Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Arguments against Substance Dualism, Part 1
- 3 Arguments against Substance Dualism, Part 2: Pairing Problems
- 4 Arguments for Substance Dualism
- 5 Interlude: What Exactly Is the Difference between Our Being Immaterial Souls and Our Being Composite Physical Objects?
- 6 Nonself, Part 1: Arguments against Our Existence
- 7 Nonself, Part 2: The Self Exists
- 8 Personal Ontology and Life after Death, Part 1: Resurrection, Reincarnation
- 9 Personal Ontology and Life after Death, Part 2: Mind Uploading
- References
- Index
8 - Personal Ontology and Life after Death, Part 1: Resurrection, Reincarnation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 March 2024
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Arguments against Substance Dualism, Part 1
- 3 Arguments against Substance Dualism, Part 2: Pairing Problems
- 4 Arguments for Substance Dualism
- 5 Interlude: What Exactly Is the Difference between Our Being Immaterial Souls and Our Being Composite Physical Objects?
- 6 Nonself, Part 1: Arguments against Our Existence
- 7 Nonself, Part 2: The Self Exists
- 8 Personal Ontology and Life after Death, Part 1: Resurrection, Reincarnation
- 9 Personal Ontology and Life after Death, Part 2: Mind Uploading
- References
- Index
Summary
This chapter examines whether agnosticism with respect to personal ontology should lead us toward agnosticism with respect to the possibility of life after death. Two afterlife scenarios are considered: resurrection and reincarnation. It is argued that all the major accounts of personal ontology are compatible with both resurrection and reincarnation, except for the non-self thesis, which is incompatible with resurrection. Various arguments for the conclusion that resurrection or reincarnation are impossible are considered and rejected. But it is argued that reincarnation faces a difficulty: the standard evidence cited for reincarnation, namely the presence of mental states apparently from a previous life, would, even if corroborated, not show that one is identical with someone from a previous life. What’s more, it would not provide any evidence for substance dualism.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Personal OntologyMystery and Its Consequences, pp. 159 - 181Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024