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Nuclear deterrence strategies are predicated on nuclear use scenarios. However, as nuclear weapons haven’t been used since 1945, why does use occur in scenarios but not in practice? If scenarios incorporated the political challenges of crossing the nuclear threshold, how would this change the utility of the deterrence strategies they support? To address these questions, this article examines Cold War-era American debates about a Soviet ‘first strike’, discusses the limits of technical critiques of nuclear use scenarios, and argues for an alternative approach to scenario design and criticism that includes political factors observable in crises and wars involving nuclear states.
The integration of sustainability into highly uncertain technology development is key to support manufacturing companies to reduce their environmental impacts. The use of future scenarios to support decision-making in early design for sustainability is promising, but there is a lack of systematic guidelines on how to build them. Through literature review and empirical research scenario-building guidelines were designed. The guidelines are step-by-step activities to be performed in workshops. Results suggest the guidelines were successful in building consistent, plausible, and useful scenarios.
Future scenarios are intermediary artefacts for mid- and long-term design of complex solutions, e.g., to improve urban mobility systems. They allow designers to explore possible alternatives and incorporate uncertainty in the process. While their making is widely studied and implemented in scenario planning, their assessment got little attention. To find out which characteristics of scenarios we can assess, we conducted interviews and an expert workshop. This results in a scenario assessment framework of 3 levels: Assessment of system impact, evaluation of impact on practitioners and quality assurance. We focus on the latter as it represents the key gap and established a checklist for it. We distinguish between the level of engagement, i.e., scenario makers and users who adapt existing sets (or archetypes). Finally, we provide a checklist to aid ensuring that when choosing existing scenario sets, key criteria are fulfilled. This shall enable designers to better integrate scenarios in their workflows. We provide examples of designing mobility solutions. Yet, the findings can be applied to all disciplines where scenarios can aid design processes but are so far limited due to the resources needed for creating meaningful scenarios.
Climate change has an impact on soybean production in the USA, necessitating thorough impact studies across broad geographic areas and extended periods to develop appropriate coping strategies. This study investigates the simulated response of soybean in ten major soybean-growing states of the USA under Climate Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 based on multiple global climate models, two representative concentration pathways [RCP8.5 and RCP4.5] under rainfed and irrigated conditions for 2013–2039, 2043–2069, 2063–2099. The future climate series was developed using Agricultural Model Intercomparison and Improvement Project protocol by applying mean and variability, and CROPGRO-soybean model was explored for soybean simulation under 400 ppm CO2 level and a set of management. Under future climate, intense changes in temperature, precipitation amount and variability are anticipated under RCP8.5 than RCP4.5. As a result, a shorter life cycle, more evapotranspiration, lower grain production, higher water consumption and water productivity were expected under RCP8.5 than RCP4.5 scenarios. A higher reduction in grain yield and water productivity is expected under rainfed than irrigated conditions and intensity increases with advancement towards end of the century. Irrigation tends to decrease adverse climate change effects; however, the marginal economy for irrigation water must be assessed. Since the northern states under study are likely to experience increased grain yields or lower negative impacts, these areas could be the major production zones for soybean production in the future if only climate change is taken into account. Before reaching a convincing conclusion, different adaptation strategies must be thoroughly investigated.
Scenarios are among the most visible and widely used products of the IPCC. Many kinds of scenarios are used in climate research, but emissions scenarios and the socio-economic assumptions that underpin them have a distinct status because the IPCC orchestrated their development. They have evolved from assessment cycle to assessment cycle and serve as ‘boundary objects’ across Working Groups and as instruments of policy relevance. The field of Integrated Assessment Modelling has emerged to produce these scenarios, thereby taking centre stage within the IPCC assessment process. Because these scenarios harmonise assumptions about the future across disciplines, they are essential tools for the IPCC’s production of a shared assessment of climate research and for ensuring the policy relevance of this assessment. Yet, the reliance on a relatively small set of complex models to generate scenarios spurs concerns about transparency, black-boxed assumptions, and the power of IAMs to define the ‘possibility space’.
