This chapter examines whether agnosticism with respect to personal ontology should lead us toward agnosticism with respect to the possibility of life after death. Two afterlife scenarios are considered: resurrection and reincarnation. It is argued that all the major accounts of personal ontology are compatible with both resurrection and reincarnation, except for the non-self thesis, which is incompatible with resurrection. Various arguments for the conclusion that resurrection or reincarnation are impossible are considered and rejected. But it is argued that reincarnation faces a difficulty: the standard evidence cited for reincarnation, namely the presence of mental states apparently from a previous life, would, even if corroborated, not show that one is identical with someone from a previous life. What’s more, it would not provide any evidence for substance dualism.

Three Indian religions are considered, in the likely order of their origin. In each case a history and analysis are first offered before a specific issue is addressed in more detail. For Jainism it is the question of reincarnation. Here it is suggested that similar concerns for justice underly both Jainism’s almost physical embedding of karma in the universe and western theism’s postulation of a doctrine of resurrection. If so, it is what is scientifically and metaphysically possible which is in dispute (the status of soul and body) rather than different moral values. With Buddhism its moral approach is considered, partly through using Gavin Flood’s comparative study on asceticism and partly through drawing parallels with the influence of Stoicism on early Christian ethics. Finally, the impersonal character of the divine advocated in Sikhism is given sympathetic treatment through considering some issues raised by Neo-Platonism. Each of these questions will be considered further in subsequent chapters.

Socrates here draws on the cyclical and kinship arguments to further explain nearly every claim made earlier in the defense speech (Chapter 3). He provides an interconnected account of virtue, happiness, moral psychology, reincarnation, and soul–body interaction. He first describes how coming to know the divine will ultimately allow the philosopher’s soul to spend the afterlife with the gods, eternally happy. By contrast, non-philosophers reincarnate because their desire for the body-like pulls them into a new body after death. Understanding this mechanism requires clarifying how Socrates thinks of the impurities in non-philosophers’ souls. After examining this, the chapter turns to how the body deceives the soul into desiring things that are not good for it. Socrates develops the account of true courage and temperance from the exchange passage (69a–e) to explain how the philosopher avoids and resists the body’s insidious effects so that the soul can pursue wisdom and so be eternally happy.

This chapter highlights the close interconnection between cosmology and human nature in the Timaeus. According to Timaeus, human beings are not merely part of the cosmos; they play a crucial role in explaining how the cosmos came to be. The cosmos must contain three kinds of mortal beings in order to be complete, and all three derive from human beings, as a result of varying degrees of moral and cognitive failure. Recognizing the distinctive role human beings play in completing the cosmos complicates the standard picture of Timaeus’ cosmology, as well as his account of human nature. While in large part the cosmos is a product of divine craft, in some part it is the product of the inevitable disturbance of immortal souls due to mortal embodiment. Human beings have a special status as the first generation of mortal beings, as well as the only ones produced solely by divine craft. However, this distinction does not extend beyond the first generation, nor does it include any women. Ultimately, Timaeus’ account of human nature blurs the lines between humans and gods, as well as between humans and non-human animals.

This study examines the evidence for the celestial afterlife in Greek philosophy before Plato. Starting from Plato’s Phaedo myth, where we find evidence for three levels of life for souls (our level, the ‘aithêr-dwellers’ above us, and, above that, a more mysterious third level), it argues that such a stratified cosmos was not original to Plato, but can be found in certain of his predecessors. The two best-documented instances of it occur in Heraclitus and the new, Strasbourg papyrus of Empedocles. Both thinkers, in attempting to frame the place of soul in the order of nature, also adopt a stratified, hierarchical cosmic scheme, with rewards and demotions along the vertical axis. But they also thereby take up positions on the nature of soul: What stuff is it made of? Is it (essentially) immortal or not? And if not, can its immortality be secured? Against Plato’s later doctrine of an essentially immortal soul, both conceive of soul as somehow physical and, for different reasons, appear to deny its full or essential immortality.

The Jewish exegete Philo of Alexandria speaks of death and immortality in several different ways. He may refer to the higher or lower part of the soul or the body, and mean either moral or ontological death. Not all combinations are possible; e.g., Philo never says the soul’s leading part could cease to exist, and the body can neither undergo moral death nor avoid the physical one. Three types of Philonic discourse are discussed: human mortality caused by the body, the soul’s moral corruption that Philo calls its death, and the ontological immortality of the mind. Despite the last one, Philo speaks of attaining immortality. This is not an inconsistency but refers to the mind’s liberation from its mortal companions (the body and the mortal portion of the soul) so that only its congenital immortality remains. Attaining immortality also means the end of the repeated deaths in the cycle of reincarnation, and the mind’s restoration to its original state of blessedness.

This chapter examines parapsychology – the study of anomalous experience. It first distinguishes between telepathy, clairvoyance, ESP, psychokinesis (PK) and psi. It examines experimental evidence for psi, focussing on methodological difficulties in finding evidence for it, as well as at experimenter effects. It looks in particular at experiments in the Ganzfeld state as evidence for psi, and discusses meta-analyses of these experiments. We also look at remote viewing. We then look at spontaneous cases, including poltergeists. The chapter also looks at correlates of psi, in trait and state experiments. The chapter concludes with a survey of survival, particularly at the evidence for reincarnation.

Tor argues that Parmenides conceives of the soul as a hot, fiery, aethereal and divine thing, and that this notion plays an important role in his epistemology.

Chapter 7 describes a distinctively Indian phenomenon. The participation of individual autocrats (Kshatriyas) in the dialogues of the early Upanishads is associated with new metaphysical doctrines that will be shown to reflect monetisation. The social power that is interiorised in the construction of the unified inner self is in India (mainly) autocracy, whereas in Greece – where kingship is in decline – it is (mainly) monetary value.

Chapter 9 describes the earliest extant Indian beliefs about the afterlife, which were superseded by the idea of individually accumulated metaphysical merit accompanied by the danger of repeated death, which develops into the idea of subjection in the hereafter to a repeated cosmic cycle. All this prefigures the combination of individually accumulated karma with the universal cycle of reincarnation (sam?sara), from which escape was sought by various forms of renunciation. An important factor in these developments was the individual accumulation and universal circulation of money.

Chapter 10 begins with a critique of the best existing attempt (by Obeyesekere) to explain the origins of what I call ethicised indiscriminate reincarnation (EIR) in India and in Greece. But in my view any successful explanation cannot exclude monetisation, which also contributes to the importance of cyclicality in reincarnation, and to the advent of the widespread and persistent idea of individually accumulated karma. This requires reflection on the different roles of kinship in Greece and India.

Chapter 14 describes the opposition within early Greek metaphysics between the ontological privileging of (communal) circulation and of (individually owned) abstract value. Our three key processes of abstraction, monetisation and ritual are assessed as factors in the production of Parmenidean ‘reason’, a combination facilitated by the similarities between money and ritual, both of which contribute to the Greek doctrine of reincarnation, which was taught in mystic initiation and involved a cosmic projection (cosmisation) of monetised circulation.