The ways that psychopathology manifests in adolescence have shifted dramatically over the past twenty-five years, with rates of many externalizing behaviors declining substantially while rates of anxiety and depressive disorders have skyrocketed. This paper argues that understanding these changes requires rethinking the field’s historically somewhat negative views of intense peer connections, peer influences, and adolescent risk-taking behavior. It is argued that intense peer connections are critical to development, and that peer influence and risk taking have important, often overlooked, adaptive components. The shift in observed manifestations of adolescent psychopathology over this period can be viewed at least partly in terms of a shift away from strong peer connections and toward greater risk aversion. Implications for research and intervention based on a focus on the adaptive aspects of peer influences and risk taking are discussed.

Prior research on self-other differences involving risk have found that individuals make riskier decisions for others than for the self in situations where risk taking is valued. We expand this research by examining whether the direction of self-other differences reverses when risk aversion is valued, as predicted by social values theory (Stone & Allgaier, 2008). Two studies tested for self-other differences in physical safety scenarios, a domain where risk aversion is valued. In Study 1, participants read physical safety and romantic relationship scenarios and selected what they would decide for themselves, what they would decide for a friend, or what they would predict their friend would decide. In Study 2, participants read public health scenarios and either decided or predicted for themselves and for a friend. In keeping with social values theory, participants made more risk-averse decisions for others than for themselves in situations where risk aversion is valued (physical safety scenarios) but more risk-taking decisions for others than for themselves in situations where risk taking is valued (relationship scenarios). Further, we show that these self-other differences in decision making do not arise from incorrectly predicting others’ behaviors, as participants predicted that others’ decisions regarding physical safety scenarios would be either similar (Experiment 1) or more risk taking (Experiment 2) than their own decisions.

Are people honest about the extent to which they engage in unethical behaviors? We report an experiment examining the relation between self-reported risky unethical tendencies and actual dishonest behavior. Participants’ self-reported risk taking tendencies were assessed using the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) questionnaire, while actual self-serving dishonesty was assessed using a private coin tossing task. In this task, participants predicted the outcome of coin tosses, held the predictions in mind, and reported whether their predictions were correct. Thus, the task allowed participants to lie about whether their predictions were correct. We manipulated whether reporting higher correct scores increased (vs. not) participants monetary payoff. Results revealed a positive relation between self-reported unethical risky tendencies and actual dishonesty. The effect was limited to the condition in which dishonesty was self-serving. Our results suggest liars are aware of their dishonest tendencies and are potentially not ashamed of them.

Earlier frameworks have indicated that older adults tend to experience decline intheir deliberative decisional capacity, while their affective abilities tend toremain intact (Peters, Hess, Västfjäll, & Auman, 2007). Thepresent study applied this framework to the study of risky decision-makingacross the lifespan. Two versions of the Columbia Card Task (CCT) were used totrigger either affective decision-making (i.e., the “warm” CCT) ordeliberative decision-making (i.e., the “cold” CCT) in a sample of158 individuals across the lifespan. Overall there were no age differences inrisk seeking. However, there was a significant interaction between age andcondition, such that older adults were relatively more risk seeking in the coldcondition only. In terms of everyday decision-making, context matters and riskpropensity may shift within older adults depending upon the context.

Preferences about delayed rewards and preferences about risk are central to the literature on decision making. Several proposals suggest that such preferences arise from a single process and thus predict strong associations between preferences about delay and risk. Although there is a wealth of data on this association, the evidence is inconclusive; some studies have reported significant associations but many have not. Consequently, it is unclear whether the association between delay preferences and risk preferences is strong enough to support single-process theories. To further explore this question, we took a meta-analytic approach surveying 26 studies totaling 32 effect sizes. Results reveal a small to moderate association between risk preferences and delay preferences. This result provides little support for existing proposals because the observed relationship is no stronger than associations observed between either delay preferences or risk preferences and other variables. Moderating variables provide some explanation for inconsistencies across studies. Implications, including the apparent discrepancy between this literature and the conventional construct of impulsivity, are also discussed.

Prospect Theory predicts that people tend to be more risk seeking if their reference point is perceived as a loss and more risk averse when the reference point is perceived as a gain. In line with this prediction, Franken, Georgieva, Muris and Dijksterhuis (2006) showed that young adults who had a prior experience of monetary gains make more safe choices on subsequent decisions than subjects who had an early experience of losses. There are no experimental studies on how experiencing prior gains and losses differently influences young and older adults on a subsequent decision-making task (the Iowa Gambling Task). Hence, in the current paper, adapting the methodology employed by Franken et al.’s (2006), we intended to test the generality of their effect across the life span. Overall, we found that subjects who experienced prior monetary gains or prior monetary losses did not display significant differences in safe/risky choices on subsequent performance in the Iowa Gambling task. Furthermore, the impact of prior gains and losses on risky/safe card selection did not significantly differ between young and older adults. These results showed that the effect found in the Franken et al.’s study (2006) is limited in its generality.

This paper proposes a revised version of the original Domain-Specific Risk-Taking(DOSPERT) scale developed by Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002) that is shorter andapplicable to a {broader range of ages, cultures, and educational levels}. Italso provides a French translation of the revised scale. Using multilevelmodeling, we investigated the risk-return relationship between apparent risktaking and risk perception in 5 risk domains. The results replicate previouslynoted differences in reported degree of risk taking and risk perception at themean level of analysis. The multilevel modeling shows, more interestingly, thatwithin-participants variation in risk taking across the 5 content domains of thescale was about 7 times as large as between-participants variation. We discussthe implications of our findings in terms of the person-situation debate relatedto risk attitude as a stable trait.

