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More humanitarian accountability, less humanitarian access? Alternative ideas on accountability for protection activities in conflict settings

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 May 2019

Natalie Klein-Kelly
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Abstract

Ambitions to fulfil accountability demands in humanitarian action are high, including for protection activities in armed conflict settings. However, from a Dunantist position, meeting accountability demands is often not only unsatisfactory for practical reasons, but is also inappropriate in view of humanitarian principles and flawed from related ethical perspectives. Regarding accountability primarily as a technical exercise, rather than as being linked to ethical perspectives on humanitarianism and its principles, may thus inadvertently contribute to reduced acceptability of, and ultimately reduced access for, humanitarian actors. Dunantist actors wishing to stay true to their ethical approach need new ways of thinking about accountability, a reflection which can serve as an example for an ongoing need to consider differences between actors within the humanitarian–development nexus.

Keywords

accountabilityhumanitarian accesshumanitarian ethicshumanitarian principlesprotection of civiliansarmed conflict
Type
Selected articles
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 100 , Issue 907-909: 150 years of humanitarian reflection , April 2018 , pp. 287 - 313
Copyright
Copyright © icrc 2019 

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Footnotes

*

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

References

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3 Dijkzeul and Hilhorst have recently noted that “the two different ethical approaches have always been used in the humanitarian field”; they offer the definitions of consequentialism as “an ethic that focuses more on the outcomes of action than on the purity of its intentions” and see the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) as operating in a “Dunantist vein” and following “a deontological ethic”, meaning “duty-bound to alleviate suffering and save lives”. D. Dijkzeul and D. Hilhorst, above note 1, p. 56.

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50 For a brief summary of how these principles are being challenged, see Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Bob Reinalda, “A Brief History of Humanitarian Actors and Principles”, in Z. Sezgin and D. Dijkzeul (eds), above note 5, p. 50.

51 The ICRC generally maintains the relevance of all humanitarian principles, including neutrality. See, recently, Labbé, Jérémie and Daudin, Pascal, “Applying the Humanitarian Principles: Reflecting on the Experience of the ICRC”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 97, No. 897/898, 2016Google Scholar.

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62 N. Niland et al., above note 30, p. 16.

63 The IASC definition says that protection activities are aimed at obtaining respect for the relevant laws, but stops short of spelling out from whom this respect is to be obtained. The ICRC definition clarifies: “Protection aims to ensure that authorities and other actors respect their obligations and the rights of individuals in order to preserve the safety, physical integrity and dignity of those affected by armed conflict and other situations of violence.” See ICRC, above note 58, p. 752.

64 Ibid., p. 752, footnote 2.

65 H. Slim and A. Bonwick, above note 53, p. 114.

66 U. Reichhold and A. Binder, above note 56, p. 49.

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70 Pictet, Jean, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross: Commentary, Henry Dunant Institute, Geneva, 1970, p. 56Google Scholar.

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72 For an argument that accepts the application of a humanitarian imperative, but also names related dilemmas, see Schweizer, Beat, “Humanitäre Dilemmata: Anspruch und Wirklichkeit der humanitären Prinzipien”, in Lieber, Jürgen and Dijkzeul, Dennis (eds), Handbuch Humanitäre Hilfe, Springer Verlag, Heidelberg, 2013, pp. 333–349CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

73 H. Slim, above note 56, p. 3.

74 Terry, Fiona, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action, Cornell University Press, New York, 2002, pp. 238, 244Google Scholar.

75 For a discussion on how the actions of Henri Dunant cannot be seen as developing out of a categorical imperative (i.e., he did not have to act, but he chose to act voluntarily), see E. Wortel, above note 12, p. 783.

76 Ibid., p. 781.

77 J. Goodhand, above note 37, p. 260.

78 Bonino, Francesca, Evaluating Protection in Humanitarian Action: Issues and Challenges, Working Paper, ALNAP and ODI, London, 2014, p. 28Google Scholar, available at: http://www.alnap.org/resource/19237.

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80 M. Barnett, above note 22, p. 216.

81 D. Dijkzeul, D. Hilhorst and P. Walker, above note 33, p. S15.

82 H. Slim and A. Bonwick, above note 53, pp. 106–108.

83 U. Reichhold and A. Binder, above note 56, p. 8.

84 Abbott, Diane, “Doing ‘Incorrect’ Research: The Importance of the Subjective and the Personal in Researching Poverty ‘Footprints’”, in Thomas, Alan and Mohan, Giles (eds), Research Skills for Policy and Development: How to Find Out Fast, Sage, Los Angeles, CA, 2007, p. 212–213Google Scholar.