Relationships between extractive industries and local northern communities are under intensive discussion. Scenarios are a way to explore uncertain futures and have been used for envisioning potential consequences of climate-related and political changes in the Arctic. However, existing Arctic scenarios do not target the relationship between extractive industries and local communities. By combining a review of published scenarios with insights from a series of scenario workshops carried out across Nordic Arctic, we have identified a series of wild cards that would have major implications for relations between extractive projects and local communities. By connecting these to existing general scenario archetypes, we enrich the established scenario narratives on plausible Arctic futures. We furthermore suggest linking participatory scenario exercises with efforts to elucidate the impacts of different drivers of change to examine the social-ecological-technological systems in which mining and local communities are embedded. Such efforts would be relevant for developing a more robust and anticipatory/proactive knowledge base for making political decisions about extractive industries.
Climate change adaptation demands a deeper appreciation of plural senses of place and how these pluralities can create synergies as well as frictions in adaptation practice. In this chapter we aim to explore one highly overlooked dimension of this global challenge – the plural temporalities embedded within senses of place. Here we explore the dimensions of time in place-focused adaptation efforts by drawing on a series of case studies that utilise scenario-based futures methods. These methods have rapidly become critical tools in tackling the exigencies of the climate crisis but too often they presume a singular temporal mode and marginalise other temporalities and senses of place. This chapter concludes by offering new ways to reconceptualise plural senses of place and time in both theory and practice.
Will we, by 2050, be able to feed a rapidly growing population with healthy and sustainably grown food in a world threatened by systemic environmental crises? There are too many uncertainties for us to predict the long-term evolution of the global agri-food system, but we can explore a wide range of futures to inform policymaking and public debate on the future of food. This is typically done by creating scenarios (story lines that vividly describe what different futures could look like) and quantifying them with computer simulation models to get numerical estimates of how different aspects of the global agri-food system might evolve under different hypotheses. Among the many scenarios produced over the last twenty years, one would expect to see the future advocated by the food sovereignty movement, which claims to represent roughly two hundred million self-described “peasants” (small farmers) worldwide. This movement defends a vision of the future based on relocalized, sustainable, and just agri-food systems, self-governed through direct and participatory democratic processes. Yet, food sovereignty is conspicuously absent from quantified scenarios of global food futures. As part of the roundtable, “Ethics and the Future of the Global Food System,” this essay identifies seven obstacles that undermine the creation of food sovereignty scenarios by examining two attempts at crafting such scenarios.
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) provide an integrated and ambitious roadmap for sustainable development by 2030. National implementation will be crucial and there is an urgent need to understand the scale and pace of transformations to achieve the goals. There is also concern that achieving socio-economic objectives will undermine longer-term environmental sustainability. This study uses modelling to explore how different policy and investment settings can enable the necessary transformations, adopting Fiji as a use-case. Modest investment over the coming decade can deliver improved performance. However, far more ambitious actions are needed to accelerate progress while managing long-term trade-offs with environmental objectives.
Technical summary
This paper presents the results from a national scenario modelling study for Fiji with broader relevance for other countries seeking to achieve the SDGs. We develop and simulate a business-as-usual and six alternative future scenarios using the integrated (iSDG-Fiji) system dynamics model and evaluate their performance on the SDGs in 2030 and global planetary boundaries (PBs) and the ‘safe and just space’ (SJS) framework in 2050. Modest investment over the coming decade through a ‘sustainability transition’ scenario accelerates SDG progress from 40% to 70% by 2030 but fails to meet all SJS thresholds. Greatly scaling up investment and ambition through an SDG transformation scenario highlights possibilities for Fiji to accelerate progress to 83% by 2030 while improving SJS performance. The scale of investment is highly ambitious and could not be delivered without scaled-up international support, but despite this investment progress still falls short. The analysis highlights where key trade-offs remain as well as options to address these, however closing the gap to 100% achievement will prove very challenging. The approach and findings are relevant to other countries with similar characteristics to increase the understanding of the transformations needed to achieve the SDGs within PBs in different country contexts.
