Introduces the economic crisis that the US is currently experiencing and the reasons why industrial policy is the right solution to it.

Summarizes the industrial policies of the US from 1750 to 1865, especially the fact that the US was founded as a protectionist nation with active industrial policies.

Chapter 1 is the introduction to the book. The chapter provides the background to the problem. The anti-dumping investigations are conducted with complicated procedural rules so that exporters cannot cooperate with the investigating authorities. Investigating authorities tend to inflate anti-dumping duties and use anti-dumping for protectionist purposes taking advantage of the non-cooperation. In this context, research questions are listed in connection to the main problem. The scope of the research is also set in Chapter 1.

Article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that measures equivalent to a quantitative restriction shall be prohibited. The case law of the European Court of Justice interpreting this has addressed product standards, selling arrangements and all other kinds of national measures that might tend to hinder trade or affect consumer behaviour and thereby restrict imports. Relying on judge-made ideas such as mutual recognition and mandatory requirements, the Court has put the informed consumer at the heart of the market, at the expense of the paternalistic state. On the other hand, it recognises the need to restrict free movement where legitimate public interests are at stake, with the proportionality of such restrictive measures being the main question in most cases.

Doctrine became increasingly less important, giving way to the second form of the conservative quest: the turn to culture as the defining feature of Christianity. The third chapter traces the development of postliberalism through the lens of mainline Protestantism’s interest in the authority and interpretation of scripture, beginning with biblical theology and concluding with the postliberal project of theological interpretation of scripture. This development explains how the norms of Christianity became understood as cultural norms, thus paving the way for orthodoxy becoming a form of culture war.

This chapter analyses macroeconomic policy, with a focus on monetary policy, relating it to the performance of the economy in Turkey in the Great Depression. The Depression was transmitted to Turkey primarily through a sharp decline in agricultural commodity prices. In response, the government adopted strongly protectionist measures starting in 1929 and pursued import-substituting industrialization. In contrast, Turkey’s macroeconomic policy was cautious. Fiscal policy adhered to the principle of balanced budgets. The policies of the new central bank, established in 1930, were similarly restrained: as a result, the monetary base increased very little before 1938. While this restraint resulted in some appreciation of the currency, Turkey’s economy did better than most others around the Eastern Mediterranean. The chapter argues this performance was primarily due to strong protectionism, which paid benefits in the short run, and recovery in the agricultural sector.

The relationship between capitalism and nationalism escapes easy generalization – hardly surprising given the many conceptions of nationalism, and the many stages and varieties of capitalism. Let us begin, then, with some ideal-typical definitions.

Nationalism is a form of politicized ethnicity in which a self-identified cultural group seeks to create or succeeds in creating a nation-state of its own. It also refers to ideological goals and tangible policies oriented to the preservation or strengthening of the nation-state.

There are as many ways of defining capitalism as there are of nationalism. For our purposes, this definition is most useful. Capitalism is a political-economic system in which property rights are legally protected by the state, in which prices are set primarily by supply and demand in a market composed of profit-seeking entrepreneurs or companies, usually (but not always) employing free wage labor.

When Britain unilaterally embraced free trade in 1846, proponents at home and abroad widely assumed that the rest of the industrializing world would soon follow suit. But Britain’s economic cosmopolitan trump card received an unanticipated countermove from its competitors; one rival after another instead turned to economic nationalism in order to foster their infant industries at home and to expand their closed colonial markets abroad. Even Britain’s own settler colonies abandoned free trade by the turn of the century. Economic nationalism, not free trade, became the driving political economic force underpinning the century of imperial expansion from the mid-nineteenth century to the Second World War.

British free traders sought to curb this economic nationalist turn, and the United States, Britain’s resource-rich former colony, seemingly contained the most fruitful soil for free trade’s mid-nineteenth-century transplantation. All the early omens appeared promising.

The extent to which Chinese goods exports faced unilateral trade policy changes taken by other WTO members is documented here and decomposed between those policy changes that specifically target China and those that do not. Chinese goods exposure to measures taken by the European Union, the United States, China’s regional partners, and those taken worldwide are also contrasted, in terms of scale, discriminatory or liberalising treatment, as well as timing. The degree to which China’s WTO membership protected its goods exports from worse competitive conditions since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis is assessed and found wanting.

A major difference between the WTO as compared with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund is the domestic political sensitivity of trade. Among trade issues, none are more politically sensitive than agriculture. It took eight rounds of GATT negotiations to achieve the landmark Agreement on Agriculture in 1993. There has been little progress toward reforming agricultural trade rules in the ensuing years. Much more needs to be done.

Nationalist ideas on the economy went global in the late nineteenth century, affecting policy in Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Ireland, India, Russia, the Ottoman Empire and Japan. In general, policy makers considered closing the gap with Great Britain to be of paramount importance. This aided the spread of Listian ideas. However, these ideas were transformed by local conditions in the countries they impacted. Developmental approaches worked better if they could be tethered to indigenous ideas, as was the case in Japan. In Germany, Listian was transformed into an aggressive ideology of territorial expansion and national struggle. In colonial India and Ireland, opposition to British rule and the necessity of public mobilisation meant that industrialist ideas were supplemented with agrarian interests. In multi-ethnic locations, such as the Russian, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, isolationist approaches came to the fore as nationalists looked to build ethnically homogenous economies separate from those of other nationalities.

Liberia’s declaration of independence in 1847 was motivated in part by the Liberian government’s dependence on revenue from trade. Previous histories of Liberia have argued that there was a dramatic shift from protectionist policies in the nineteenth century to a policy of "open door" from the interwar period onward. This conclusion was based on the restriction of foreign trade to specific ports through so-called ports of entry laws dating back to the 1830s, and not abolished until 1931. There were also active debates among the Liberian elite about how protectionist Liberia should be in contemporary political discourse. This chapter uses new data on Liberian tariff rates to compare its trade policy to that of countries in Latin America and Asia. It finds that Liberia’s tariffs were somewhere between the protectionism of Latin America and the free trade policies of Asia, but closer to the latter. Despite rhetoric about the "closed door," trade was too important to the incomes of Liberian elites to restrict it.

Born of confidence at the height of optimism for economic globalization, the WTO has failed so far to fulfill all the high hopes of its founders. WTO members have largely been unable to agree on new rules to meet new commercial needs, and global trade governance has been fragmented by a resulting proliferation of local and regional trade agreements. The rise of developing countries - and especially the rise of China - have transformed global trade negotiations. The return of economic nationalism in the United States and elsewhere has accelerated a retreat from multilateral trade liberalization and other global solutions in trade.

The pandemic has turned the world inward and toward such perennial false promises of self-sufficiency as localism and protectionism. The trade links made possible by global supply chains are being questioned along with all else that connects the global economy. Amid this questioning, in the ongoing battle to end the pandemic, tariffs and other barriers to trade in medicines and other medical goods must be eliminated; vaccine nationalism must be replaced by vaccine multilateralism; and trade restrictions on the global supply of food must be avoided.

New trade rules for the new pandemic world must begin with long needed rules that have yet to be agreed after decades of deadlocked multilateral trade negotiations. Trade must be freed in international trade in manufactured goods, agricultural goods, and services.