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34 - Imagination in the Philosophy of Art

from Part V - Phenomenology-Based Forms of the Imagination

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 May 2020

By
David Davies
Edited by
Anna Abraham
Anna Abraham
Affiliation:
University of Georgia
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Summary

What is it for something to be an artwork, or a particular kind of artwork? What is the nature of the creative processes whereby artworks come into existence? What kinds of cognitive capacities and processes enter into the reception and appreciation of artworks? Philosophers of art have appealed to the imagination in answering each of these questions. I first consider the nature and role of the imagination in traditional conceptions of artistic creation, and why such conceptions are now viewed as more problematic. I then outline Kendall Walton’s highly influential analysis of the nature and appreciation of artistic representations in terms of a kind of imagining that he terms “make-believe.” I also consider Gregory Currie’s analysis of the nature of literary and cinematic fictions in terms of prescriptions to imagine various things, and of the role of the imagination in our engagement with such fictions. I next address recent critical responses to the roles ascribed to the imagination by Walton and Currie. Finally I look briefly at what has been termed the puzzle of “imaginative resistance,” our reluctance to engage in some of the imaginings prescribed by literary and cinematic fictions.

Keywords

Artistic creativityartistic appreciationfictionsimulationmake-believefilm experienceimaginative resistance
Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of the Imagination , pp. 565 - 577
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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