We typically believe that irony is a completely human affair, but there have been interesting attempts to create computational models of irony use and understanding. This chapter presents an overview of some of these models, especially as implemented as conversational agents. One of the beauties, and major challenges, of computer modeling is that it forces researchers to make concrete decisions on how best to implement some linguistic observation or theoretical idea (e.g., how to create a workable model of echoic mention, pretense, or what is meant by incongruity). Veale presents his EPIC model in which an expectation (E) predicts a property (P) of an instance (I) of concept (C) that can get upended by an ironic utterance. This model provides a quantifiable view of what it means for an ironic utterance to achieve its desired effect on an audience. The success of an ironic utterance hinges on its capacity to highlight the failure of a reasonable expectation. The effectiveness of this computational model was partly assessed by obtaining human judgments about the meaning and quality of different ironic utterances in varying contexts that are suggestive of different expectations. In this way, Veale’s work offers insights as to how engineering solutions may be very informative about the way irony functions in human communication.

In this chapter we examine a particular sort of imaginative activity – imagining the impossible, or fantasy. We trace the development of children’s ability to distinguish between fantasy and reality in various contexts – in pretense and imaginative play, in reasoning about mythical beings, and in storybooks and television. Throughout, we explore three groups of factors that influence judgments about whether various entities and events are real or fantastical: (1) characteristics of the child, such as age and fantasy orientation; (2) characteristics of the entity or event, such as whether it is self-generated or a product of culture; and (3) features of the environment, such as the context in which the entity or event is encountered. We also explore the tools children use to make these distinctions, and consider effects of both engaging with fantasy and making the fantasy-reality distinction on cognitive development more broadly. We conclude with suggestions for future research.