This article explores “religious racism,” or discrimination against devotees of African-derived religions in Brazil, as a broader pattern of structural racism rooted in racialized religious alterity, Afrophobia, and the epistemic divide between religion and nonreligion. The term religious racism has been proposed by some devotees and anti-racist activists to emphasize that Afro-Brazilian religions are uniquely targeted in ways other non-Christian religions are not. Unlike religious intolerance, the term religious racism explicitly connects discrimination against Afro-Brazilian religions to colonization, color or racial hierarchy, and anti-Black prejudice. This article clarifies the ideological groundings of religious racism that encourage Neo-Pentecostal extremists to pursue “order and progress,” as the national motto suggests, through physical violence.

O antipetismo explica o voto de pelo menos 40 por cento dos eleitores brasileiros para os quais a ideia de eleger o Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) é inadmissível. O antipetista típico tende a ser descrito pela literatura como sujeito branco, escolarizado e anticorrupção. Neste trabalho, argumento que os evangélicos pentecostais, em sua maioria eleitores não brancos e de baixa renda, formam uma sólida base antipetista. Isso ocorre porque os eleitores desse grupo associam ao PT um conjunto de pautas vistas como “identitárias” e “anti-família”. Para testar esse argumento, utilizo dados de quatro rodadas do LAPOP que permitem distinguir a filiação religiosa e analisar o comportamento eleitoral dos respondentes nas eleições realizadas entre 2002 e 2018. Os resultados indicam que os evangélicos pentecostais são menos propensos a (1) votar no PT nas eleições presidenciais; (2) manifestar sentimentos de simpatia em relação ao partido; (3) recompensá-lo nas urnas pelos ganhos em bem-estar induzidos pela implementação do programa Bolsa Família.

International conventions and domestic laws have been enacted to prevent, punish and eradicate violence against women worldwide. However, these progressive policy initiatives have faced opposition in contentious contexts where policy rivals have contested their creation and implementation. Existing scholarship focuses primarily on progressive networks that have led to policy advances, such as violence against women (VAW) policies, while emerging literature has noted their limited impact and implementation. However, there is scant attention paid to one major underlying cause of limited impact and problematic implementation: that there is sustained opposition to these policies by policy rivals that resist and undermine progressive policies. We identify opponents and entrenched opposition to VAW laws in Mexico and Nicaragua in the 1990s and 2010s. We also identify how these opponents leverage ties with the state and utilise ‘family discourse’, framing progressives as anti-family, as strategies and mechanisms for stunting and even reversing VAW laws.

Studies on the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40) have tended to emphasise popular support for the Cardenista regime while underestimating the domestic opposition to the president. The story of Enrique Rodríguez (‘El Tallarín’), a former Zapatista militant from the state of Morelos, reveals the breadth and complexity of the opposition to Cárdenas. The rebellion led by Rodríguez from 1934 to 1938 forced Cárdenas to renegotiate the terms of Zapatista loyalty to the federal government in order to secure peace in Morelos and represented a broad critique of the post-revolutionary state's advancement during the 1930s. Rodríguez stood as a defender of agrarian self-reliance, traditional chieftainship and pueblo religious liberty.

This article addresses the various mechanisms by which the religious figure of the Christian martyr became a useful notion in Argentine political discourse. It argues that the process by which the idea of the ‘martyr’ was secularised and politicised was actually initiated by religious agents themselves. The analysis considers how commemoration initiatives devised by religious agents, social movements and political actors have brought ‘Catholic martyrs’ into the pantheon of national symbols. It also deals with the various semantic shifts seen in the public discourses of religious agents themselves, shifts that extend the boundaries of an eminently religious category by associating it with other figures in a more specifically political imaginary, such as that of the hero and the victim. The article shows how the political power of the religious figure of the martyr lay in the way various actors could use it to invoke the image of a legitimate and heroic victim of political violence. It thus allowed those actors to sidestep the vexed public question of whether those being commemorated had had any involvement in armed struggle.