Many ancient African societies had advanced and sophisticated humanitarian protection mechanisms and war codes to regulate the conduct of armed hostilities. A careful examination of both historical and contemporary African customs and traditions provides unique avenues through which to interpret and apply international humanitarian protection in armed conflict. As a sub-branch of international law, international humanitarian law (IHL) seeks to limit the excesses of warfare and regulate the conduct of armed hostilities. However, international conventions such as those of IHL remain severely constrained if they are not framed and reconciled with indigenous understandings and meanings of humanitarian protection. In non-international armed conflicts specifically, this enduring challenge demands that IHL conventions and other international conventions be framed and understood within indigenous frameworks that support local ownership of this internationalized body of law. Encouraging dialogue between international norms and indigenous practices can enhance the relevance, authority and legitimacy of IHL in Africa.

This article aims to clarify how international humanitarian law (IHL) rules on targeting apply when drug cartels are party to a non-international armed conflict. The question of distinguishing between a cartel's armed forces and the rest of the cartel members is a pertinent matter. It is crucial to avoid considering every drug dealer a legitimate target, just as we do not consider that everyone working for the government is a legitimate target. Nevertheless, it is unclear at what point a member of a cartel would change from being a criminal to being a member of the armed wing of the cartel, hence becoming a legitimate target. The present article will suggest a teleological approach to solving this conundrum.

Violent conflicts involving non-State armed groups challenge conventional perceptions of war and armed conflict. Criminal enterprises (transnational organized criminal groups including gangs and cartels) are involved in violent competition for both profit and territorial control in many parts of the world. This paper examines the situation in Mexico and Brazil as case studies to assess the legal challenges to criminal armed violence when criminal groups battle among themselves and the State. The paper focuses on the operational challenges and considerations facing police, military, and security forces and justice institutions to illuminate the legal challenges.

This article offers a brief review of the forces that have contributed to the contemporary impasse in the formation of new international law and institutions. It identifies areas where development of the law of armed conflict would provide great benefits, yet where current international conditions render formal legal agreements highly unlikely. It then considers how to advance desirable projects nonetheless. In the absence of effective formal international law-making, jurists face a choice. One approach, which I call inspirational, is to propose idealized legal systems based on claims of justice and practicality. Much published work over the last decade seems to take this path. The hope is that the ideas will inspire and thus lead relevant actors to adopt the systems at a time when the obstacles to international agreements recede. The other approach, which I call entrepreneurial and describe here, involves leading States acting as “norm entrepreneurs”. They can propound and in practice adhere to norms with the intention of inducing other States to follow. The entrepreneurial approach entails a State engaging in a practice that it hopes others will emulate, while the inspirational involves an appeal to the international community as a whole, including significant non-State actors.

Burkina Faso has suffered attacks most often attributed to unidentified armed individuals. These attacks occur in an area which is under the influence of terrorist groups as well as criminal groups. Instability does not stem from a prior armed conflict, but from a continuous deterioration resulting from unclaimed attacks. The challenge then is to know whether international humanitarian law (IHL) can apply in a context where the perpetrators of violence are not identified. This requires visiting the conditions of applicability of IHL in non-international armed conflict to assess their relevance in a context of production of violence without identification of the perpetrators.

As belligerent parties, non-State armed groups (NSAGs) contribute to environmental damage in non-international armed conflicts. Drawing from the actual practice and doctrine of NSAGs, this article unpacks the legal and policy framework for engaging them on the protection of the environment. It analyzes the international humanitarian law rules protecting the environment binding on NSAGs. To improve environmental protection, a model of environmental responsibilities under international human rights law and international environmental law based on the NSAG's level of territorial control is suggested, as a matter of policy. This article then explores how to engage NSAGs on the legal and policy framework identified and proposes a model unilateral declaration for the protection of the natural environment.

On 8 June 1977, the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts adopted two Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. This was the result of nearly ten years of intensive and delicate negotiations. Additional Protocol I protects the victims of international armed conflicts, while Additional Protocol II protects the victims of non-international armed conflicts. These Protocols, which do not replace but supplement the 1949 Geneva Conventions, updated both the law protecting war victims and the law on the conduct of hostilities. This article commemorates the 40th anniversary of the adoption of the 1977 Additional Protocols.

This article presents the preliminary findings of a scoping study that Geneva Call is conducting to understand the existing dynamics between armed non-state actors (ANSAs) and cultural heritage. Geneva Call is a Swiss-based non-governmental organization dedicated to promoting the respect of international humanitarian law by ANSAs. The study centres on three case studies—Syria, Iraq, and Mali—on which information has been obtained through desk and field research, interviews with ANSAs operating in those countries, and with leading organizations committed to the protection of cultural heritage, globally or regionally. The article first maps the various attitudes of ANSAs toward cultural heritage, highlighting both positive and negative examples from current practices. Then it analyzes the response of specialized organizations to the impact of ANSAs on cultural heritage and their level of engagement with these actors on cultural heritage issues. Finally, the conclusion offers some tentative recommendations to enhance the respect of cultural heritage by ANSAs in non-international armed conflicts.

This article challenges the idea, both in domestic and international law, of defining terrorism. Using section 1 of the UK's Terrorism Act 2000 as an illustrative example, this article argues that a single definition of terrorism is invariably broad owing to the need to accommodate the lowest common denominator. This is damaging to the ‘principle of legality’ as recognized in British public law and the ECHR. Moreover, this problem is further exacerbated by the increasing application of counterterrorism legislation to non-international armed conflicts. This article therefore suggests an alternative solution: multiple definitions of terrorism whose breadth is dependent upon the specific circumstances for which they are designed. Fears that such an approach may amount to an ‘expression of inconsistency’ will be addressed by arguing that law's capacity to shape and frame public and political debate on the concept of terrorism is over-exaggerated. Legal definitions of terrorism therefore should remain primarily concerned with the legal rather than political function of defining terrorism.

