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2 results

  • 3 - Moral Virtues in Proverbs

  • Arthur Jan Keefer
  • Book:
    The Book of Proverbs and Virtue Ethics
    Published online:
    22 October 2020
    Print publication:
    05 November 2020, pp 42-92

  • Summary

    Biblical interpreters assume that the moral concepts in Proverbs resemble virtues as understood by moral philosophers, especially Aristotle. No study, however, has considered how the moral-philosophical criteria for defining virtue compare to the concepts in Proverbs. I argue that Proverbs’ moral instructions (focusing on Proverbs 10-29) cohere with Aristotle’s understanding of moral virtue and vice in the Nicomachean Ethics, including his notion of the mean. That is, certain concepts in Proverbs are virtues and vices in the Aristotelian sense. To demonstrate this, I argue that (1) virtues of action and emotion in Proverbs are identifiable through praise and blame; that (2) the vices reflect excess and deficiency in action and emotion; and that (3) the virtues “hit the mean” of these actions and emotions.

  • Chapter 11 - Virtue and the fitting culturing of the human critter

  • Edited by Abrol Fairweather, San Francisco State University, Owen Flanagan, Duke University, North Carolina
  • Book:
    Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue
    Published online:
    05 April 2014
    Print publication:
    27 March 2014, pp 197-222

  • Summary

    This chapter provides a detailed assessment in philosophy of the Big Five approach, specifically on the question of whether it provides empirical support for the widespread possession of the moral and epistemic virtues. It briefly reviews some of the recent discussions in philosophy concerning the empirical adequacy of the virtues. The chapter also provides an overview of the Big Five approach in personality psychology. It focuses on three important reasons for why the Big Five taxonomy, however well supported it might be, does not offer any empirical support for the widespread possession of the traditional moral and epistemic virtues. Three important concerns are: Big Five traits are only summary labels; problems for the leading causal trait model of the Big Five; and Big Five and responsibility. The labeling approach can apply to the facets which use virtue concepts.