of a consensus claim lies precisely in its invocation of a fairly mystical ‘out there’. Consensus, as it turns out, evaporates the moment we attempt to substantiate it, and this might be precisely where its strength lies. The second part of the article thus shifts focus to how these claims are substantiated. An empirical inquiry into the footnotes supporting consensus claims reveals that, most of the time, writers refer to the same scholars to substantiate their claims. Making use of Henry Small's idea of ‘concept symbols’, the article argues that these most-cited scholars turn into the ‘bearers’ of majority opinion. On the level of the individual academic piece, the singular reference might appear to be fairly innocent. Yet, when considered as a more widespread practice of ‘self-referentiality’, it seriously impacts who gets a say – and thus, ultimately, what we know – in international law.

This article aims to map the position of academic legal research, using a distinction between “law as a practical discipline”, “law as humanities” and “law as social sciences” as a conceptual framework. Having explained this framework, we address both the “macro” and “micro” level of legal research in the UK. For this purpose, we have collected information on the position of all law schools within the structure of their respective universities. We also introduce “ternary plots” as a new way of explaining individual research preferences. Our general result is that all three categories play a role within the context of UK legal academia, though the relationship between the “macro” and the “micro” level is not always straight-forward. We also provide comparisons with the US and Germany and show that in all three countries law as an academic tradition has been constantly evolving, raising questions such as whether the UK could or should move further to a social science model already dominant in the US.