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9 - Enhanced Agency Costs

from Part III - Charities and Accumulation Reformed

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 July 2021

Ian Murray
Affiliation:
University of Western Australia, Perth
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Summary

The accumulation of assets by charities enhances the risk of agency costs resulting from charity controllers shirking or acting in their own interests, such as by losing or misapplying accumulated funds or hoarding assets to increase their own prestige or job security. This chapter identifies that there is limited need for structural reform, although there may be some scope for improved administration by regulators so as to reduce agency costs. The chapter sketches key market mechanisms that work to reduce agency costs for many of the types of charities identified as potential sites of accumulation, such as universities, hospitals and fund-raising religious institutions. It then outlines the coordinated effect of the legal restraints discussed in Part II and considers whether there really are material gaps, particularly in jurisdictions such as Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand that have reformed their charity regulators. Finally, consideration is given to whether more coordinated action by existing regulators could fill any remaining gaps. Examples are provided from the United States, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom.

Type
Chapter
Information
Charity Law and Accumulation
Maintaining an Intergenerational Balance
, pp. 257 - 271
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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  • Enhanced Agency Costs
  • Ian Murray, University of Western Australia, Perth
  • Book: Charity Law and Accumulation
  • Online publication: 23 July 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108854283.014
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  • Enhanced Agency Costs
  • Ian Murray, University of Western Australia, Perth
  • Book: Charity Law and Accumulation
  • Online publication: 23 July 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108854283.014
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Enhanced Agency Costs
  • Ian Murray, University of Western Australia, Perth
  • Book: Charity Law and Accumulation
  • Online publication: 23 July 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108854283.014
Available formats
×