The present study aimed to investigate whether contextual factors influence how a reference is processed in discourse. We used intact and violated presuppositions (PSP), triggered by a definite or indefinite noun phrase, to monitor the reference process. In one sentence set, a contextual referent was explicitly mentioned close or far from the PSP-triggering noun phrase (memory context). In another sentence set, a referent was not explicitly mentioned in the context, but an inference to a referent was either plausible or implausible due to contextual semantic relations (inference context). Participants were asked to rate the coherence of the discourse after listening to it. Our results revealed a strong influence of the temporal distance of the contextual presentation of a referent. When the referent was far in the context (memory context), PSP violations were judged to be less severe than for close referents, suggesting that they are less clearly represented in memory. Furthermore, PSP violations seemed to play a subordinate role when the semantic context provided a basis for the plausible presence of a referent (inference context). Our results suggest that discourse comprehension involves referential processes whose importance may fade with distance in memory or may be obscured by semantic contextual content.

Best practice and descriptive research claim that presuppositions, such as the “too” in “#MeToo,” increase the persuasiveness of arguments. Surprisingly, there is hardly any causal evidence for this claim. Therefore, we tested experimentally if advertisements and political statements with presuppositions are more persuasive than equivalent assertions. In 1999, Sbisà already theorized that “persuasive presuppositions” incidentally urge addressees to extend their (ideological) knowledge to make true the unstated assumptions writers have about what their addressee knows, which leads to greater agreement. Following Sbisà, we hypothesized that the persuasiveness depends on the addressee’s need and willingness to accommodate the presupposed content. In three experiments, we manipulated (a) the presupposition trigger using either the German additive particle auch “too,” the iterative particle wieder “again,” or factive verbs compared to assertive equivalents and (b) the preceding discourse context which supported the presupposition or not. Results show that presuppositions are perceived as more persuasive if they convey discourse-new information, largely irrespective of addressees’ ideological involvement. Also considering eye-tracked reading, we suggest that the integrative cognitive process of presupposition accommodation initiates their persuasive edge. The findings imply that persuasive communication benefits from the use of lexically conveyed presuppositions if they are sufficiently informative to trigger accommodation.

Despite recent breakthroughs in Machine Learning for Natural Language Processing, the Natural Language Inference (NLI) problems still constitute a challenge. To this purpose, we contribute a new dataset that focuses exclusively on the factivity phenomenon; however, our task remains the same as other NLI tasks, that is prediction of entailment, contradiction, or neutral (ECN). In this paper, we describe the LingFeatured NLI corpus and present the results of analyses designed to characterize the factivity/non-factivity opposition in natural language. The dataset contains entirely natural language utterances in Polish and gathers 2432 verb-complement pairs and 309 unique verbs. The dataset is based on the National Corpus of Polish (NKJP) and is a representative subcorpus in regard to syntactic construction [V][że][cc]. We also present an extended version of the set (3035 sentences) consisting more sentences with internal negations. We prepared deep learning benchmarks for both sets. We found that transformer BERT-based models working on sentences obtained relatively good results ($\approx 89\%$ F1 score on base dataset). Even though better results were achieved using linguistic features ($\approx 91\%$ F1 score on base dataset), this model requires more human labor (humans in the loop) because features were prepared manually by expert linguists. BERT-based models consuming only the input sentences show that they capture most of the complexity of NLI/factivity. Complex cases in the phenomenon—for example, cases with entitlement (E) and non-factive verbs—still remain an open issue for further research.

I propose an analysis of lying with uninformative speech acts. The orthodox view states that lying is restricted to assertions. However, the growing case for non-assertoric lies made by presuppositions or conventional implicatures challenges this orthodoxy. So far, the only presuppositions to have been considered as lies were informative presuppositions. In fact, uninformative lies were not discussed in the philosophical literature. However, limiting the possibility of lying to informative speech acts is too restrictive. Firstly, I show that standard, uninformative presuppositions can also be lies. Secondly, I extend this picture into uninformative lies made by declarative statements. To implement my proposal, I do not need a new definition of lying. Recently popular commitment-based definitions of lying are able to properly handle uninformative lies.

