This chapter situates the emergence of leniency programmes in competition law in the broader context of contemporary trends in business regulation. It is suggested that although leniency programmes are a distinctive form of regulatory intervention, they do exhibit a family resemblance with other regulatory mechanisms that have emerged in the last two decades in other fields of business regulation, and that similar trends, pressures and effects can be seen across different regulatory contexts. The four trends highlighted are a shift towards some form of negotiated justice, a new emphasis on regulatory experimentation, the creation of new forms of transnational legal risk, and the emerging importance of regulatory networks. The intention of this chapter is not to blur the distinction between these different developments, but rather to suggest that by locating leniency in the context of these broader trends, we can deepen our understanding of the significance of these developments.

Transnational private regulation (TPR) includes a large number of private regimes that regulate the behaviour of multinational firms and their interaction with investors, consumers, local communities. It consists of regulatory regimes designed and implemented by private actors, often in collaboration with international organisations. TPR standards are voluntary. TPR’s legitimacy is linked to and partly based on its effectiveness. Private and public regulation at transnational level are intertwined and international organizations play a significant function in making TPR effective. The chapter examines these regimes and tries identifying determinants of regulatory convergence and divergence. Convergence may concern procedural and/or substantive standards. Do private transnational regulatory models vary? Are they converging towards common characteristics? What are the factors determining divergences or convergences? The main question concerns the impact of international regulatory cooperation on divergence or convergence of transnational regulatory models. The paper demonstrates a correlation between forms and instruments of cooperation and modes of convergence. Firstly, the analysis shows that conventional comparative methodology used for state laws is unsuitable to compare transnational private regimes. Secondly the determinants of convergence or divergence of transnational regulatory models differ from those affecting the evolutionary patterns of State legal systems.

Corruption is a current and complex problem with significant effects on trade. For example, at the time of writing the US Justice Department was intervening in a case against a large a pharmaceutical company. It was alleged that the company was responsible for a scheme of drug price increases in the US, as it “ … bribed doctors and their staffs to increase sales.” The price of the drug, addressing infant seizure disorder, had increased 97,000% since the year 2000. Also, many of the affected sales were driven by Medicare reimbursements.1 This case suggests that corruption may:Corruption is also a concern in a global perspective. The UN Secretary-General António Guterres, when addressing the UN Security Council on the issue of corruption in post-war territories, stated that “Corruption robs schools, hospitals and others of vitally needed funds,” with negative effects on people’s rights, foreign investment, and the economy. Based on the World Economic Forum, the cost of corruption is at least $2.6 trillion, or five percent of the global gross domestic product (GDP). According to the World Bank, businesses and individuals pay more than $1 trillion in bribes every year.2 Finally, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), through its Clean Government Initiative, has identified at least four negative effects of corruption, namely:The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) builds upon international instruments on corruption. It addresses them differently, by adhering to their principles, encouraging their observance, or mandating their ratification or accession. The list of instruments includes (Art. 26.6)

In today’s broader context of resistance to the expansion of international trade, particularly in the United States (with its rejection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)) and the United Kingdom (with its rejection of the European Union), the regulatory coherence chapter of the TPP is highly relevant. Its cross-cutting sectoral approach and use of industry-specific annexes to reduce technical or regulatory barriers to trade is likely to serve as the model for all future multilateral trade treaties. Moreover, even though the TPP was rejected by the Trump administration, it later rose as the CPTPP. The United States may still participate in some form. Recently, the United Kingdom expressed an interest in becoming a party. Ambitious trade deals like the TPP sometimes take decades to finalize. In any case, both the substantive provisions and the architectural structure of a highly negotiated free trade agreement (FTA) like the TPP are quite enduring, so the TPP’s regulatory coherence mechanics are likely to re-surface in future FTAs. In other words, the current form of the TPP will serve as a model for any future TPP or similar mega-regional FTA.

The convergence of AI, robotics, 3D printing, blockchain and the Internet of Things into digitally connected networks of production, communication and consumption is driving the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Recent notifications of draft regulations to the TBT Committee show that Industry 4.0-related regulations are increasing in number and variety. There is a risk that the interconnectivity and interoperability required by Industry 4.0 could be hampered by discriminatory or unnecessarily divergent standards and regulations. This chapter discusses how the existing principles and disciplines in the TBT Agreement as well as practices and guidance developed by the WTO TBT Committee could help avoid unnecessary regulatory diversity and reduce trade costs. It argues that the TBT Agreement, by promoting global regulatory coherence (harmonization via international standardization) and global regulatory cooperation and convergence (via Good Regulatory Practices, Equivalence, Mutual Recognition), will assume even greater importance as standards and regulations are developed for Industry 4.0.

This chapter calls for caution in the US drive to negotiate new trade provisions to govern the digital economy. It is in four parts. Part I introduces the transformative nature of innovation in the data-driven economy. Part II presents the severe challenges posed by this development, including its contribution to monopolization, inequality, social control through surveillance, geopolitical competition between the United States and China, and system vulnerability. Part III assesses the current trade negotiating context involving competing models advanced by the United States (advocating free data flow), the European Union (promoting privacy regulation), and China (stressing sovereignty and the facilitation of trade in goods through e-commerce). Part IV presents a governance framework that calls for modesty in recognition of national differences and the severe challenges posed, while building institutions to foster deliberation and learning in light of uncertainty.

The accumulation of assets by charities enhances the risk of agency costs resulting from charity controllers shirking or acting in their own interests, such as by losing or misapplying accumulated funds or hoarding assets to increase their own prestige or job security. This chapter identifies that there is limited need for structural reform, although there may be some scope for improved administration by regulators so as to reduce agency costs. The chapter sketches key market mechanisms that work to reduce agency costs for many of the types of charities identified as potential sites of accumulation, such as universities, hospitals and fund-raising religious institutions. It then outlines the coordinated effect of the legal restraints discussed in Part II and considers whether there really are material gaps, particularly in jurisdictions such as Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand that have reformed their charity regulators. Finally, consideration is given to whether more coordinated action by existing regulators could fill any remaining gaps. Examples are provided from the United States, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom.