The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War provides a practical and effective framework for the protection of civilians in international armed conflicts that has retained its relevance for 75 years since its adoption. As with all treaties, its ‘object and purpose’ has a concrete impact on how its terms are interpreted, giving insights into the ordinary meaning of the text and allowing the aim of the Convention to be fully realized. This article asks and answers a series of questions to elucidate the role of the object and purpose in treaty interpretation and how to identify the object and purpose of a given treaty before focusing on the specificities of international humanitarian law treaties. On that basis, it determines that the overall ‘object and purpose’ of the Convention is to protect civilians during armed conflict, including in circumstances where they are subject to permissible measures of control and security. The article then demonstrates how that ‘object and purpose’ assists with the resolution of specific, well-known interpretive dilemmas including the determination of protected status under the Convention and the application of provisions premised on the existence of a Protecting Power.

Conceptually rooted in the efforts to ban indiscriminate weapons and both their immediate and long-term effects, humanitarian mine action and humanitarian disarmament operations have developed significantly since 1988, when the United Nations first took on work on mine action operations for the protection and benefit of local communities. A large part of those operations has been carried out by humanitarian disarmament NGOs such as the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), one of the first organizations to be established on this issue. Drawing on MAG's experience and perspective, this article explores how the humanitarian principles apply to humanitarian disarmament operations. The aim of the article is to show that as an operator on the humanitarian–development nexus, MAG considers the four humanitarian principles as a critical and necessary part of its reference framework due to the influence of the humanitarian disarmament framework, even when operating in the development space. All in all, the case of humanitarian disarmament and MAG's experience are good examples to illustrate where the humanitarian horizon is extended because of long-terms serious needs, and that humanitarian principles remain essential to keep the focus on the needs of affected populations.

In November 2022, eighty-three States endorsed the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (Political Declaration). The Political Declaration is a new and significant development in the long-standing and ongoing efforts to protect civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas – an issue which has been of growing concern for a number of states, the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and civil society for more than a decade.

The use of explosive weapons in populated areas has been documented to result in widespread civilian deaths and injuries as well as longer-term harm to civilians resulting from damage to or the destruction of hospitals, water and sanitation systems and electrical power grids. Although less researched, the use of explosive weapons in populated areas also plays a prominent role in damaging and destroying the environment in situations of armed conflict.

This article examines the potential of the new Political Declaration for strengthening the protection of the environment. An express reference to the environment, and the impact of explosive weapons thereon, exists only in the Declaration's preamble, but the lack of express references to the environment in the Declaration's operative commitments does not mean it lacks potential as a tool for strengthening the protection of the environment. On the contrary, the preambular reference provides an important basis on which to argue that the armed forces of endorsing States must consider the protection of the environment in their efforts to implement a number of the Declaration's key operational commitments.

Approximately 100 years ago, a colonial conflict of great breadth began on the south side of the Mediterranean. Initially seen as an “indigenous” rebellion, the conflict evolved into an intense war, the final phase of which involved the intervention of two great colonial powers (France and Spain). Looking at the Rif War (1920–1926) in a region of what is now Morocco, then claimed by Spain, as an example, this article presents a critical analysis of a conflict rich in lessons for current humanitarian challenges and the sometimes-difficult relationship between humanitarian actors and the parties to a conflict. Assessed in the light of its human cost, which is largely forgotten today, the Rif War can feed debates through necessary historical reflection surrounding humanitarian action and the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross. It will also examine the complicated connections between historical truth, collective memory and the political difficulties inherent to reconciliation.

Article 11 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities requires that the rights and protections of the Convention not be derogated or suspended during “situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict”. Even so, persons with disabilities are still often the group most disproportionately impacted by armed conflict. This reality is not due to a failing of international humanitarian law to protect and consider persons with disabilities; rather, it is due to a failure to mainstream disability into the application of and approach to existing protection frameworks. Impactful mainstreaming of disability necessitates the inclusion of all relevant mutually reinforcing legal frameworks and traditions. By examining four main areas – military operations, evacuation, humanitarian assistance, and long-term assistance and services – this paper argues that the protection of persons with disabilities in armed conflict, and specifically within Muslim contexts, will be enhanced through the inclusion and consideration of Islamic law.

Persons with disabilities are at higher risk of injury or death during an armed conflict, either as specific targets or through inability to protect themselves. Humanitarian responses concentrate on meeting the immediate basic needs of an average population. Yet historically, the situation of persons with disabilities during armed conflict, as well as peacebuilding processes, has been largely absent in the discussion at the Security Council. On 20 June 2019, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2475. This groundbreaking text marks the first time the Council has dedicated an entire resolution to the situation of persons with disabilities in situations of armed conflict. The resolution has significantly raised the attention and understanding of the situation of persons with disabilities in the context of the armed conflict in the Security Council and beyond. This article details the process that led to Resolution 2475, as well as what has happened since.

Dr Eirini Giorgou is a Legal Adviser in the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Arms and Conduct of Hostilities Unit, where she works, among other issues, on explosive weapons in populated areas and on nuclear weapons. She has several years’ experience in multilateral disarmament and arms control diplomacy and negotiations outside the ICRC. She is a licensed lawyer and holds a PhD in international law from the University of Geneva.

The Martens Clause owes its name to the diplomat and jurist Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens, a representative of the Russian Empire at the First Hague Conference in 1899. Drafted and proposed by Martens during the negotiations, yet as a spontaneous compromise, the Clause has been included in the preamble of the Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and is still considered an important principle of international humanitarian law today. This article traces the biography and academic path of F. F. Martens and explores the enduring significance of the Martens Clause.

Despite the existence of a definition of civilian status in international humanitarian law (IHL), differences in the application of this definition – both in theory and in practice – continue to be observed. One of the contexts where these differences remain palpable (and do so for various fighting parties) is Afghanistan, a country where civilian harm has remained high for several years. This article explores the legal concepts of civilian and civilian population, including how they have been formed and interpreted and, ultimately, what protection they afford to persons who belong in these categories. The second part of the article brings these questions into the Afghan context, one that is complex and where cultural and religious implications should not be overlooked. Public statements, reports and codes of fighting parties in the country which touch upon civilian status are presented, followed by the civilian experience in Afghanistan, particularly focusing on the reported harm. Ultimately, it is proposed that despite the factual and contextual confusion, the existing legal rules and interpretations, when applied in good faith, suffice to ensure both that those who are civilians under IHL are protected and that the threats which some civilians’ behaviour might pose can be effectively addressed without a status change.

Ambitions to fulfil accountability demands in humanitarian action are high, including for protection activities in armed conflict settings. However, from a Dunantist position, meeting accountability demands is often not only unsatisfactory for practical reasons, but is also inappropriate in view of humanitarian principles and flawed from related ethical perspectives. Regarding accountability primarily as a technical exercise, rather than as being linked to ethical perspectives on humanitarianism and its principles, may thus inadvertently contribute to reduced acceptability of, and ultimately reduced access for, humanitarian actors. Dunantist actors wishing to stay true to their ethical approach need new ways of thinking about accountability, a reflection which can serve as an example for an ongoing need to consider differences between actors within the humanitarian–development nexus.

This article gives an overview of the principles regulating the use of force under the Islamic law of war in the four Sunni schools of Islamic law. By way of introducing the topic, it briefly discusses the origins, sources and characteristics of the Islamic law of war. The discussion reveals the degree of compatibility between these Islamic principles and the modern principles of international humanitarian law, and offers insights into how these Islamic principles can help in limiting the devastation and suffering caused by contemporary armed conflicts in Muslim contexts, particularly those conflicts in which Islamic law is invoked as the source of reference.

Implementing the principles of international humanitarian law (IHL) represents a real challenge if the protection of civilians in today's urban armed conflicts remains a priority for armed forces. The application of the principle of distinction comes up against the difficulties of obtaining intelligence, in particular in the absence of troops on the ground. The minimalization of collateral damage requires putting in place very precise targeting procedures, and even the adoption of tactics designed to draw out traditional combat from cities. In terms of precautionary measures in attack or against the effects of an attack, these must be adapted to the context of urban combat. Nevertheless, IHL remains an essential instrument that must be analyzed and translated into action in a practical manner in order to conduct military operations that are at the same time effective and legally permissible.

While international humanitarian law envisages the possibility of holding formal thematic discussions, only United Nations General Assembly resolutions prompted the depositary of the Geneva Conventions to consult the High Contracting Parties on the opportuneness of conflict-specific conferences. Recalling the precedents of 1999 and 2001 – convened on the basis of the support expressed by the States Parties during related consultations – this article focuses on the Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 17 December 2014, which is likewise related to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The result of the conference consists of a declaration reflecting the willingness of the States Parties to further implement Article 1 common to the four Geneva Conventions.

The ‘protection of civilians’ mandate in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations fulfils a critical role in realising broader protection objectives, which have in recent years become an important focus of international relations and international law. The concepts of the ‘protection of civilians’ constructed by the humanitarian, human rights and peacekeeping communities have evolved somewhat separately, resulting in disparate understandings of the associated normative bases, substance and responsibilities. If UN peacekeepers are to effectively provide physical protection to civilians under threat of violence, it is necessary to untangle this conceptual and normative confusion. The practical expectations of the use of force to protect civilians must be clear, and an overarching framework is needed to facilitate the spectrum of actors working in a complementary way towards the common objectives of the broader protection agenda.

Mandates of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions increasingly include stabilisation and peace enforcement components, which imply a proactive use of force often carried out by national, regional or multinational non-UN partners, operating either in support of or with the support of the UN, acting as ‘proxies’. This article analyses the legal, policy and perception/security implications of different types of ‘peace operations by proxy’ and the additional challenges that such operations create for humanitarian action. It suggests some mitigating measures, including opportunities offered by the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, for a more coherent approach to the protection of civilians, but also acknowledges some of the limitations to an independent UN-led humanitarian action.

Proportionality is a condition provided under both jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Based on a particular interpretation of state practice and international case law, recent legal literature argues that the two notions of proportionality are interrelated in that proportionality under jus in bello is included in the assessment of proportionality under jus ad bellum. This article seeks to refute such a position and, more generally, to clarify the relationship between the two notions of proportionality.

The main argument of the article is in line with the traditional position regarding the relationship between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. It is argued that, although sharing common features and being somewhat interconnected, the notions of proportionality provided under these two separate branches of international law remain independent of each other, mainly because of what is referred to in this article as the ‘general versus particular’ dichotomy, which characterises their relations. Proportionality under jus ad bellum is to be measured against the military operation as a whole, whereas proportionality under jus in bello is to be assessed against individual military attacks launched in the framework of this operation.

This article nonetheless emphasises the risk of overlap between the assessments of the two notions of proportionality when the use of force involves only one or a few military operations. Indeed, in such situations, the ‘general versus particular’ dichotomy, which normally enables one to make a distinct assessment between the two notions of proportionality, is no longer applicable since it becomes impossible to distinguish between the military operation as a whole and the individual military attacks undertaken during this operation.