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87 F. Bonino, above note 78, p. 24.

88 U. Reichhold and A. Binder, above note 56, pp. 25, 32–35.

89 Ramalingam, Ben, Aid on the Edge of Chaos: Rethinking International Cooperation in a Complex World, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 107–111Google Scholar.

90 U. Reichhold and A. Binder, above note 56, p. 46. “Theory of change” refers to “a planning and evaluation method for social change”; it takes a more flexible and less rigid approach than, for example, the logical framework approach to explain how impact will be achieved. For more details, see S. J. Meharg (ed.), above note 54, p. 49.

91 U. Reichhold and A. Binder, above note 56, p. 40.

92 For the concept of accountability for “care and attention” but from development action, see C. D. Wraight, above note 46, p. 130.

93 On hopes placed in technological advances to increase accountability, see Kristin Bergtora Sandvik, “Stronger, Faster, Better: Three Logics of Humanitarian Futureproofing”, in V. M. Heins, K. Koddenbrock and C. Unrau (eds), above note 1, p. 131. On complexities in humanitarian technology, see K. L. Jacobsen, above note 31.

94 Judy El-Bushra, “Power, Agency and Identity: Turning Vicious Circles into Virtuous Ones”, in H. Yanacopulos and J. Hanlon (eds), above note 37, p. 210.

95 For considerations on power interactions within groups of beneficiaries spoken to by aid organizations – here as part of a participatory approach, but applicable also to protection activities where similar group interviews are frequently used, and also outside a conflict setting – and mentioning the inherent risks and hence responsibilities of aid actors to manage these, see Linda Mayoux and Hazel Johnson, “Investigation as Empowerment: Using Participatory Methods”, in A. Thomas and G. Mohan (eds), above note 84, especially p. 207.

96 ICRC, above note 59, pp. 27–28.

97 Ibid., pp. 103–140.

98 Redfield, Peter, “The Impossible Problem of Neutrality”, in Redfield, Peter and Bornstein, Erica (eds), Forces of Compassion: Humanitarianism between Ethics and Politics, SAR Press, Santa Fe, NM, 2010, pp. 66–67Google Scholar.

99 N. Niland et al., above note 30, p. 49.

100 E. Wortel, above note 12, p. 789; M. DuBois, above note 67, pp. 7–9.

101 Kai Koddenbrock, “More than Morals: Making Sense of the Rise of Humanitarian Aid Organisations”, in V. M. Heins, K. Koddenbrock and C. Unrau (eds), above note 1, p. 93.

102 And possibly also invisible for academia: T. G. Weiss, for example, does not see internal accountability taking place, in “Humanitarianism's Contested Culture”, above note 2, p. 27.

103 ICRC, Annual Report 2013 for Syrian Arab Republic, Geneva, 2014, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/annual-report/current/icrc-annual-report-syria.pdf.

104 For more about the ICRC's neutrality stance, see Terry, Fiona, “The International Committee of the Red Cross in Afghanistan: Reasserting the Neutrality of Humanitarian Action”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 881, 2011CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

105 D. Dijkzeul and D. Hilhorst, above note 1, p. 54.

106 T. G. Weiss, above note 2, p. 30.

107 E. Wortel, above note 12, p. 781.

108 H. Slim, above note 56, p. 68.

109 Bennett, Christina, Time to Let Go: Remarking Humanitarian Action for the Modern Era, ODI and HPG, 2016, p. 69Google Scholar, available at: www.odi.org/hpg/remake-aid. For the concrete example of this problematic facing the ICRC in Afghanistan, see F. Terry, above note 104, p. 176.

110 Volker M. Heins and Christine Unrau, “Introduction: Cultures of Humanitarianism, Old and New”, in V. M. Heins, K. Koddenbrock and C. Unrau (eds), above note 1, p. 4.

111 J. Labbé and P. Daudin, above note 51, pp. 24–25.

112 For a description of the term “humanitarian space” and the idea of “humanitarian access” contained within it, see D. Hilhorst and E. Pereboom, above note 35, p. 87.

113 T. G. Weiss, above note 2, p. 18; K. B. Sandvik, above note 93, p. 100.

114 Fiona Terry calls listening to predicaments of beneficiaries a “first step to really respecting their dignity”: see F. Terry, above note 74, p. 242.

115 To expand on this, without direct access, humanitarian actors rely on information from other sources. As good and reliable as these may be, they may be biased in some way or another, and not sufficiently reflective of the needs and situations of different groups (such as tribes, genders or castes) of the affected population. This is not to suggest that such risks cannot be mitigated (for example, by triangulating different sources) or that having direct access is the ultimate panacea to such risks, which still need mitigating. The point here is that direct access in itself is one key mitigating factor to reduce the risk of misconceptions that could lead to discriminatory or non-impartial action.

