This chapter analyzes how work and employment are shaped within a landscape marked by organizational innovation and, more often than not, even by the fundamental transformation of formal organizations. Even large organizations are increasingly adopting what some have called “post-bureaucratic” forms. The post-bureaucratic organizational landscape is marked by three trends with the aim of achieving even more fluidity in organizations: temporariness, plurality, and partiality. With regard to these three aspects, we argue that work and employment, often intermediated with the help of agencies of all sorts, are increasingly integrated in networked processes of interorganizational value creation.

In this chapter we discuss standards as forms of partial organization. Standards are defined as decided rules for common and voluntary use. Taking the example of CSR and corporate governance standards, we show that the degree of partiality of standards can vary widely – ranging from a single element of organization, i.e. decided rules, to all five elements of organization, i.e. decided rules, hierarchies, membership, monitoring and sanctioning. We demonstrate that in some cases partiality is the result of restrictions in the design of standards, while in other cases it is the result of an explicit choice. We also demonstrate that the degree of partiality of standards can change over time, as there are often pressures for standards to adopt additional organizational elements. Furthermore, we discuss the dispersed nature of many standards, showing how different actors often provide different organizational elements of standards without any central coordination. We close with an outline of an agenda for future research.

Markets and organizations are often contrasted with each other and are sometimes even treated as opposites. But they share at least one characteristic: They are both organized. Many markets have been created by organization, and virtually all markets are organized to a greater or lesser extent; for markets to function according to the normative ideals of economists, a high degree of organization is necessary. In this chapter, the organization of markets is contrasted to other ways by which markets are formed – mutual adaptation among sellers and buyers and institutions. Organization adds substantially to the uncertainty that has been seen as a typical trait of markets. The chapter describes how different combinations of organizational elements are used in different markets. In addition to sellers and buyers, there are two types of market organizers: ‘profiteers’, who organize in order to benefit their own business; and ‘others’, who claim that they organize for the benefit of other people or of everyone. Market organization is the basis for a form of democracy on the global level – a form other than that tied to a formal organization, such as a state.

The argument of this chapter is that brotherhood can be conceptualized as a partially organized relationship, based on membership and rules. To illustrate the conceptualization, the chapter draws examples from three different arenas where there is a strong rhetorical emphasis on brotherhood, or fraternity: the military, motorcycle clubs, and monasteries. Membership determines who is a brother or not and while the brotherly relationship sometimes extends beyond the cessation of membership in a formal organization, it presupposes membership at some point. Rules clarify important components of brotherhood including homogeneous relations among all brothers (or sisters). This makes a crucial difference relative to friendship, which is a type of relationship that can even be a threat for brotherhood. In areas where collectivist ideology, homogeneity of relationships, and requests on loyalty are especially forceful, personal or friendly relations between individual members cannot compensate for failure as a “brother.” Brotherhood justifies sacrifice of individual needs to collective demands, and this may include the sacrifice of a personal relation.

The idea of partial organization has not been fully explored. Relatively little attention has been paid to organization within organizations or to the possibility of partial de-organization. We explore this possibility in the context of business firms for which innovation and strategic renewal are imperatives. The firm’s top management created conditions for autonomous action in the form of a dedicated internal development program for strategic renewal. Thus, it attempted to partially deconstruct its organizational hierarchy and other elements of its decided order. Employees from all over the organization were invited to participate in the program and to present proposals for new strategic initiatives. The contribution of the paper is in the introduction of the concept of partial de-organizing and in the argument that partial organization is also observable within, and not just without, the boundaries of formal organizations.

This chapter is about how the concept of partial organization can contribute to our understanding of the specificity of organizing collective action through social media. Empirically, it is a story about how a small group of activists via Facebook could raise 9 million Swedish crowns (around 900 000 Euros) in just over a week to a private bank account, and also about the ensuing challenges involved in allocating the funds and packing and distributing the tons of clothes and other items they collected. Theoretically, we want to propose that the undecided order of a social media initiative may hold sufficient power to initiate it, but it may become too strenuous to manage in the long run without legitimate authority. In turn, pressures to incorporate standardized practices of membership, leadership, and monitoring may risk the very basis of the large-scale engagement that the partialness of the social media initiative has enabled.

