Households in the USA spend about $70 billion annually on pets. Dogs, the most common pet, can be found in nearly half of American households. An important shadow price in the analysis of policies affecting human mortality is the value of statistical life (VSL), which is imputed from how people make decisions involving tradeoffs between small mortality risks and other goods. The value of statistical dog life (VSDL) is also an important, but until now unavailable, shadow price for use in regulation of such goods as pet foods and environmental toxins. Additionally, an estimate of the VSDL would have uses outside the regulatory process in valuing programs involving zooeyia, in setting tort awards for wrongful dog death, and in property divisions in divorce settlements where joint custody of dogs is not feasible. In order to estimate the VSDL, we conducted a contingent valuation of a national sample of dog owners that elicited willingness-to-pay for changes in mortality risk for pet dogs. Specifically, respondents were asked about willingness-to-pay for a vaccine that would reduce the risk of canine influenza. The design included both quantity (different magnitudes of risk reduction from the offered vaccine) and quality (differences in nature of death from the influenza) treatments as scope tests. It also included treatments involving spillover effects to other dogs and a priming question about disposable income. Based on the analysis and consideration of its assumptions, we recommend $10,000 as the VSDL.

In this study, I examine how the regulatory analysis practices of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), an independent regulatory agency, changed when the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA) of 2008 relaxed its statutory obligations to conduct benefit-cost analysis (BCA). When given discretion, the agency dropped the practice despite significant institutional experience in conducting regulatory BCA and a history of using BCA as a key input to regulatory decisions. While the decision reflects an agency belief that omitting BCA would speed rulemaking under the CPSIA, the results have been mixed. Moreover, choosing to forego BCA-based decision-making fundamentally changed the agency’s regulatory portfolio. In contrast to the typical rule CPSC historically supported with BCA findings, many of the CPSIA rules impose significant economic burdens yet appear to yield negligible benefits. The CPSC would have been unlikely to have pursued the CPSIA rulemakings on its own because it could not have made the necessary BCA findings.