This article provides a holistic examination of the international legal frameworks which regulate targeted killings by drones. The article argues that for a particular drone strike to be lawful, it must satisfy the legal requirements under all applicable international legal regimes, namely: the law regulating the use of force (ius ad bellum); international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It is argued that the legality of a drone strike under the ius ad bellum does not preclude the wrongfulness of that strike under international humanitarian law or international human rights law, and that since those latter obligations are owed to individuals, one State cannot consent to their violation by another State. The article considers the important legal challenges that the use of armed drones poses under each of the three legal frameworks mentioned above. It considers the law relating to the use of force by States against non-State groups abroad. This part examines the principles of self-defence and consent, in so far as they may be relied upon to justify targeted killings abroad. The article then turns to some of the key controversies in the application of international humanitarian law to drone strikes. It examines the threshold for non-international armed conflicts, the possibility of a global non-international armed conflict and the question of who may be targeted in a non-international armed conflict. The final substantive section of the article considers the nature and application of the right to life in armed conflict, as well as the extraterritorial application of that right particularly in territory not controlled by the State conducting the strike.

The paper offers the first comprehensive treatment of the applicability and regulation of belligerent reprisals in non-international armed conflicts. It introduces three approaches to the topic (‘extralegal’, ‘permissive’ and ‘restrictive’ approaches) which all enjoy some support among States and scholars. The paper shows that international humanitarian law (IHL) treaties, IHL customs and other legal sources do not make it possible to decide between these approaches, as they are either silent on the topic or allow for several interpretations. It is the assessment of extralegal considerations and of the general framework of IHL which allows us to conclude that belligerent reprisals are inapplicable in non-international armed conflicts (‘extralegal’ approach). Yet, there are signs indicating that a gradual shift toward the ‘restrictive’ approach could be under way. The paper cautions against a premature acceptance of this approach drawing attention to its limits.

This article analyses the outcome of the ‘Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations’: a five-year multi-stakeholder effort to develop principles and good practices on detention in international military operations. The Process concluded in 2012 when 18 States ‘welcomed’ a set of non-binding ‘Principles and Guidelines.’ The Principles and Guidelines address uncertainties surrounding the legal basis for the detention, treatment, and transfer of detainees during international military operations, drawing on both human rights and international humanitarian law. This article comments on the Principles and Guidelines, shedding some light on the context in which they were developed and adopted.

Current peace operations often include an element of enforcement. Such operations are based upon Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and are regularly endowed with a right to use ‘all necessary measures’ to fulfil the tasks set down in the particular mandate from the UN Security Council. Such operations, moreover, are often deployed in unstable conditions that border on armed conflict, or in areas of existing conflict. At times, the military forces involved in these operations are also involved in the armed conflict itself.

The utilization of military force naturally raises the question of the legal status of personnel in peace operations under international humanitarian law (IHL). They represent the international community and as such are protected personnel. But how should they be treated from the perspective of IHL? Should they, despite their obvious military characteristics, be regarded as civilians? At what point, if any, could they be regarded as combatants? On the issue of change of status under IHL, does the same threshold apply for the operation's military forces as for other military personnel? Does the involvement of peace forces in an armed conflict, made up of contributions from a number of States, automatically cause that conflict to assume an international nature? Are the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and IHL, applicable in non-international armed conflicts, mutually exclusive? These dilemmas are well illustrated by the difficulties facing the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

A central concept found in the 1907 Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land is the notion of ‘belligerents’. The formal status of ‘belligerents’ or, in more modern terms, ‘combatants’, is limited to international armed conflicts. One of the crucial functions that the status fulfils relates to distinguishing those who are legitimate objects of attack from those who enjoy protection. Combatants are legitimate targets, while civilians are not, unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities. Civilians are defined as all those who are not combatants. Because the formal status of ‘combatant’ is limited to international armed conflicts, the principle of distinction cannot be conceptualized in the same way in non-international armed conflicts. Who, then, may be targeted in non-international armed conflicts and under what conditions and who is conversely immune from being made the object of attack and enjoys protection against the dangers arising from military operations by virtue of the status of ‘civilian’? This article argues that, in principle, members of armed forces of both state and non-state parties to a non-international armed conflict are legitimate targets and all those who are not such members are to be considered civilians. However, the practical operationalisation of the principle of distinction in this way faces a number of difficulties. Due to the variety and changing nature of organised armed groups, a more differentiated approach is required in striking a reasonable balance between military considerations and humanitarian concerns.

This article discusses the contribution made by the jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal to the articulation of the body of international humanitarian law that applies to all armed conflicts, regardless of whether they are international or internal. The Tadić Jurisdiction Decision rendered by the Appeals Chamber in 1995 set the stage for a substantial “rapprochement” of the regulatory content of war crimes committed in international and internal armed conflict, using Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as the main vehicle. The first judgements have contributed greatly to the expansion of the body of “Geneva law” applicable to all armed conflicts. More recently, the Tribunal has started to examine cases of armed conflicts per se, in which perpetrators have been charged with violation of the “Hague law”, i.e., the law relating to the conduct of hostilities. The end result of this development will be elaboration of a common core of Geneva law and Hague law applicable to all armed conflicts that have reached the threshold of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.