116 For the importance of altruism and humanity as well as professionalism in staff, see G. Carbonnier, above note 45, pp. 199–200; for a call for “appropriate care and attention” by development actors, as a key criteria for evaluation of their efforts, see C. D. Wraight, above note 46, p. 130.

117 For examples, see V. M. Heins and C. Unrau, above note 110, p. 4.

118 For claims of assaults, kidnappings and killings of humanitarian personnel increasing, see Ibid., p. 6.

119 For a discussion of the expansion of multi-mandate actors and issues that this poses, see D. Hilhorst and E. Pereboom, above note 35, p. 88.

120 See definition by W.-E. Eberwein and B. Reinalda, above note 50, p. 26: “Humanitarian organizations in a wider sense are those active in the domain of social welfare, such as development in general, the environment, peace and human rights.”

121 K. B. Sandvik, above note 93, p. 101.

122 Mackintosh, Kate, “Reclaiming Protection as a Humanitarian Goal: Fodder for the Faint-Hearted Aid-Worker”, International Legal Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2010, p. 396Google Scholar.

123 U. Reichhold and A. Binder, above note 56, p. 34.

124 On the possibility and necessity of both ethical strands, even within one organization, see D. Dijkzeul and D. Hilhorst, above note 1, pp. 57–59.

125 Wider as in “improving people's lives” and more restrictive as in “saving lives”: see W.-E. Eberwein and B. Reinalda, above note 50, p. 25.

126 E. Schenkenberg van Mierop, above note 86.

127 Research by author for Open University course (MSc in development management), “Accountability in Humanitarian versus Development Management: Example of Protection Activities in Conflict Settings”, April 2015. On file with author.

128 C. D. Wraight, above note 46, pp. 88–91: G. Carbonnier, above note 45, p. 198.

129 Marie Juul Petersen, “International Muslim NGOs: ‘Added Value’ or an Echo of Western Principles and Donor Wishes?”, in Z. Sezgin and D. Dijkzeul (eds), above note 5, p. 266, quotes a staff member from a Muslim NGO differentiating between “the traditional and the modern” Islamic organization, with the traditional one depending only on “personal accountability. It's about you as a spiritual person, about whether you are trustworthy or not. It's not about the system; it's about the person.”

130 D. P. Forsythe, above note 57, p. 44; E. Wortel, above note 12, p. 793.

131 Also calling for more documentation, see T. G. Weiss, above note 2, p. 30.

132 ICRC delegate Phillippe Gaillard, quoted in Rieff, David, A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis, Vintage, London, 2002, p. 178Google Scholar.

133 Erica Bornstein and Peter Redfield, “An Introduction to the Anthropology of Humanitarianism”, in E. Bornstein and P. Redfield (eds), above note 98, p. 6.

134 E. O'Gorman, above note 25, p. 62.

135 M. Barnett, above note 22, p. 217.

136 J. Pictet, above note 70, pp. 24–25.

137 H. Slim, above note 56, pp. 43, 162.

138 C. D. Wraight, above note 46, p. 130.

139 Xabier Etxeberria, “The Ethical Framework of Humanitarian Action”, in Humanitarian Studies Unit (ed.), above note 21, p. 87.

140 See, for example, T. G. Weiss, above note 2, p. 33; Didier Fassin, “Noli me Tangere: The Moral Untouchability of Humanitarianism”, in E. Bornstein and P. Redfield (eds), above note 98, p. 36; Gordon, Stuart and Donini, Antonio, “Romancing Principles and Human Rights: Are Humanitarian Principles Salvageable?”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 97, No. 897/989, 2016, p. 15Google Scholar.

141 R. Apthorpe, above note 85, p. 1550.

142 Gentile, Pierre, “Humanitarian Organisations Involved in Protection Activities: A Story of Soul-Searching and Professionalization”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 884, 2011CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

143 Stressing the importance of this ethical ability, see H. Slim, above note 56, p. 181.

144 For suggestions of such potential scientific approaches, see D. Dijkzeul, D. Hilhorst and P. Walker, above note 33, pp. S7–S13.

145 B. Ramalingam, above note 89, p. 107.

146 See J. Pictet, above note 70, p. 55: “If, in the general interest of everyone, we wish to have Red Cross institutions continue their work in occupied territories, their agents must, through irreproachable conduct, continue to maintain the full confidence of the authorities. One cannot, at the same time, serve the Red Cross and fight. One must choose.” See also p. 60 on choosing between justice and charity.