Anticipated regret is an important determinant in risky decision making, however only a few studies have explored its role in problem gambling. This study tested for differences in the anticipation of regret among social and problem gamblers and examined how these differences affect risk preferences in a gambling task. The extent of problem gambling was assessed using the South Oaks Gambling Screen and participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the risky feedback condition, the feeling of regret was avoided by choosing the risky gamble, whereas in the safe feedback condition the safe gamble was the regret-minimizing option. Problem gambling was associated with the choice of the risky gamble in both conditions indicating less sensitivity to anticipated regret. It was also associated with risk seeking across feedback conditions when the stakes of winning and loosing were higher. These findings suggest that less regret or the poor anticipation of regret might contribute to excessive gambling and thus need to be addressed in cognitive treatments of problem gambling.

Objectives: Several studies on human risk taking and risk aversion have reported the involvement of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Yet, current knowledge of the neural mechanisms of risk-related decision making is not conclusive, mainly relying on studies using non-motor tasks. Here we examine how modulation of DLPFC activity by repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) affects risk-taking behavior during a motor response task. Methods: One-Hertz rTMS to the right DLPFC was applied to monitor risk-taking and risk-aversion performance during a goal-directed risky task with motor response. Healthy participants were instructed to aim for a high score by throwing a ball as close to the ceiling as possible, while avoiding touching the ceiling with the ball. Results: One-Hertz rTMS stimulation to the right DLPFC significantly increased the frequency of ceiling hits, compared to Sham-stimulation. Conclusions: Our results suggest that the right DLPFC is a valid target for manipulating risky behavior in tasks with a motor-response. Following rTMS stimulation participants' preference shifts toward immediate awards, while becoming significantly less sensitive to potential negative consequences. The results confirm that the right DLPFC is involved in impulse control in goal-directed executive tasks. (JINS, 2019, 25, 72–78)

Previous research suggests that social comparisons affect decision making under uncertainty. However, the role of the length of the social interaction for this relationship remains unknown. This experiment tests the effect of social comparisons on financial risk taking and how this effect is modulated by whether social encounters are sporadic or repeated. Participants carried out a computer task consisting of a series of binary choices between lotteries of varying profitability and risk, with real monetary stakes. After each decision, participants could compare their own payoff to that of a counterpart who made the same decision at the same time and whose choices/earnings did not affect the participants’ earnings. The design comprised three between-subjects treatments which differed in the nature of the social interaction: participants were informed that they would be matched with either (a) a different participant in each trial, (b) the same participant across all trials, or (c) a “virtual participant”, i.e., a computer algorithm. Compared to the non-social condition (c), subjects in both social conditions (a and b) chose lotteries with lower expected value (z = –3.10, p < .01) and higher outcome variance (z = 2.13, p = .03). However, no differences were found between the two social conditions (z = 1.15, p = .25 and z = 0.35, p = .73, respectively). These results indicate that social comparison information per se leads to poorer and riskier financial decisions, irrespective of whether or not the referent other is encountered repeatedly.

We used an open-ended survey to elicit Spanish young adults' perceptions of the benefits and drawbacks of speeding and not wearing a seatbelt (or helmet).Around half of the sample reported past engagement in these two risky behaviors, although forecasted engagement was low. Past and forecasted risk taking were positively correlated. Participants provided more drawbacks than benefits of each risky behavior. Drawbacks typically referred to a combination of behavioral acts and social reactions (e.g., accident, punishment) that occurred during the journey. By contrast, benefits largely referred to personal effects (e.g., save time, comfort) that occurred after the journey had ended (speeding) or during the journey (not wearing a seatbelt/helmet). These findings contribute to our theoretical understanding of young adults' risk taking on the road, and to the development of road safety programs.

Against a background of decreasing age at sexual debut, local Brook staff voiced concerns about the increase in clinic attenders under the age of 14 years, who appeared to engage in risky behaviours. This exploratory study, carried out with service providers in a young persons sexual health clinic, aimed to discover what issues staff felt were important to 11–14 year-old girls, in order that a future study be conducted with the young girls themselves. Service providers from two Brook Advisory Centres were interviewed. The interviews were semi-structured and analysed using content analysis. Many of the issues that staff identified as important to young girls mirrored current research findings with older adolescents. These were: alcohol consumption, peer pressure, low self-esteem and confidence, and a lack of knowledge around sexually transmitted infections. However, a new issue to emerge was the high proportion of young girls attending the clinic for the emergency contraceptive pill despite not knowing whether they had had intercourse or not. The study also found that staff perceived the need to understand issues from the perspective of the young girls themselves.

Staff identified a necessity for improved sex education and education around peer pressure and assertiveness, whilst topics for future research which emerged from the study findings included issues of self-esteem, dynamics of peer/media pressure and why young girls feel that they need to have sex.

Subarachnoid hemorrhage (SAH) survivors often report psychosocial and emotional changes, including a diminished capacity for decision making. However, systematic investigations into the nature of the changes have been limited to those patients surviving SAH secondary to aneurysms of the anterior communicating artery. This study aimed to explore the nature of decision making in survivors of SAH secondary to aneurysms of the middle cerebral or posterior communicating artery using a series of computerized tasks. Twenty SAH survivors and 20 matched controls completed a battery of computerized decision-making tasks. These included tasks examining an individual's ability to make probabilistic choices and risk-taking behavior, as well as tasks examining aspects of impulsivity. The results revealed two key patterns of abnormal decision-making behavior in the SAH survivors: altered sensitivity to both reward and punishment, and impulsive responding. These complex deficits may contribute to difficulties in daily living resulting from apathy, poor judgment, or inhibition in SAH survivors. (JINS, 2006, 12, 697–706.)