Social media summary
How can countries accelerate progress on the SDGs by 2030 while ensuring longer-term coherence with climate and sustainability thresholds?
There have been calls for the expansion of protected areas (PAs) to tackle the ongoing biodiversity loss, yet it is unclear where future PAs might help to protect biodiversity in degraded landscapes under the conservation planning principles of complementarity, connectivity and cost-effectiveness. Our conservation goal is to increase the PA network coverage to up to 30% of the landscape of the Zhangjiang River Basin for target species in the karst area of southwest China, a global biodiversity hotspot. Zonation 4GUI was used to evaluate the adequacy of current PAs and to strategically expand PAs while maximizing the coverage of target species and considering ecological integrity and socioeconomic activities. The results show that significant habitat degradation has occurred across 77.9% of the basin. The current PAs cover 6.3% of the site and represent 8.7% of the total distribution of key species. With regards to the threshold of protection of 30% of the area, protecting an additional 27.2% of the site under an ecological integrity prioritization scenario and a scenario of the socioeconomic costs involved in iteration would cover 93.5% and 80.4% of the ranges of the key species, respectively. Our results can be used to inform the upcoming actions associated with karst area conservation-related policies.
This article examines the history of the Royal Dutch Shell scenarios, from the first horizon scan exercise in 1967. It proposes that forward-looking scenarios were integrated in planning at Shell as tools for managing uncertainty in global time and space relations of oil after 1967. Specifically, the article proposes that Shell strategically used the scenarios to respond to arguments, emanating both from OPEC and from the Club of Rome, of oil as a limited resource. Shell used the scenarios to create images of a future oil market dominated by innovation, creativity, and sustainable solutions.
In this chapter the research question is answered but, more importantly, three scenarios as sketched concerning the way to move forward: cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. The cooperative scenario is an informal inter-organisational relationship lacking a common mission, structure or joint planning but focuses mostly on improving the current information exchange, for example, by the publication of more (translated) documents and enhancing current digital platforms. In the coordination scenario the CJEU and Supreme Administrative Courts are going to work together more actively to advance their separate, yet compatible missions to advance the working of the preliminary reference procedure via more formalized communication channels and a more active role for national courts, for example, as amicus curiae. In the third scenario, national Supreme Courts become European courts and not only from the receiving end. They will be given a more prominent role in filtering, synthesizing and distributing preliminary questions from lower courts and become decentralized EU courts dealing with most bulk cases that currently fill the docket of the CJEU. This would enable the Luxembourg court to develop into a real constitutional court of the EU with less attention for dispute resolution and more attention for judicial law making.
The world agreed to achieve 17 Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. Nine planetary boundaries set an upper limit to Earth system impacts of human activity in the long run. Conventional efforts to achieve the 14 socio-economic goals will raise pressure on planetary boundaries, moving the world away from the three environmental SDGs. We have created a simple model, Earth3, to measure how much environmental damage follows from achievement of the 14 socio-economic goals, and we propose an index to track effects on people's wellbeing. Extraordinary efforts will be needed to achieve all SDGs within planetary boundaries.
The conclusions are drawn by identifying the range of possibilities contained in the current crisis. Positive and negative economic trends are documented. Populism is shown to be endemic in representative institutions. Deep social and cultural roots of the crisis are emphasized.
In 1975, the OECD created a research committee entitled ‘Interfutures. Research project into the development of the advanced industrial societies in harmony with the developing world’. The purpose of Interfutures was to examine how the new tools of futures research could be put to use in order to shape strategies for dealing with a new phenomenon of ‘interdependence’, and to set out a ‘long-term vision’ of the Western world. This article argues that Interfutures was appointed in order to draft an alternative image of the future to two radical visions of the early 1970s. The first was the so-called New International Economic Order. The second was the 1972 Club of Rome report, The limits to growth. As a response to these two visions, Interfutures presented a vision of globalization as a process oriented around an expanding world market, piloted by Western interests and continued resource extraction.