A major pursuit of biblical studies, especially since the dawn of the Enlightenment, has been to discover the one, intended, objective meaning of the various biblical texts. Over the last several hundred years, a plethora of methodological paradigms, biblical language and reference tools, historical studies, sociological analyses, comparative linguistic investigations, and anthropological and cultural examinations have all been published through many outlets by a host of people for the purpose of finding THE meaning the biblical authors wished to convey to their respective audiences. Although the results of all these works have positively contributed to our knowledge of scripture in profound ways, the problem is this: none can claim that they have actually discovered this one objective meaning. This is not to say, however, that there are not better understandings of scripture which point more adequately to the originally intended meaning, but simply that the best anyone can do is interpret scripture. The consequence of interpretation, though, is the relativity of meaning. In other words, there are several interpretations of scripture which can validly point to the intended meaning of the biblical authors and texts. One purpose of this article, then, will be to explore why it is not possible to find the one intended meaning of scripture, by defining some key concepts (e.g. tradition and presupposition) in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, who is one of the most influential names in the history of philosophical hermeneutics of the twentieth century, as interpreted by Merold Westphal.

Some scriptural interpreters, especially evangelicals, are frightened by the idea that biblical meaning is relative because such a pluralistic approach can lead quickly to the demise of biblical infallibility and authority. A second major purpose of this article will be to help ease such fear by offering a biblically grounded theological justification for the interpretative plurality of scripture by looking at the relativity of meaning through the lens of the doctrine of the Trinity. This justification will suggest that the more we rely upon the Holy Spirit and act out our faith in God through Jesus Christ in and outside of the church, the better our interpretation of scripture will become.

The present paper analyses the meaning of Spanish mood in factive contexts from a Cognitive Grammar perspective. It is argued that terms like assertion and presupposition do not explain the semantics of the subjunctive. Rather, they constitute an initial classification for finding a conceptually grounded explanation of it. The hypothesis is put forward that mood choice in factive contexts can be explained by the elaboration of Maldonado's (1995) notions of dominion and control. On the one hand, the conceptualizer has a low degree of effective control over the described event in presupposed contexts where the subjunctive mood occurs. On the other hand, presupposed contexts with the verb in the indicative mood equates with epistemic control over the described event. Thus, it is argued that the meaning of the subjunctive mood is related to the conceptualizer's epistemic dominion, and to the dominion of effective control. An additional analysis of the subjunctive mood in volitional, causative and perceptual contexts corroborates the initial claim.

This article examines data drawn from a 2001 Ontario (Canada) provincial inquiry into the deaths of seven people as a result of water contamination in a small Ontario town. The examination focuses on question-answer sequences in which the premier of Ontario, Michael Harris, attempted to resist lawyers' attempts to control and restrict his responses. In particular, on the basis of the data it is argued that the power of cross-examining lawyers does not reside solely in their ability to ask controlling and restrictive questions of witnesses, but rather is crucially dependent on their ability to compel witnesses to produce straightforward, or “type-conforming,” answers to these controlling and restrictive questions. The witness whose testimony is analyzed was not compelled to produce answers that logically conformed to the form of the lawyers' questions (i.e., “yes” or “no”) and, as a result, often usurped control over the topical agenda of the proceedings. In this sense, the present work builds on Eades's conclusion that “we cannot rely on question form to discover how witnesses are controlled.”A previous version of this article was presented at Sociolinguistics Symposium 15, Newcastle, U.K., in April 2004. We thank audience members at that conference and two reviewers for Language in Society for comments on previous versions. The research on which this article is based was funded in part by a SSHRCC Regular Research Grant (#410-2000-1330) to the first author.