In recent years, researchers have observed the increasing emergence of new forms of organization, in which membership is described as becoming fluid or unclear. Against this backdrop, scholars have proposed to drop membership as a defining criterion for formal organizations and instead to apply the broader concept of ‘contributorship’, which states that there are not only members of an organization, but also contributors who belong partially to the organization, as long as they participate in the organizational processes. I add to this development and combine the concept of contributorship with the decision-based perspective on organizations, which sees decisions as the constitutive elements of organization. Thus, contributorship can be understood as a matter of decision: through their decisions, organizations manage the possibilities for individuals to contribute. I build on two qualitative case studies demonstrating that instead of defining specific members, organizations can decide on spatial, temporal, attributional, resource-related, and/or quantitative-limitational premises for distributing possibilities of contributions.

The modern world is highly organized. Much organization occurs within formal organizations, to the extent that the extensive study of formal organizations has overshadowed other forms of organization. But organization happens not only within, but also outside the context of formal organizations. We define ‘organization’ as a decided order, and we see some decisions as more fundamental than others and have dubbed these decisions ‘organizational elements’. We distinguish five such elements: membership, rules, monitoring, sanctions, and hierarchy. Individuals or organizations can use organizational elements to organize other individuals or organizations, even if they do not belong to the same organization. But organizers do not necessarily use all elements, and all settings are not organized by all elements. In fact, many social settings are only partially organized – even formal organizations. We use the concepts of social relationships and formal organization to specify what we mean by organization and organizational elements, and compare organizational elements with other ways in which social relationships develop. We describe the differences between organization and other origins of social order such as institutions and networks. The chapter ends with an overview of the following chapters.

Although the question whether organisation obstructs or supports social movement claims and mobilisation has long been debated, it is undeniable that some level of organisation exists in even the most radically horizontal social movements. Relatively little attention has been paid, however, to how movements operate in dealing with the tensions associated with the question of organisation, that is, how they seek to be effective in decision-making while maintaining or advancing inclusivity and participation. This chapter presents an analysis of the organising efforts of a timebank. With a particular focus on the production of organisation, we illustrate how a group vested on the idea of horizontal, non-hierarchical collective action is dealing with the coordination and decision-making challenges they meet over time.

The objective of this chapter is to explore the potential of the partial-organization concept as applied to the analysis of inter-firm networks as a form of economic governance that is created, reproduced or transformed with the help of network management practices. Key insights that the partial-organization perspective can provide into the process and the outcome of organizing and managing inter-firm networks are discussed. Inter-firm networks are conceived as partial organization of more or less complete formal organizations. Under specific circumstances, inter-firm networks could even be considered, at least in some aspects, as being even more organized than organizations. With regard to insights into the dynamics of this organizational form the chapter argues that the concept of partial organization helps to understand the development of this form from initial market relationships as well as from hierarchical organizations

Although the question whether organisation obstructs or supports social movement claims and mobilisation has long been debated, it is undeniable that some level of organisation exists in even the most radically horizontal social movements. Relatively little attention has been paid, however, to how movements operate in dealing with the tensions associated with the question of organisation, that is, how they seek to be effective in decision-making while maintaining or advancing inclusivity and participation. This chapter presents an analysis of the organising efforts of a timebank. With a particular focus on the production of organisation, we illustrate how a group vested on the idea of horizontal, non-hierarchical collective action is dealing with the coordination and decision-making challenges they meet over time.

