The chapter opens by making the case for a capacious understanding of the psychology of the religious imagination. Psychological capacities and propensities, it is suggested, are enabling as much as they are constraining, and religious actors creatively employ these capacities and propensities as much as they are unknowingly subject to them. The particular phenomenon for which this notion of the religious imagination is then explored in the bulk of the chapter is the deus ex machina of Greek tragedy; the relevant imaginative capacity is the human propensity for make-believe. The chapter argues that both externally, as a form of make-believe, and internally through details of the dialogue between god and characters, deus ex machina scenes pull systematically in two directions: the religious experience they enable is one in which there is room simultaneously for both belief and disbelief, trust and distrust, commitment and distance. A subsidiary strand of the argument aims to contribute to current debates about the notion of ‘belief’ in scholarship on Greek religion. The chapter emphasizes that ‘belief’ is usefully understood as sometimes including an attitudinal dimension. This attitudinal dimension comes to the fore in the deus scenes.

In the previous chapter we looked at childhood through the lens of dependency. Infants and children can be distinguished from the young of mammals, generally, because, while their brains are large and growing rapidly, representing over half of their metabolism, they remain virtually helpless and in an immature state for a very long time. Others must care for them. In this chapter, we will examine the flip side of that coin and look at how “brainy” but incompetent children set about acquiring their culture and becoming competent members, ultimately supporting their erstwhile caregivers. This process we might characterize as “making sense,” which incorporates two ideas. One is that the child must strive to understand or make sense of all that’s going on around him or her, and this begins in infancy. And two, the child strives to be accepted, to fit in.

What is it for something to be an artwork, or a particular kind of artwork? What is the nature of the creative processes whereby artworks come into existence? What kinds of cognitive capacities and processes enter into the reception and appreciation of artworks? Philosophers of art have appealed to the imagination in answering each of these questions. I first consider the nature and role of the imagination in traditional conceptions of artistic creation, and why such conceptions are now viewed as more problematic. I then outline Kendall Walton’s highly influential analysis of the nature and appreciation of artistic representations in terms of a kind of imagining that he terms “make-believe.” I also consider Gregory Currie’s analysis of the nature of literary and cinematic fictions in terms of prescriptions to imagine various things, and of the role of the imagination in our engagement with such fictions. I next address recent critical responses to the roles ascribed to the imagination by Walton and Currie. Finally I look briefly at what has been termed the puzzle of “imaginative resistance,” our reluctance to engage in some of the imaginings prescribed by literary and cinematic fictions.

Chapter 2 demonstrates that a similar shift took place in the reception of Aristotle’s Poetics in Arabic. Arabic philosophy was faced with the problem of making sense of the poetic as a type of syllogism, since it inherited a classification of Aristotle’s treatise as part of his books on logic (the Organon). While initial attempts in late antiquity distinguished the poetic from other types of syllogism based on its falsehood, Arabic philosophy, especially with Avicenna (d. 1037), decoupled the poetic from truth and falsehood and distinguished the kind of conclusion that one attains through the poetic syllogism as “make-believe” (takhyīl). This new solution shifted the assessment of the poetic from a statement’s truth and falsehood to its ability to conjure a make-believe image. This process was also expected to allow for an experience of discovery and wonder in the listener according to the philosophers. While Aristotle discussed wonder as resulting from manipulations of a tragic plot, Arabic philosophy developed a theory of wonder resulting from the verbal arts, especially simile and metaphor. The chapter follows the development of these ideas in the works of Averroes (d. 1198), al-Qarṭājannī (d. 1285), and al-Sijilmāsi (d. c. 1330).