FTAs have become a major conduit for developing and organising a legal framework for capital movements across borders. While FTAs contemplate the liberalisation of signatories’ capital account and the facilitation of payments and transfers as a means to foster trade in goods and trade in financial services between countries, the agreements do more than simply require the free flow of capital. Indeed, FTAs also provide a variety of exceptions and carve-outs aimed at providing regulatory policy space. The amount and degree of policy space differs between and among agreements, but the trend is for treaties to include more and stronger protections. This chapter analyses typical provisions relating to financial services found in FTAs before turning to common FTA exclusions and exceptions. In so doing, four modern agreements are extensively referred to as examples – CPTPP, USMCA, RCEP and CETA. While many obligations and exceptions are based on and resemble the GATS, the provisions contained in FTAs can be deeper and more comprehensive than those of the multilateral trading system. Properly drafted, such FTAs should provide comfort to governments seeking to make use of targeted CFMs that they will be able to do so without violating their bilateral and regional trade agreements.

This chapter assesses the compatibility of capital controls and other CFMs with the multilateral trade framework; that is, the WTO’s GATS. The GATS contains several provisions that relate to controls and restrictions on services in general, and to financial services in particular. This chapter begins by setting out the framework for obligations in the GATS relevant to cross-border capital movements before explaining and evaluating the relevant exceptions. While the exceptions should in theory allow capital controls to be put in place in a manner that is consistent with the GATS, each of the exceptions contain uncertainties which, depending on how they are interpreted, could mean capital controls would fall outside the scope of the exceptions. Recent jurisprudence, however, should provide some comfort to governments seeking to make use of exceptions in the financial services sector, namely the so-called prudential exception. In this regard, the GATS should not be viewed as a major impediment to the implementation of CFMs implemented in good faith and for prudential reasons.

Having clarified how capital movements are regulated at the multilateral level and explained how the multilateral framework translates to the bilateral or regional levels through FTAs, we now turn to the third level of regulation made available in an international law context – international investment agreements (IIAs). IIAs are critical to capital movements and capital flows in that they create a specific legal framework with substantive provisions aimed at protecting and promoting cross-border investors and investment. Like the previous chapter, this chapter refers extensively to the four representative comprehensive treaties – CPTPP, USMCA, RCEP and CETA. Where applicable, reference is made to other agreements, and in particular agreements negotiated by developing countries. The main conclusion of the chapter is that modern IIAs contain a wide range of safeguards and limitations which effectively allow host governments to put CFMs into place in circumstances of financial instability and financial duress. Moreover, the chapter also details how arbitral tribunals have narrowly interpreted state obligations and given substantial deference to host states when applying exceptions. That being said, treaties are drafted differently and the language, terms and choices made in drafting a treaty can significantly affect obligations and outcomes.

The analysis in the substantive chapters of the book have led to the following six observations and concluding remarks: (1) the IMF has regulatory authority over capital controls; (2) The WTO is not an impediment to the implementation of CFMs; (3) modern FTAs and IIAs are not an impediment to the implementation of CFMs; (4) Investment Tribunals and WTO Dispute Settlement Panels have interpreted the prudential exception broadly, fairly and reasonably; (5) a CFM taken in accordance with IMF recommendations or guidance is unlikely to conflict with modern trade and investment agreements; and (6) there is a potential convergence between WTO and international investment law. A recurring theme is that the risk of IEL instruments constraining governments has been overstated. The main risk lies not so much in IEL agreements per se but in those agreements that do not incorporate modern drafting techniques which limit or condition State obligations or provide for a wide range of safeguards to ensure that legitimate CFMs do not run afoul of treaty obligations.