This chapter examins the internalisation of investment treaty obligations in Korean governmental decision making. The chapter describes how Korea’s approach to internalisation has evolved over time, beginning with largely informational measures and moving towards the development of monitoring and remedial measures following its experience with invetsment claims. Among others, the chapter addresses the role of the Ombudsman. The chapter identifies two principal factors that have posed challenges to internalisation in Korea.

This chapter assesses the compliance of institutional DRMs with the fair trial criteria developed. Three types of DRMs will be subjected to scrutiny. These are permanent judicial mechanisms, arbitration and non-judicialised DRMs. As judicial mechanisms are principally established to resolve employment disputes, the focus is on the leading international administrative tribunals, namely, the UN Dispute and Appeals Tribunals and the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation. Second, the chapter will focus on the role international arbitration plays in resolving claims against IOs. The chapter shows that little thought has been given to implement arbitration as a sustainable and viable option to resolve claims against IOs. Unless a specialised arbitral regime is created that takes into account the particularities of disputes involving IOs, the chances of arbitration providing for an appropriate DRM are dim. Finally, the chapter makes a brief comment on non-judicialised DRMs, such as ombudsperson processes. While such DRMs play an important complementing role, they cannot replace an independent and impartial forum empowered to render a binding judgment. Finally, the chapter highlights that alarmingly, in too many situations, private parties cannot access any DRM at the international level at all. Access to justice is thus comprehensively undermined.

This chapter presents the institutions of central and local government. The balance of powers in favour of the executive within the Fifth Republic Constitution formalises realities of power. The traditional centralised French state with its local representatives controls many important public services. Developments over the past forty years have given more power to regions and large cities. These have provided a counterbalance to centralisation in economic development. The growth of Independent Administrative Authorities reflects developments in other developed countries. Nearly fifty years of the ombudsman function (now constitutionalised as the Défenseur(e) des droits) provides alternative redress to the administrative courts. The chapter concludes with an overview of the sources of French administrative law. The law is no longer primarily drawn from the case law of the Conseil d’Etat, but the Constitution, the enactment of codes, and the importance of EU law and the European Convention have diversified sources of law. Case law remains more important than in private law and legal scholarship is enriched by the participation of leading members of the Conseil d’Etat as authors.

Transparency has been embraced as a means of limiting the risks associated with AI. This chapter considers the manner in which transparency and the related concept of ‘explainability’ are being elaborated, notably the ‘right to explanation’ in the European Union and a move towards explainable AI (XAI) among developers. These are more promising than the arguments for legal personality, but the limits of transparency are already beginning to show as AI systems demonstrate abilities that even their programmers struggle to understand. That is leading regulators to cede ground and settle for explanations of adverse decisions rather than transparency of decision-making processes themselves. Such a backward-looking approach relies on individuals knowing that they have been harmed – which will not always be the case – and should be supplemented with forward-looking mechanisms like impact assessments, audits, and an ombudsperson.

This chapter contextualises how project finance mechanisms interface with indigenous land rights recognition and implementation, and the effects of that convergence for communities in Mongolia and Panama. I analyse how, in two cases, lender safeguarding policies are prioritised through the ordinary and mechanical stream of lender decision-making and the contractual networks that operationalise those policies, questioning the effectiveness of those policies to deliver fair, rights-compliant outcomes. I examine how private environmental and social experts, hired by the borrower, will sort and (de)prioritise local and international norms on indigenous rights and decide which social safeguard policies a borrower should comply with, and how. This provides insights into the operation of law and power in this field: specifically, the fragmented, de-prioritised and powerless nature of different sources of formal indigenous rights norms as they sit against contractual and policy norms. A larger question is of an over-reliance on private experts, the lack of transparency around their decision-making and a deficiency in independent regulatory oversight over these routinely delegated processes.