Global food security, livestock production and animal health are inextricably bound. However, our focus on the future tends to disaggregate food and health into largely separate domains. Indeed, much foresight work is either food systems or health-based with little overlap in terms of predictions or narratives. Work on animal health is no exception. Part of the problem is the fundamental misunderstanding of the role, nature and impact of the modern futures tool kit. Here, I outline three key issues in futures research ranging from methodological confusion over the application of scenarios to the failure to effectively integrate multiple methodologies to the gap between the need for more evidence and power and control over futures processes. At its core, however, a better understanding of the narrative and worldview framing much of the futures work in animal health is required to enhance the value and impact of such exercises.
Functions are important in designing. However, several issues hinder progress with the understanding and usage of functions: lack of a clear and overarching definition of function, lack of overall justifications for the inevitability of the multiple views of function, and scarcity of systematic attempts to relate these views with one another. To help resolve these, the objectives of this research are to propose a common definition of function that underlies the multiple views in literature and to identify and validate the views of function that are logically justified to be present in designing. Function is defined as a change intended by designers between two scenarios: before and after the introduction of the design. A framework is proposed that comprises the above definition of function and an empirically validated model of designing, extended generate, evaluate, modify, and select of state-change, and an action, part, phenomenon, input, organ, and effect model of causality (Known as GEMS of SAPPhIRE), comprising the views of activity, outcome, requirement–solution–information, and system–environment. The framework is used to identify the logically possible views of function in the context of designing and is validated by comparing these with the views of function in the literature. Describing the different views of function using the proposed framework should enable comparisons and determine relationships among the various views, leading to better understanding and usage of functions in designing.
The implementation of an international programme for reducing carbon emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) can help to mitigate climate change and bring numerous benefits to environmental conservation. Information on land change modelling and carbon mapping can contribute to quantify future carbon emissions from deforestation. However limitations in data availability and technical capabilities may constitute an obstacle for countries interested in participating in the REDD programme. This paper evaluates the influence of quantity and allocation of mapped carbon stocks and expected deforestation on the prediction of carbon emissions from deforestation. The paper introduces the conceptual space where quantity and allocation are involved in predicting carbon emissions, and then uses the concepts to predict carbon emissions in the Brazilian Amazon, using previously published information about carbon mapping and deforestation modelling. Results showed that variation in quantity of carbon among carbon maps was the most influential component of uncertainty, followed by quantity of predicted deforestation. Spatial allocation of carbon within carbon maps was less influential than quantity of carbon in the maps. For most of the carbon maps, spatial allocation of deforestation had a minor but variable effect on the prediction of carbon emissions relative to the other components. The influence of spatial carbon allocation reaches its maximum when 50% of the initial forest area is deforested. The method can be applied to other case studies to evaluate the interacting effects of quantity and allocation of carbon with future deforestation on the prediction of carbon emissions from deforestation.
For approximately the past ten years, the European poultry sector has faced both competition from new poultry-exporting countries and growing societal concerns about animal welfare, food safety, and environmental impacts of production systems. On a global scale, poultry production increased nearly 4% per year during that period. Although it increased slightly in the European Union (EU) as a whole, largely owing to the integration of new EU member states, in some EU countries such as France it decreased by up to 20%. This caused concern among public and private stakeholders, especially poultry farmers, about the future of poultry farming in their countries. To help French stakeholders design strategies for the future, a technical institute (ITAVI) and a research institute (INRA) conducted a scenario-building exercise. Based on interviews with stakeholders and an 18-month-long series of discussions by a panel of poultry experts, four future scenarios were developed. Rather than simply extending current trends, they took into account uncertainties such as potential shifts in European policies and regulations, consumer attitudes, and stakeholder strategies. The main economic, social, environmental, and food-safety lessons of this exploration are presented here from a European perspective. More specifically, the implications of these scenarios for future research are highlighted. Although no scenario envisages strong production growth by 2025, all emphasise the importance of multidisciplinary research to characterise the quality and sustainability of poultry production, which in turn can improve its competitiveness.