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BELLIGERENT REPRISALS IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2014

Veronika Bílková
Veronika Bílková*
Affiliation:
Lecturer at the Charles University in Prague and Researcher at the Institute of International Relations in Prague, Czech Republic, bilkova@prf.cuni.cz.
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Abstract

The paper offers the first comprehensive treatment of the applicability and regulation of belligerent reprisals in non-international armed conflicts. It introduces three approaches to the topic (‘extralegal’, ‘permissive’ and ‘restrictive’ approaches) which all enjoy some support among States and scholars. The paper shows that international humanitarian law (IHL) treaties, IHL customs and other legal sources do not make it possible to decide between these approaches, as they are either silent on the topic or allow for several interpretations. It is the assessment of extralegal considerations and of the general framework of IHL which allows us to conclude that belligerent reprisals are inapplicable in non-international armed conflicts (‘extralegal’ approach). Yet, there are signs indicating that a gradual shift toward the ‘restrictive’ approach could be under way. The paper cautions against a premature acceptance of this approach drawing attention to its limits.

Keywords

belligerent reprisalsinternational humanitarian lawnon-international armed conflicts
Type
Articles
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 63 , Issue 1 , January 2014 , pp. 31 - 65
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2014 

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References

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72 This omission of a reference to belligerent reprisals was regretted by Cuba (CDDH/SR.56, 8 June 1977, VII-225) and the Holy See (CDDH/SR.58, 9 June 1977, VII-321-322).

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86 CDDH/II/SR.33, 10 March 1975, XI-340.

87 CDDH/II/SR.32, 7 March 1975, XI-336.

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89 CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, IX-453.

90 CDDH/II/SR.33, 10 March 1975, XI-342.

91 Art 1(2) of the Amended Protocol II: ‘This Protocol shall apply … to situations referred to in Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.’

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94 ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf, Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands, Judgment, 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 44.

95 Other contentious areas include the institution of persistent objector, the relation between custom and treaties, and the existence of the instant custom.

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97 Continental Shelf case (n 94) section 27.

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147 CDDH/SR.46, 31 May 1977, VI-371.

148 CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, IX-455.

149 Kupreškić (n 14).

150 Kalshoven (n 43).

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153 See Section IVB of this article.

154 I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for drawing my attention to this point.

155 Kupreškić (n 14) section 530.

156 Greenwood (n 49).

157 Kupreškić (n 14) section 528.

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