Studies of political persuasion often use an exogenous encouragement as an instrument for persuasive messaging. However, for some people, such encouragement is insufficient, while for others, it is unnecessary. These individuals are excluded from methods that only estimate a treatment effect among compliers. Using the marginal treatment effect framework, we extend research finding that exposure to West German television increases support for communism. We find that, because of self-selection, for those who watch West German TV regardless of signal quality, i.e. always-takers, cutting off West German television would have increased support for communism. Our extrapolation shows that media choices reinforce, rather than mollify, political preferences.

Many researchers use an ordinal scale to quantitatively measure and analyze concepts. Theoretically valid empirical estimates are robust in sign to any monotonic increasing transformation of the ordinal scale. This presents challenges for the point-identification of important parameters of interest. I develop a partial identification method for testing the robustness of empirical estimates to a range of plausible monotonic increasing transformations of the ordinal scale. This method allows for the calculation of plausible bounds around effect estimates. I illustrate this method by revisiting analysis by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011, American Economic Review, 101, 3221–3252) on the slave trade and trust in sub-Saharan Africa. Supplemental illustrations examine results from (i) Aghion et al. (2016, American Economic Review, 106, 3869–3897) on creative destruction and subjective well-being and (ii) Bond and Lang (2013, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 95, 1468–1479) on the fragility of the black–white test score gap.

Ecological inference (EI) is the process of learning about individual behavior from aggregate data. We relax assumptions by allowing for “linear contextual effects,” which previous works have regarded as plausible but avoided due to nonidentification, a problem we sidestep by deriving bounds instead of point estimates. In this way, we offer a conceptual framework to improve on the Duncan–Davis bound, derived more than 65 years ago. To study the effectiveness of our approach, we collect and analyze 8,430 $2\times 2$ EI datasets with known ground truth from several sources—thus bringing considerably more data to bear on the problem than the existing dozen or so datasets available in the literature for evaluating EI estimators. For the 88% of real data sets in our collection that fit a proposed rule, our approach reduces the width of the Duncan–Davis bound, on average, by about 44%, while still capturing the true district-level parameter about 99% of the time. The remaining 12% revert to the Duncan–Davis bound.

The analysis of list experiments depends on two assumptions, known as “no design effect” and “no liars”. The no liars assumption is strong and may fail in many list experiments. I relax the no liars assumption in this paper, and develop a method to provide bounds for the prevalence of sensitive behaviors or attitudes under a weaker behavioral assumption about respondents’ truthfulness toward the sensitive item. I apply the method to a list experiment on the anti-immigration attitudes of California residents and on a broad set of existing list experiment datasets. The prevalence of different items and the correlation structure among items on the list jointly determine the width of the bound estimates. In particular, the bounds tend to be narrower when the list consists of items of the same category, such as multiple groups or organizations, different corporate activities, and various considerations for politician decision-making. My paper illustrates when the full power of the no liars assumption is most needed to pin down the prevalence of the sensitive behavior or attitude, and facilitates estimation of the prevalence robust to violations of the no liars assumption for many list experiment applications.

Forthright characterization of scientific uncertainty is important in principle and in practice. Nevertheless, economists and other researchers commonly report findings with incredible certitude, reporting point predictions and estimates. To motivate expression of incredible certitude, economists suggest that researchers respond to incentives that make the practice tempting. This temptation is the ‘lure’ of incredible certitude. I appraise some of the rationales that observers may have in mind when they state that incredible certitude responds to incentives. I conclude that scientific expression of incredible certitude at most has appeal in limited contexts. It should not be a general practice.