This chapter examines the contextual elements of article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the requirement that a prohibited ‘threat or use of force’ be in ‘international relations’. It analyses the meaning of this term and whether it requires that the object of a prohibited use of force be another State and draws conclusions about the types of acts that fall within and outside the scope of this term (and thus the scope of article 2(4)). The type of acts discussed include use of force on another State’s territory or against its extraterritorial sovereign manifestations, to reclaim disputed territory not within de facto control, those in violation of international demarcation lines, those directly arising from a political dispute between States, use of force by a State within its own territory against its own population, in the exercise of law enforcement jurisdiction against private foreign actors, against entities falling short of Statehood, those with no nexus to another State (such as against an international organisation or on terra nullius) and the use of force within a State’s own territory against small-scale incursion by another State’s armed forces.

This chapter begins by differentiating qualitative and quantitative research. While some have argued that these approaches are incommensurable paradigms, this chapter argues that they are commensurable but suited to answering different research questions. It introduces a typology of research questions, with six types of question – three qualitative (describing phenomena, theoretical framing, and generating explanations) and three quantitative (measuring phenomena, testing theory, and exploring explanations). The chapter ends by reviewing heuristics to help researchers generate novel and productive research questions.

The concept of freedom has been relatively neglected in anthropology. This chapter explores why and argues that freedom, especially when placed in tandem with care, is crucial for an anthropology of ethics, which is not focussed on rule-based morality but rather on the ways in which people work out what constitutes a life worth living and how to lead it. It makes this case both by drawing on emic invocations of freedom which often incorporate social critique and by analysing individual ethical choices via a family of concepts, which includes freedom, regard, care, and responsibility. This liberates ‘freedom’ from its associations with both individual autonomy and radical change, and enables us to focus more on its relational dimensions. If we think about ethical projects as attempts to move from an existing situation identified as unsatisfactory to a situation identified, on reflection, as better or good, we can see that an anthropology of ethics does not have to be confined to individual projects or religious projects of transcendence, but can take on board political projects of critique and transformation. We can then ask how people exercise the freedom or create the social conditions necessary to enact these projects.

Chapter 3 explains how any evaluation of effectiveness requires the measurement of goal realization. In order to understand what an effective remedy is and could be, it is thus necessary to know the purposes the effective remedy is to serve. The chapter proceeds by explaining how remedies may have different purposes which are connected to different functions in different manners. Further, even though the Court's case law reveals that Article 13 advocates a specific form of access to justice and that the primary purpose of the required redress is to correct individual justice, it remains uncertain to what extent Article 13, also, promotes other functions and purposes, for example, to what extent the access to justice required by Article 13 has independent procedural value apart from being a prerequisite for achieving redress, to what extent Article 13 must promote general and/or individual deterrence, and to what extent Article 13 has a function of promoting and regulating the relationship between the domestic and international levels by promoting, for example, subsidiarity and the rule of law.

Chapter 25 focuses on the translation of songs and other vocal music. Translations of songs may be required for various purposes – for singers to sing, for announcers to speak, for CD listeners to read, for singing students to study, and for display as surtitles at a performance. Since no translation is ideal for every purpose, translators need to choose strategies and options that best suit the end-users. Particularly complex is the ‘singable translation’ (singable in the target language) which is intended to fit a pre-existing melody – here translators are subject to unusual constraints, such as the need to achieve the right number of syllables and a workable rhythm. Often, a singable translation may include so many changes that the term ‘adaptation’ is more accurate than the term ‘translation’.

Chapter 13 argues for the central importance of translation to philosophy, which is ‘born translated’ and constantly renews itself through translation. It considers leading philosophical accounts of translation, focusing on the question of untranslatability, before addressing complementary ways in which translation studies as a discipline has been exercised by philosophical questions, especially concerning translation equivalence and the ethical duty of the translator. The chapter examines some of the purposes met by translations of philosophical texts, and some of the practical issues involved in translating philosophical texts by canonical German philosophers into English.

A tort is a wrongful act or omission, for which compensation or other remedy can be awarded to C (the claimant, or the person aggrieved) against D (the defendant, or tortfeasor). The corpus of Tort law, in general, excludes wrongs which are remediable as a breach of contract (albeit that some claims may give rise to concurrent liability in contract and in tort), a crime (albeit that occasionally a tort may also be a crime), an equitable cause of action, or a restitutionary cause of action.

Scholarly interest in the law of state responsibility has been on the rise during recent years, and increasingly so critical explorations. In contrast to much other literature this study adopts a comprehensive, critical approach to state responsibility in order to elicit discussions about state responsibility in the broader context of international responsibility. It explores the role and functions of state responsibility highlighting the fact that multiple purposes are ascribed to state responsibility ranging from its reparative function to the maintenance of world peace. It is argued that state responsibility no longer enjoys a unique position in international law and that its importance varies across the different branches of international law. International practice has developed away from one general law of wrongs. Specialized regimes have grown next to state responsibility that fare better in meeting the standard of functionality, which will be the basis for appraisal in this study.