This editorial takes a practical approach. It aims to stimulate reflections on the way we teach international law today, on how new technologies could enhance the pedagogical experience, on the upgrading of the role and participation of students, and on a better connection with the ‘real world’. It focuses on ‘how’ rather than on ‘what’ or ‘for what purpose’ we teach international law. With this aim in mind, it serves a few ideas seasoned with suggestions and examples.

How can I as an international lawyer, conscious that international law is deeply implicated in today's global injustices and that the course of history will not be changed by any grand legal design, practice law responsibly? Taking as a point of departure my own desire not to seek comfort in the formulation of a critique of law, but to aspire to a responsible practice, I consult two quite different bodies of work: first, critical theory of law and second, recent scholarship on international law that argues a practice guided by ethics may enhance the legitimacy of international law. I turn then to my own practice of international economic law focusing on my occasional role as legal expert on the so-called megaregionals the EU aims to conclude with Canada and the United States. I propose that the debate on international economic law lacks an investigation into the role of law in shaping political economy; that this lack can be explained by the compartmentalization of expertise which leads to justification gaps with respect to projects such as the megaregionals. One way lawyers can assume responsibility is to work on closing these gaps even if it means leaving the ‘inside’ of the legal discipline. Finally, I suggest that a responsible legal practice of social change might follow Roberto Unger's call for institutional imagination. Maybe I can satisfy my wish for a transformative practice by joining forces with friends in experimenting with institutions, hoping to build an alternative political economy.

One of the most striking trends in contemporary international law (IL) scholarship is the turn to empirical research methods. Some see this as sign of progress, whereas others call for caution or even show hostility. With a view to the future of IL scholarship, however, all sides in this at times heated debate seem to have considerable problems keeping a clear focus on the key question: What are the implications of this empirical turn in terms of philosophy of legal science, of the social understanding of IL, and, not least, of the place of doctrinal scholarship after the alleged Wende? What is needed, we argue, in order to answer this question is not yet another partisan suggestion, but rather an attempt at making intelligible both the oppositions and the possibilities of synthesis between normative and empirical approaches to law.

Based on our assessment and rational reconstruction of current arguments and positions we outline a taxonomy consisting of the following three basic, ideal-types in terms of the epistemological understanding of the interface of law and empirical studies: toleration, synthesis and replacement. This tripartite model proves useful with a view to teasing out and better articulating implications of and interrelations between positions. As such the model: i) provides a framework to better situate arguments about the role of empirical studies in IL; ii) helps identify real epistemological stakes in order to overcome ‘trench wars’ – or worse: absence of dialogue and genuine argument; and iii) thus ultimately contributes to the development of a genuine basic science-of-law.

This article portrays the use of consensus claims, as well as their substantiation, in the debate on cyber-attacks and Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Focusing on (re)interpretations of the prohibition on the use of force in the light of cyber-attacks, the article first shows how scholars appeal to the ‘majority opinion’ of scholars or the ‘generally accepted’ interpretation of the norm. It points out the different uses of these ‘consensus claims’, as I refer to them, and what scholars invoke exactly when referring to this elusive majority. Elaborating on this ‘elusive’ nature of consensus, I argue that the appeal of a consensus claim lies precisely in its invocation of a fairly mystical ‘out there’. Consensus, as it turns out, evaporates the moment we attempt to substantiate it, and this might be precisely where its strength lies. The second part of the article thus shifts focus to how these claims are substantiated. An empirical inquiry into the footnotes supporting consensus claims reveals that, most of the time, writers refer to the same scholars to substantiate their claims. Making use of Henry Small's idea of ‘concept symbols’, the article argues that these most-cited scholars turn into the ‘bearers’ of majority opinion. On the level of the individual academic piece, the singular reference might appear to be fairly innocent. Yet, when considered as a more widespread practice of ‘self-referentiality’, it seriously impacts who gets a say – and thus, ultimately, what we know – in international law.

In the past ten years or so, several documentaries on international criminal justice have been produced, shown at film festivals, and used for advocacy and educational purposes. On some occasions, artists, humanitarian organizations, and the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) have worked closely together in the production of documentary films. Documentaries have thus become important tools for education and the spread of imageries of international criminal justice. So far, however, international legal scholars have largely shied away from researching cinematic representations of their field. In this article, I seek to remedy this by focusing on a family of four recent influential documentaries related to the ICC: The Reckoning, The Court, Prosecutor, and Watchers of the Sky. All four use similar modes of representation, narration and promotion and basically communicate the same message about the Court. My article critically analyzes how such artistic interventions have helped create specific images, stories, and sentiments.

This article examines Roger Fisher's scholarship in international law in the decades prior to the publication of Getting to Yes. Fisher engaged with the same major questions as other international law scholars during the Cold War, but his scholarship was distinguished by the degree to which he grappled with the cutting-edge social science of the mid-century. Even as Fisher collaborated with game theorists and nuclear strategists to understand the theory of conflict, he maintained a critical view of the basic assumptions of game theoretic analysis – defending certain normative elements of the methodology even as he denied its descriptive claims. Subsequent work sought to generate robust descriptions of the role of law in international decision-making during crises. Fisher's normative and descriptive studies of the role of law in such crises led directly to Getting to Yes, creating a body of ‘meta-game theory’ that situated formal studies of conflict within a lawyer's understanding of dispute resolution. Fisher's engagement with social scientists helps illuminate current methodological debates in international law by highlighting the stakes of these theoretical questions and the tensions between scholarship and practice in international law.

International law scholars frequently seek to participate in international legal proceedings as amici curiae. Often they do so by ‘piggy-backing’ onto the submissions of NGOs and other advocacy groups. Occasionally – but increasingly in recent years – they do so in their own names, purporting to offer ‘pure’ academic expertise, and generating certain expectations of scholarly neutrality. This article focuses on the latter trend, which the authors argue has the potential to re-shape the scholar-adjudicator dialogue in interesting ways. Under the traditional approach towards ‘teachings’, the decision of whether, how and with whom to engage is firmly in the hands of the adjudicators. The proliferation of academic amicus briefs threatens to disrupt this arrangement. It also brings certain benefits: the briefs are often more ‘on point’ than doctrinal writings, while openness to unsolicited academic submissions encourages plurality and reduces reliance on reputation as a measure of scholarly quality. Our survey of the emerging practice across various international courts and tribunals indicates that adjudicators tend to be reticent when it comes to the reception of unsolicited academic amicus briefs, however, we identify several instances of productive engagement. This leads us to conclude that it would be unduly gloomy to characterize the emerging practice as a ‘dialogue of the deaf’. A fairer assessment would be that the academic amicus trend is bringing about a modest adjustment in the way that international law scholars and adjudicators engage with each other.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court) continues to hear and determine the contentious cases submitted to it, keeping up what has been referred to as an acceptable ‘cruising pace’. After recalling the extent to which the demands on the Court have increased, and the practical means available to it have been greatly extended, the author (following up an earlier article on the subject in the Netherlands International Law Review) examines the Court's recent case-law (decisions given since 2010) to show how each decision, besides furthering settlement of the specific dispute, has contributed to the enlargement or development of international law. Attention is concentrated, however, on particular questions: the role of peremptory norms (jus cogens); interpretation of treaties; questions of jurisdiction (including the problem of the existence of a justiciable dispute in each case); and certain incidental proceedings contemplated by the Court's Statute and Rules, namely provisional measures and intervention under Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute.