This paper investigates the role of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in the context of the European Union (EU) Cohesion Policy. After presenting the EU policy framework and the CBA guidelines adopted by the European Commission, we perform an empirical analysis drawing from a dataset of around 1000 major project applications, submitted during the period 2007–2013 by 22 European countries, and representing almost €180 billion of investment. A distinctive feature of the current CBA approach adopted by the European Commission is that applications for funding must provide a forecast of both the project’s financial rate of return (FRR) and economic rate of return (ERR). While the former represents the financial profitability of the project from a private investors’ perspective, the latter reveals its socio-economic benefits for the whole society. The difference between ERR and FRR mainly depends on the use of shadow prices, the inclusion of externalities and other nonmarket effects in the estimation of ERR, whilst the FRR is based on market prices. We find that, on average, the FRR is slightly negative ($-2.9$%) and the ERR is positive (16.2%). ERR and FRR are positively correlated on average with differences across sectors. We discuss these findings and suggest further research needs.

Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) is used to optimize investment in public projects. Indeed, in many countries, BCA is mandatory for provision of most public services. However, once BCA is mandated, residents can strategically alter their behaviors based on a dynamic inconsistency that the BCA-based optimal service level depends on residents’ behaviors. This paper discusses this dynamic inconsistency problem, taking transportation services as an example. We show that the problem may decrease both social welfare and the utility of residents as compared with the first-best case, and that the occurrence of second-best outcomes depends on the reversibility of the project and the general-equilibrium interdependency with another project.

The decades-old literature on the correct method for choosing and estimating a social discount rate (SDR) has resulted in two, largely opposing viewpoints. This note seeks to clarify the key sources of disagreement between these two camps. One view advocates that the choice should be based chiefly on the social opportunity cost of the return to foregone private capital investment (SOC), and suggests a SDR of around 7%. The other viewpoint, expressed by the authors, argues that the choice should be based on the social rate of time preference (STP), the rate at which society is willing to trade present for future consumption, suggesting a SDR of around 3.5%. Because of the fundamentally normative basis of the SDR choice, neither approach generates testable hypotheses that would allow falsification. For government project evaluation, the choice ultimately depends on the opportunity cost of public funds, which in turn depends on how fiscal policy actually operates. The STP approach contends that governments set targets for deficits and public debt, so that a marginal government project will be tax-financed, largely crowding out current consumption. The SOC belief is that governments set revenue targets, so that any government project will be deficit-financed on the margin, which will largely crowd out private investment. The authors also argue that a SDR based on the STP approach is appropriate for: benefit-cost analysis of government regulations, self-financing government projects, and government cost-effectiveness studies.

The debate about the effectiveness of investments in public infrastructure initiated by Aschauer suggests that there may be substantial discrepancies between the results of conventional cost-benefit analysis and the ultimate effects of such investments on welfare. This paper takes a closer look at this issue by investigating the existence of secondary or indirect effects under conditions of monopolistic competition. We find that such effects will in general exist, and that they are potentially large, but that they can also be negative, depending on the specification of the model. With linear demand curves, indirect effects can be positive, zero or negative, with Dixit-Stiglitz they are always nonnegative and closely related to the taste for diversity, while with the logit model they are always identically zero. Free entry reinforces the positive indirect effects in the Dixit-Stiglitz model, and causes negative indirect effects in the logit model. Given this variety of results, robust empirical measurement of the indirect effects appears to be difficult.

This paper introduces the concepts of amount and speed of a discounting procedure in order to generate well-characterized families of procedures for use in social project evaluation. Exponential discounting sequesters the concepts of amount and speed into a single parameter that needs to be disaggregated in order to characterize nonconstant rate procedures. The inverse of the present value of a unit stream of benefits provides a natural measure of the amount a procedure discounts the future. We propose geometrical and time horizon based measures of how rapidly a discounting procedure acquires its ultimate present value, and we prove these to be the same. This provides an unambiguous measure of the speed of discounting, a measure whose values lie between 0 (slow) and 2 (fast). Exponential discounting has a speed of 1. A commonly proposed approach to aggregating individual discounting procedures into a social one for project evaluation averages the individual discount functions. We point to serious shortcoming with this approach and propose an alternative for which the amount and time horizon of the social procedure are the averages of the amounts and time horizons of the individual procedures. We further show that the social procedure will in general be slower than the average of the speeds of the individual procedures. For potential applications in social project evaluation we characterize three families of two-parameter discounting procedures – hyperbolic, gamma, and Weibull – in terms of their discount functions, their discount rate functions, their amounts, their speeds and their time horizons. (The appendix characterizes additional families, including the quasi-hyperbolic one.) A one parameter version of hyperbolic discounting, d(t) = (1+rt)-2, has amount r and speed 0, and this procedure is our candidate for use in social project evaluation, although additional empirical work will be needed to fully justify a one-parameter simplification of more general procedures.

This paper discusses some institutional and procedural designs that can strengthen CBA as a decision making tool within the public sector. Our discussion is based on Chile's National Public Investment System (SNI) the earliest and most consolidated investment appraisal system in Latin America. The objective of Chile's SNI is to provide a coherent framework for identifying, coordinating, evaluating and implementing public investments. Chile's SNI has several interesting institutional characteristics. For example, it standardizes project presentation formats, establishes explicit application and evaluation processes for public funds, provides general as well as sector specific methodological guidelines for CBA of projects and programs, and introduces a system of “checks and balances” by separating the institution that evaluates projects from the institutions promoting projects. Besides describing the system and highlighting the features we believe strengthen the use of project appraisal as a decision making tool. The paper also presents data on the number of projects appraised by sector, the overall results of appraisals and other administrative data, as well as a summary of ex-post studies for a sample of road, rural electricity, education and health projects. Unfortunately, the limited data available and the lack of a proper counterfactual scenario do not allow for strong conclusions to be made regarding the performance of the system. However, the data presented serves as an illustration of the Chilean system and it may be of value to researches in this field as well as to policymakers in other countries wishing to improve their public investment systems.

This paper reviews the theory underlying the concept of the social opportunity cost of labor (SOCL), as that concept is used in benefit-cost analysis and in applied welfare economics generally. It then presents in detail the procedures to be followed in estimating the SOCL in real-world cases. Important steps in data processing include calculating gross and net wages from data on “reported” wages. Further economic analysis involves taking account of migration patterns and of labor market duality. Estimates are made for 32 labor market areas in Mexico, covering 21 occupations for males and 19 for females.

Our main results are a) that there are important differences between reported wages and the gross wages paid by employers, and also between both of these and the net wages received by workers, and b) that taking labor market duality into account leads to significant modifications of our SOCL estimates. More important, perhaps, than our specific estimates for Mexico, is the methodological framework that we use. This framework, based on the fundamental principles of applied welfare economics, can serve as a useful starting point for serious estimation of the SOCL for other countries.

International aid projects in post-communist countries were meant to support environmental protection during the transition period and to introduce new standards of environmental governance. While the outcomes of the World Bank biodiversity project in the Belavezhskaya Pushcha National Park in Belarus were evaluated positively after its delayed completion, an assessment using the same criteria 10 years later questioned its long-term effectiveness. This paper links current project outcomes with the implementation process, and uses this knowledge to deduce lessons for designing and implementing future international initiatives in Belarus and other post-communist contexts. There are four interlinked and project-specific reasons for the observed unsustainability of project outcomes are identified: (1) the predominance of the natural sciences, (2) an unbalanced representation of actors within the hierarchical system of governance, (3) powerful implementation by official high-level actors, and (4) insufficient knowledge of participatory methods and principles of multi-level governance. In order to introduce new standards for environmental governance, international aid projects should (1) streamline communications between the actors at different scales, including donor organizations, local agencies and stakeholders in the receiving countries; and (2) use ongoing project and, in particular, process assessment to reflect on the project progress to achieve longer term effectiveness of project outcomes.

Billions of dollars are spent on legal development every year, but its effectiveness continues to be questioned. Many donors have responded to this internal and external critique by developing monitoring and evaluating systems. This article problematizes the tendency of conventional modes of evaluation to assume a link between the outcomes of individual projects (the ‘truth’ of rule of law) and the fulfillment of overarching program goals (the ‘consequences’). We argue that examining this assumed link is of particular importance as rule of law projects take place within a host of simultaneous political and social changes; are time consuming and unpredictable and have multiple and sometimes conflicting objectives. Our analysis of four recent rule of law projects from Asia, Africa and Latin America exposes the inability of conventional evaluations to accommodate such complexities. We demonstrate how, by contrast, robust empirical research reveals important truths about the disparity between the actual, intended and unintended consequences of legal development projects.