Markets and organizations are often contrasted with each other and are sometimes even treated as opposites. But they share at least one characteristic: They are both organized. Many markets have been created by organization, and virtually all markets are organized to a greater or lesser extent; for markets to function according to the normative ideals of economists, a high degree of organization is necessary. In this chapter, the organization of markets is contrasted to other ways by which markets are formed – mutual adaptation among sellers and buyers and institutions. Organization adds substantially to the uncertainty that has been seen as a typical trait of markets. The chapter describes how different combinations of organizational elements are used in different markets. In addition to sellers and buyers, there are two types of market organizers: ‘profiteers’, who organize in order to benefit their own business; and ‘others’, who claim that they organize for the benefit of other people or of everyone. Market organization is the basis for a form of democracy on the global level – a form other than that tied to a formal organization, such as a state.

The modern world is highly organized. Much organization occurs within formal organizations, to the extent that the extensive study of formal organizations has overshadowed other forms of organization. But organization happens not only within, but also outside the context of formal organizations. We define ‘organization’ as a decided order, and we see some decisions as more fundamental than others and have dubbed these decisions ‘organizational elements’. We distinguish five such elements: membership, rules, monitoring, sanctions, and hierarchy. Individuals or organizations can use organizational elements to organize other individuals or organizations, even if they do not belong to the same organization. But organizers do not necessarily use all elements, and all settings are not organized by all elements. In fact, many social settings are only partially organized – even formal organizations. We use the concepts of social relationships and formal organization to specify what we mean by organization and organizational elements, and compare organizational elements with other ways in which social relationships develop. We describe the differences between organization and other origins of social order such as institutions and networks. The chapter ends with an overview of the following chapters.

In this chapter we argue that the key to an understanding of international governmental organizations (IGOs) is to conceptualize them not as standard forms of organizations with individuals as their members, but as meta-organizations comprising organized actors as members. Meta-organizations are paradoxical constructions: autonomous actors with autonomous actors as members. Organizational elements cannot be considered in isolation in meta-organizations; their combination are key factors; therefore meta-organizations are often partially organized. IGOs are permanently competing for actorhood with their member states and this competition has far-reaching implications for to what extent they can make use of all organizational elements. Using one element may require the avoidance of other elements or certain forms of decision-making. This helps to explain why IGOs have problems achieving co-ordinated organizational action and why they are less powerful actors than standard organizations are. Yet IGOs are strong in other respects. The most important organizational element in IGOs is membership. The strengths of IGOs can be understood in relation to their creation, their expansion, and their long-term influence on their members.

In this chapter, we explore the usefulness of applying the idea of partial organization as one way of mitigating the confusion surrounding the notion of organized crime. We examine three types of collectivities that are usually seen as examples of organized crime: outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCs), street gangs, and mafias. When we examine the occurrence of organizational elements, we find substantial differences among these three cases not only in the amount of their organization, but also in the ways in which they are organized. A few multinational outlaw motorcycle gangs have gradually been able to form strong formal organizations containing all organizational elements. For a mafia, the situation is quite the opposite. Because its embeddedness in kinship relationships provides cohesion and protection, it needs little organization. Through its strong kinship ties, a mafia has access to several functional equivalents to the organizational elements one can find in OMCs. In street gangs the appearance of organizational elements varies among the gangs, and they rarely have more than a few elements at any one time. One obstacle for the organization of street gangs is their local embeddedness and limited duration, which loosen the boundaries of the gang.

This chapter is concerned with further advancing a process perspective on partial organization. More specifically, we address the question of how the different organizational elements of partial organization (i.e. membership, hierarchy, rules, monitoring, and sanctions) interrelate dynamically. Based on the emerging ‘communication as constitutive of organization’ (CCO) perspective in organization studies, we argue that social collectives can alternate between states of organizational ‘partialness’ and ‘completeness’ over time. The temporary and situational completion of partial organization can occur in and through communicative events that demonstrate and ‘celebrate’ a social collective’s ability to mobilize all five elements simultaneously. We illustrate our theoretical considerations by drawing on selected findings from an earlier empirical case study of the hacktivist collective Anonymous.